Government institutions and persistent communal conflicts in Nigeria

• Published date: 01 March 2024
• Author: Adeleke Gbadebo Fatai,Lawal Musediq Olufemi,Lanre‐Babalola Folake Olubunmi,Akinpelu Temitope Oluwakemi
• Date: 01 March 2024
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/crq.21406

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Government institutions and persistent

communal conflicts in Nigeria

Adeleke Gbadebo Fatai | Lawal Musediq Olufemi |

Lanre-Babalola Folake Olubunmi | Akinpelu Temitope Oluwakemi

Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of

Sociology, Osun State University, Osogbo,

Osun State, Nigeria

Correspondence

Adeleke Gbadebo Fatai, Faculty of Social

Sciences, Department of Sociology, Osun

State University, Osogbo, Osun State,

Nigeria.

Email: gbadebo.adeleke@uniosun.edu.ng

Abstract

Against the backdrop of scholarship on the internal

causes of conflicts, this study examined how govern-

ment institutions externally fuel persistent communal

conflicts (PCC) in Nigeria. With multiple methods and

triangulation of sampling techniques, we examined

12 pairs of warring communities, 4464 respondents,

and 18 key interviewees. The causes of PCC were

misapplication of constitutional/legal instruments and

biased enforcement administration that favored one

community over the other. Through matrix correlation,

institutions like constitution and legal mechanisms,

peace-building mechanisms, and the enforcement

agents' roles fuelled PCC among the warring communi-

ties. This correlation has a negative relationship that

led to the people's loss of confidence in the umpires,

vengeance, jungle justice and intolerance among the

warring communities. We concluded that these institu-

tional lapses created a class of disadvantaged and

aggressive victims who have become intolerant of other

communities. There is a need to sanitize governmental

institutions to treat communal disputes with justice

and fairness.

1|INTRODUCTION

Nigeria, like most sub-Saharan African countries, is blighted by the endemic evil of communal

conflicts which are caused by numerous internal and external reasons that vary from one

Received: 30 October 2022 Revised: 14 June 2023 Accepted: 3 August 2023

DOI: 10.1002/crq.21406

Conflict Resolution Quarterly. 2024;41:281–297. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/crq © 2023 Wiley Periodicals LLC. 281

community to another (Aapengnue, 2010; Boone, 2017; Fisk, 2019; Oladoyin, 2017). These

warring communities have witnessed the massacre of thousands of people and destruction of

properties worth billions (Adebowale, 2013; Wig & Tollefsen, 2016). A large volume of research

(Assal, 2013; Autesserre, 2010) has consistently pointed out that some weaker communities

have become helpless because certain institutional agencies support the communities that

appear to have the backing of the government. Unfortunately, this situation has degenerated

into more conflicts and disharmonious relationships among rival communities as evidenced by

the persistent slogan of vengeance—“kill my people with the gun, and die by my gun too.”This is

quite pronounced in Hillesund's (2019) study “on choosing whom to target”which has popular-

ized this situation.

The current study is concerned with some unanswered questions such as how social order

can be maintained in conflicting communities when the institutional umpires are biased.

Greiner (2013) lamented that the perpetrators of the communal conflicts enjoy more protection

from law enforcement agencies than the victims. In order to estimate the general effect of

umpires' roles, Fisk (2019) considered the proximity of conflicting communities to each other

and the heterogeneous nature of Nigerian communities. In finding answers to this question, we

examined the impact of government institutions on the enforcement of law and order in the

conflicting areas and their involvement in peace-building generally in Nigeria. A few scholars

(Brosché & Rothbart, 2013) argued that since the traditional methods of dispute settlement have

become outmoded, people have resorted to courts and legal mechanisms. Drawing from Jeffrie's

(2012) study, these legal institutions wrongly apply the legal mechanisms, especially where legal

principles and rules are concerned. Specifically, fictitious cases are ruled upon and technicali-

ties are used to frustrate communal conflict matters from court. These legal institutions are also

biased in their management of conflicts and in peace-building affairs. Butler and Scout (2012)

pointed out that various government institutions are often biased in peace-building matters,

especially between non-party and government-supporting communities. Thus, offenders in

government-supporting communities easily escape punishment through the framework of jus-

tice administration. Brosché and Elfversson (2012) explained that various government institu-

tions are usually biased when a community is endowed with valuable economic resources, deep

religious interests, social influences, and political expediencies. Thus, the framework for admin-

istration of justice becomes a loophole for offenders to go scot-free, as long as they are members

of the desired community. Often, this leads to persistent communal conflicts. Oladoyin (2017)

lamented that undue leniency such as pardon, nolle prosequi—stop further prosecution of a

criminal case, prerogative of mercy, and clemency benefit perpetrators of crimes in communi-

ties, which indirectly increases the propensity for vengeance.

Brosché and Rothbart (2013) stated that the law exists for a moral reason and that all

crimes, even the victimless ones, involve a social and moral harm. They further revalidated that

the law, under any circumstance—civil or criminal, simple or felonious—affects the moral code

and social order within the society. Odiegwu (2012) maintained that some sections of the

Nigerian constitution empowers the executive arm of government to use their powers to either

pave the way for suspects to escape prosecution or free an offender after conviction. Such sec-

tions are Section 36(5), Section 175(1) (2), and Section 174(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the

Federal Republic of Nigeria. In these sections, the Governor, President or the Attorney-General

at the Federal or State level, as the case may require, has the power to free an offender or stop a

prosecution, through legal instruments like pardon, prerogative of mercy, clemency, amnesty,

and nolle prosequi. Adebowale (2013) alleged that these powers are negatively exercised without

due consideration for the warring communities and the victims. The nolle prosequi is somewhat

282 FATAI ET AL.