Government Agenda-Setting and Bicameral Conflict Resolution
| Published date | 01 December 2013 |
| Author | David Fortunato,Sven-Oliver Proksch,Thomas König |
| DOI | 10.1177/1065912913486197 |
| Date | 01 December 2013 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2013
Article
Political Research Quarterly
66(4) 938 –951
Government Agenda-Setting and
© 2013 University of Utah
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
Bicameral Conflict Resolution
DOI: 10.1177/1065912913486197
prq.sagepub.com
David Fortunato1, Thomas König2, and Sven-Oliver Proksch2
Abstract
We examine the extent to which governments consider the role of bicameral conflict resolution procedures in
legislative agenda-setting. We argue that governments may use these institutions to promote policy change in the event
of bicameral conflict, especially when facing uncertainty over bicameral policy preferences. We test our arguments
using comprehensive original data on forty years of German legislation and find that bicameral conflict resolution
committees play a more sophisticated role in governmental policy making than previously suspected.
Keywords
bicameralism, agenda-setting, executive–legislative interactions, legislative institutions, German politics
Governments are responsible for policy change in parlia-
level of bicameral conflict are uncertain, governmental
mentary systems. They initiate most legislation, control
agenda-setters face difficulties in anticipating the reac-
informational resources, and monopolize legislative tion of the second chamber and forming “optimal” coali-
agenda-setting procedures. But governments may also
tions for legislative proposals.
face institutional hurdles and uncertainty when making
In this study, we investigate whether and how govern-
policy. Previous research has emphasized the substantial
ments adapt their agenda-setting strategies under uncer-
obstacles governmental agenda-setters face under bicam-
tain conditions. In situations where agenda-setters are
eral institutions, which systematically constrain policy
fully informed about bicameral conflict and certain about
change and require legislative compromise (Levmore
the outcome of their proposals, extant research on bicam-
1992; Tsebelis and Money 1997). Governmental agenda-
eral policy making predicts that, as bicameral conflict
setting is more cumbersome when second chambers
increases, governments simply alter the content of their
enjoy veto power and when the preferences of the two
agenda to make it more appealing to the second chamber
chambers are dissimilar (Binder 2003; Hammond and
majority (Krehbiel 1998). This may include initiating pol-
Miller 1987; König 2001; Tsebelis 2002). This has
icies that are closer to the ideal point of the second cham-
prompted researchers to argue that, in divided bicameral
ber or even refraining from policy initiation—strategies
parliaments, political parties anticipate such effects and
referred to as auto-limitation or self-censorship (Manow
attempt to form government coalitions that safeguard
and Burkhart 2007; Vanberg 2001). This literature is
bicameral majorities (Druckman, Martin, and Thies 2005;
silent, however, with regard to how governments respond
Druckman and Thies 2002; Proksch and Slapin 2006).
to bicameral conflict under uncertain conditions.
Considering the composition of the second chamber at
Our analysis of these uncertain conditions emphasizes
the time of government formation may constitute an
the role of institutions for bicameral conflict resolution
effective strategy when the policy preferences of parties
and thereby expands our understanding of governmental
in both chambers are known and do not change. While
agenda-setting in two regards. First, we take a closer look
governmental preferences usually correspond with the
at institutions of bicameral conflict resolution, which are
preferences of the parliamentary majority in the first
employed to break deadlock between the two chambers
chamber, less is known about governmental agenda-
setting when uncertainty exists about the distribution of
1
policy preferences in the second chamber. This uncer-
University of California, Merced, USA
2University of Mannheim, Germany
tainty may arise when the composition of the second
chamber may be prone to change during a legislative
Corresponding Author:
term. In such situations, the level of bicameral conflict
David Fortunato, School of Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts,
University of California, Merced, 5200 North Lake Road, Merced, CA
may change during the life of a government or even dur-
95343, USA.
ing the life of a legislative proposal. When the type and
Email: dfortunato@ucmerced.edu
Fortunato et al.
