Greater Goods: Morality and Attitudes toward the Use of Nuclear Weapons

• Author: Rachel Stein,Brian C. Rathbun
• DOI: 10.1177/0022002719879994
• Date: 01 May 2020
• Published date: 01 May 2020
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Greater Goods: Morality

and Attitudes toward

the Use of Nuclear

Weapons

Brian C. Rathbun

1

and Rachel Stein

2

Abstract

Recent research into the public’s attitude toward the use of nuclear weapons

repeats long-standing mistakes in how international relations theorists think about

morality. Falsely equating consequentialism with state egoism and normative obli-

gations with restrictions on the use of weapons of mass destruction implies that

ethically motivated beliefs about foreign affairs must be other-regarding and that

other-regarding behavior is not utilitarian in character. Drawing on empirical

research into moral psychology, we argue that liberal, other-regarding morality is

only one kind of ethical foundation. Alternative moral concerns such as retribution,

deference to authority, and in-group loyalty also help to determine foreign policy

beliefs. We find that all three are associated with support for the use of nuclear

weapons in the American public. Our survey respondents act as moral utilitarians

who weigh different ethical considerations in forming their judgments.

Keywords

public opinion, belief structure, civilian casualties, foreign policy decision-making

1

Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Southern California,

Los Angeles, CA, USA

2

Department of Political Science, George Washington University, DC, USA

Corresponding Author:

Brian C. Rathbun, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Southern

California, 3518 Trousdale Parkway, Los Angeles, CA 90089, USA.

Email: brathbun@usc.edu

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2020, Vol. 64(5) 787-816

ªThe Author(s) 2019

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DOI: 10.1177/0022002719879994

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The debate over whether there is a “taboo” against the use of nuclear weapons has

recently taken a behavioral turn. Proponents of the nuclear taboo argue that the

nonuse of nuclear weapons since 1945 can be attributed to the “logic of appro-

priateness,” in which states are restrained by an ethical compunction against the use

of nuclear weapons whichrests in part on the internalization of an antinuclear normin

the mass public (Tannenwald 1999, 2005,2007). In contrast, recent articles by Press,

Sagan, and Valentino (2013) and Sagan and Valentino (2017) seem to offer compel-

ling evidence against the existence of a nuclear taboo at the level of public opinion,

arguing instead that Americans’ attitudes toward nuclear weapons are shaped by the

“logic of consequences.” Americans seem to weigh the costs and benefits for the

United States and are willing to supportthe use of nuclear weapons when they offer a

significant military advantage. Thus, Press, Sagan, and Valentino (2013) conclude

that concerns about the morality of nuclearweapons “take a back seat to assessments

of their advantages and disadvantages compared to other military options” and that

American presidents are consequently less constrained in their ability to threaten or

use nuclear arms than has been assumed by the taboo school (p. 4).

This article argues that framing this latest iteration of the debate as a contest

between the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness obscures the role

played by ethical considerations in forming foreign policy attitudes, a mistake that is

common in the field of international relations more generally. The broader literature

on norms and morality in international relations typically conflates or equates con-

sequentialism with egoism and appropriateness with other-regarding behavior, lead-

ing to two misconceptions about the nature of morality. First, if moral action is

always other-regarding, then national egoism must always be amoral or immoral.

Second, if consequentialism is always egoistic, then moral action cannot be con-

sequentialist in character but instead must be deontological (i.e., based on the appli-

cation of rules) rather than utilitarian.

The presumption that egoistic behavior cannot be moral is based on an impover-

ished understanding of the diversity of human morality, one common in the field.

Morality is typically defined in a “liberal” way, in which ethical action is that which

does not harm others (Price 2008, 192). However, morality can also be nonliberal as

demonstrated by the moral foundations research program, which has shown that

many people think about morality in terms of the “binding foundations” of deference

to authority, loyalty to the in-group, and the maintenance of purity (Graham et al.

2011; Koleva et al. 2012). Similarly, studies have shown that retribution—the belief

that wrongs deserve to be repaid—is also an important moral value that influences

both private behavior and political opinions (Tripp and Bies 2009; Carlsmith and

Darley 2008; Aharoni and Fridlund 2012). These values influence support for the use

of military force under a wide variety of circumstances (Kertzer et al. 2014; Liber-

man 2006, 2013), and we extend and apply this research to the use of nuclear

weapons.

However, rather than acting as strict rules that must be applied regardless of the

outcome, both nonliberal and liberal values act as distinct moral lenses through

788 Journal of Conflict Resolution 64(5)