GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT IN THE SOMALI TERRITORIES.

• Author: Stremlau, Nicole
• Position: Report

Somalia is often described as the "most failed state", (1) a '"lawless" country, (2) or simply a place where there is "nothing" left. (3) However, despite decades of war, the region enjoys some of the fastest internet connections on the continent. (4) The world's most ambitious experiment in mobile money has led much of the country to become cashless. In the midst of this apparent "disorder" much seems to be working and some sectors of the economy, such as telecommunications, are even thriving. This article explores how law and politics work in the Somali territories. (5)

Conceptualizing the complex governance arrangements in the Somali territories is challenging and this article begins by discussing the various categories that have been attempted, from "ungoverned spaces" to concepts of "hybridity", and the implications of such concepts on understanding the protracted violence and the ways in which communities have constructed and maintained order. The variety of governance arrangements is then introduced, from the Somali Federal Government efforts to extend control beyond the capital Mogadishu, to the self-governing and well-established regions of Somaliland and Puntland, to the role of insurgency groups such as Al Shabaab and smaller, less recognized, proto-states such as Khatumo State.

Law and politics work in a variety of differing ways across the Somali territories. However, despite claims to the contrary, there is "law" and "governance", and this article discusses the common threads that are shared within these differing arrangements. The continued relevance and influence of customary, or xeer law, as well as the use of Shari'a law and other local forums for dispute resolution, have been essential. Both the presence and lack, or erosion of, networks of trust are also an important aspect to understanding the business of politics and how the variety of legal systems operate. Additionally, transnational factors, including the active and ever-present diaspora community which reaches across all sectors of Somali society, from remittances, to parliamentary representatives, to businesses, among others, have a deep influence on the varying modes of governance across the region.

Finally, the article discusses the implications of Somali realities for broader questions of nation and state-building. In the literature on "ungoverned spaces" or failed states, there are often assumptions about the role of international interventions, or the potentially transformative role of civil society groups, on changing these regions into the types of governed spaces that typically characterize rich Western countries. By briefly reflecting on the longstanding ideas of anarchy, or statelessness, and the ways societies have adopted or even sought out such arrangements, enabling some sectors to thrive, the article attempts to reframe debates on "ungoverned spaces" to focus on questions about what is working in such societies and why.

Conceptualizing Modes of Governance in the Somali Territories

Like almost all states in Africa, Somalia is a colonial construct with Somali communities spread well into neighboring Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. When referring to governance in the Somali territories, particularly the way in which communities are governed at the local level, it is easier to include these cross-border regions that are inhabited by the Somali people. Putting the state to one side enhances focus on the variety of different modes of governance in the Somali territories, while at the same time bringing into relief how the state has become the object of struggle and violence. Despite the geographic spread of the broader Somali community, the Somali territories are relatively ethnically homogeneous, particularly compared with the rest of Africa or the neighboring Middle East. Nearly the entire population is ethnically Somali and Muslim, although there are some important exceptions. (6) This has made the persistence of violent conflict all the more perplexing for many, given that many of the common fractures of conflict, namely ethnic and religious lines, are not central to the Somali conflict. Clans, or families, have had a more salient role in conflict, although they have been far from being the defining feature, as business, politics, aid, and the seemingly unending competition for resources have all been major factors in the ongoing violence. (7)

Since the fall of Said Barre's government in early 1991, Somalia's government has been unable to exert control much beyond the capital, Mogadishu. What has emerged in its place has been a variety of entities, or informal systems, that have attempted to provide security and governance. This article cannot cover the full range of systems over the last 25 years (many have come and gone) but will try to capture the array of local authorities that have emerged. What is clear is that there are multiple paths and processes in which different entities have engaged as they have sought to create political order and, perhaps most importantly, security. Some have developed state-like formations while others more local security-based structures, such as neighborhood watch groups. While the latter could not be compared with a state, when combined with other services such as private education, private hospitals or private water distribution, it does suggest some of the ways governance continues to occur in "ungoverned spaces". Before examining the variety and variations of the modes of governance that have emerged in the Somali territories, it is useful to explore the prevailing ways of conceptualizing governance in what is often termed a "failed state".

Examining Governance on a Spectrum

In many respects, the Somali territories represent an extreme example of what is seen as state failure. However, looking at the extremities can often be the most telling, bringing certain characteristics into stark relief. Somalia fits squarely into the "orthodox failed states narrative" that has developed momentum along with the global war on terror. Often described as a region that needs to be fixed, particularly in the context of preventing an enabling environment for terrorists to launch strikes internationally, the conceptualization of the region as a "failed state" carries with it many assumptions that overlook various concepts of statehood or trajectories of state-building. Rooted in the concept of "failed states", "failing states" or "weak states" is the assumption that there is an endpoint states must reach, to escape such characterizations, that is very much rooted in the model of Western Liberal Democracy. Thus, in the failed states debate, states are assessed and ranked on how they stand in relation to this particular model. (9) The criticism of this approach has been substantial and sustained, not least by scholars of the Horn of Africa who have highlighted the extent to which this approach neglects the plurality of public order, or public authorities that might exist in a given time or place. This approach also neglects the variety of legal structures that may be influential and overlooked in more normative assessments of state effectiveness. (10)

Failed states are typically described as regions where there is a "total vacuum of authority" or places where anarchy prevails and warfare is "random". (11,12) These states may be characterized variously as ungoverned or ungovernable, but at the core is the view that the way governance exists in failed states is an anomaly, something that needs to be corrected and is precariously close to a complete state of Hobbesian anarchy. The concern is not only that disorder will spread to neighboring regions but that these spaces will give rise to transnational actors that will connect with terrorist groups (such as al Qaeda), will foster Islamic extremists that can potentially target Western interests, or that they will disrupt the global economy, as the pirates of the coast of Puntland, Somalia were seen to do. Fixing, or launching large-scale state-building initiatives in "failed states" has been the prescription, but has increasingly gained critics as the large-scale efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have not brought about the desired results, at least within short timeframes, by international sponsors such as the United States. This has, however, not led to wide scale reversals in conceptualizing governance. Despite growing scepticism about the ability of external actors to engineer new political orders, for the most part these regions are still described as "failed" and "ungoverned".

In recent years an emerging literature, mostly drawing on the experiences of communities in Africa providing security, has emerged focusing on concepts such as 'hybrid governance'; 'twilight institutions'; 'vernacular' politics; or an emphasis on 'public authorities'. These concepts vary but share an empirical understanding of how governance works on the ground, often in communities where the state has limited reach and authority. They also share an approach that is descriptive, rather than normative like the good governance agenda, or the failed or weak states debate.

In this vein, for example, the concept of a hybrid political order incorporates concepts of multiple sovereignties and institutional multiplicity. (13,14) This concept allows a consideration of stabilization and peacebuilding processes in the aftermath of conflicts from a historical perspective, taking into account the fluidity of configurations of power and the shifting boundary...