939
in many countries (Tsebelis and Money 1997) and show
efficiently in policy making than unified governments
that these institutions do increase the probability of suc-
(Tsebelis 2002). In their seminal work on bicameralism,
cessful governmental agenda-setting. Second, we specify
Tsebelis and Money (1997) demonstrate that incongruent
how such institutions condition the content of a govern-
majorities between chambers should make it more diffi-
mental policy proposal under certain and uncertain condi-
cult to agree on legislation but that specific institutional
tions. We find that these institutions provide a kind of
mechanisms exist to resolve bicameral conflict. These
safety net for governmental agenda-setters that face a
include the navette (shuttle system) and conference or
potential bicameral veto. This suggests that institutions of
conciliation committees. An important finding in this line
bicameral conflict resolution create an incentive for gov-
of research is that the second chamber is able to influence
ernments to propose policies closer to their own ideal
governmental agenda-setting even when it lacks formal
point than the auto-limitation literature would predict,
veto power. The rationale behind this is that the govern-
particularly when there is some uncertainty about the
ment is usually held accountable for policy results on
future composition of the second chamber. As a result,
election day and is therefore more likely to be impatient
governments will insist upon their ideal point while draft-
in the bicameral conflict resolution process. As a result,
ing policy proposals and risk a conciliation procedure
the second chamber may receive concessions from the
rather than auto-limit from the outset.
government to prevent unnecessary delay. This is what a
We test our expectations on governmental agenda-
standard agenda-setting model would suggest.
setting under uncertain conditions using a comprehensive
Building on these insights, scholars have investigated
original data set of all government proposals initiated in
the effects of bicameralism on coalition formation in par-
Germany from 1969 to 2009. We explain in detail why
liamentary systems (Druckman, Martin, and Thies 2005;
German bicameralism provides an ideal laboratory for
Druckman and Thies 2002; Proksch and Slapin 2006).
testing our arguments below. Although our theoretical
These studies argue that political parties in parliamentary
expectations and empirical tests are built upon the par-
systems anticipate the potential for bicameral deadlock
ticular institutional structure of German bicameralism,
when forming government coalitions. Druckman, Martin,
which distinguishes between a procedure with symmetric
and Thies (2005) show that governments include addi-
and with asymmetric power distribution, the implications
tional parties into the coalition to stabilize bargaining
of our findings are applicable to a wide range of legisla-
between the chambers. Not only are such coalitions more
tive (and more general bargaining) contexts (1) where
likely to form but they also tend to last longer. One impli-
there is uncertainty regarding the preferences of one or
cation of this finding is that if governmental parties con-
more veto players, and (2) where there are conflict reso-
trol or participate in majorities in both chambers, we
lution devices or other institutions that may alter the bal-
should observe less bicameral conflict. Yet, anecdotally
ance of power during the decision-making process.
and empirically, as we will show below, this picture does
The structure of the article is as follows. We first provide
not hold consistently. We still find incidents of bicameral
a brief discussion of bicameral research and discuss the
conflict and we discuss what role institutions for bicam-
need to examine conflict resolution committees and the role
eral conflict resolution play for the strategies of the gov-
of uncertainty more closely. We then present our research
ernmental agenda-setter.
design, theory, and hypotheses within the institutional con-
To understand the relationship between governmental
text of German bicameralism and illustrate the intricacies of
agenda-setting and the patterns of bicameral conflict, we
the German case with examples from our data. Our analysis
need to incorporate the role of uncertainty and the possi-
shows that governmental agenda-setters do, in fact, con-
bility for institutionalized conflict resolution. First, insti-
sider institutions of bicameral conflict resolution as policy
tutions of bicameral conflict resolution, such as a
safety nets. This suggests that the German conflict resolu-
conciliation committee composed of representatives of
tion committee performs a more important role for policy
both chambers, play an important role for finding com-
change and...
To continue reading
Request your trial