Governors, Bureaus, and State Policymaking

• Date: 01 December 1999
• Author: Charles Barrilleaux
• DOI: 10.1177/0160323X9903100105
• Published date: 01 December 1999
• Subject Matter: A Research Note

State and Local Government Review
Vol. 31, No. 1 (Winter 1999): 53-59
A RESEARCH NOTE
Governors, Bureaus, and State Policymaking
Charles Barrilleaux
CASE STUDIES of American state and do so. If only legislatures and opinion mat-
national policymaking underline
ter, the design of political institutions in the
the importance of both legislative
states is seriously flawed, as are the con-
and executive branch actions in determining
clusions of research that ascribe meaningful
policy outcomes. Despite the existing evi-
policymaking roles to the executive branch
dence for gubernatorial influence, much re-
(e.g., Lowi 1969).
search on state policymaking focuses solely
on the influence of one state political insti-
Governors and Executives
tution—the legislature. In this article, mea-
as Policymakers
sures of gubernatorial and executive branch
characteristics are added to a model of state
Some observers depict governors as being
policy liberalism by Erikson, Wright, and Mc-
central to policymaking, partly due to per-
Iver (1989; 1993), which focuses on citizen
sonal characteristics or political circumstances
and legislative ideology and on party legisla-
but also to the powers that state constitu-
tive strength as forces that determine the lib-
tions grant them (Brace 1993; Sabato 1983;
eralism of state policies.
Ransone 1985; Beyle 1988; 1990; Morehouse
Erikson, Wright, and McIver omit consid-
1981). Bureaucrats are similarly portrayed as
erations of gubernatorial or other executive
having important policymaking roles both
branch influences “due largely to measure-
through direct actions and indirectly, by fram-
ment considerations” because “little evidence
ing issues and through contacts with legisla-
exists that demonstrates an empirical link be-
tive staff lobbying on behalf of agency rep-
tween the powers of the executive and actual
resentatives (see Abney and Lauth 1984;
policy direction” (1993, 126-127). The deci-
Brudney and Hebert 1987; Elling 1990).
sion to ignore the executive branch deserves
Research focusing on the constitutional
closer consideration: governors play impor-
powers associated with governors’ offices typ-
tant roles in establishing state policy agendas
ically assumes that institutionally stronger
and in preparing annual budget requests.
governors are more likely than their weaker
Moreover, state executives are granted the
counterparts to wield policy influence, ceterus
responsibility to make and execute public poli-
paribus. Brace (1993) provides empirical evi-
cies, and have formal and informal powers to
dence linking institutionally stronger gover-
Winter 1999
53

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Barrilleaux
nors and legislatures to the production of
Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1989; 1993)
more aggressive economic development poli-
justify the omission of executive influences in
cies during 1980–85. He argues that these
their model due to the lack of existing em-
institutional powers allowed officeholders to
pirical evidence and measurement difficulties
respond more forcefully to economic condi-
previously noted and also because the poli-
tions requiring state action than could office-
cies that make up their dependent variable
holders in institutionally less powerful states.
are products of several years’ activity that
Others argue that measures of formal pow-
might not reasonably be influenced by guber-
ers are blunt instruments that miss much of
natorial partisanship (1993, 126). Rather than
the influence attributable to governors. Ber-
focusing solely on partisanship, the empha-
nick’s survey of state senators (1979) indicates
sis is on the lasting effects of institutional ca-
that they believe certain “informal” powers
pability, both of the governor and of execu-
are more important to gubernatorial success
tive branch agencies. Executive branch staff
than are the formal, constitutional ones, ar-
are for the most part career employees, so the
guing that gubernatorial success is driven at
effects of their institution are not necessar-
least partly by political acumen.
ily as limited as those of an individual gov-
Executive branch agencies are assigned the
ernor or legislator whose service may be rel-
responsibility to execute policies devised by
atively short. Additionally, formal powers of
elected officials. Despite their formal desig-
governors change only when state constitu-
nation as policy implementers, it is generally
tions change, suggesting that institutional
acknowledged that agencies also engage in
powers—not the individual influence of a sit-
policymaking activities (Downs 1967; Fesler
ting governor—may reasonably be expected
and Kettl 1991; Grupp and Richards 1975;
to influence policies over the longer term.
Lowi 1969). Aside from the influence agen-
Given that prior theory and research support
cies exert via the process of policy implemen-
the expectation that governors and adminis-
tation (in which rules are interpreted, there-
trators influence policymaking in the states, it
by influencing how policies are administered
seems premature to dismiss without a test their
in the field), the longevity of administrative
influence in a model of state policymaking.
agencies and employees provides entrée into
the process of policymaking. Downs (1967)
Modeling Effects on State Policy
argues that the bias of bureaucratic organi-
zations is to expand the role of government,
The model presented here builds on Erikson,
since administrators are driven by mixed mo-
Wright, and McIver’s three-variable direct ef-
tives, some of which are policy relevant and
fects model (1989; 1993), which explains
some directed toward organizational growth
about 81 percent of the variation in a mea-
and...