Going it Alone: The Adverse Effect of Executive Term Limits on Bargaining

• Date: 01 March 2021
• Author: Alexandra G. Cockerham
• Published date: 01 March 2021
• DOI: 10.1177/0160323X211020733
• Subject Matter: Research Articles

Research Article

Going it Alone: The Adverse

Effect of Executive Term

Limits on Bargaining

Alexandra G. Cockerham

1

Abstract

It is widely accepted that executive term limits provide a check on executive power. I challenge this

assumption by arguing that executive term limits pose an obstacle to inter-branch bargaining

because they both limit tenure potential and force an executive from office precisely when she is

most prone to bargain. While previous research has assumed that an executive’s tenure potential

remains constant throughout his time in office, I argue that the tenure pote ntial of a term-limited

executive varies with time left in office. The perfect correlation between time served (experi-

ence) and maximum remaining time in office (tenure potential) among U.S. presidents precludes

empirical analysis about the effects of tenure potential and experience. Accordingly, I turn to the

American states for analysis, and find strong empirical support for my theory.

Keywords

executives, unilateral action, executive orders, tenure potential, term limits, experience, bargaining

Numerous scholars and participants in the

political process affirm that highly autonomous

executives are a threat to the balance of power

and democratic stability more generally

(Cooper 2002; Corley 2006; Kruse and Zelizer

2019; Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Samuels and

Shugart 2010). This widely held belief is predi-

cated upon the fact that extensive executive

power will lead to a breakdown in the balance

of powers between the executive and the legis-

lature (Genovese 2011; Pious 2009; Howell

2003; Mayer 2009). Given the fact that balance

of powers is a cornerstone of American democ-

racy, we see many attempts t o limit executive

power at both the federal and state level in

order to mitigate any potential imbalance.

Across states attempts to limit executive power

abound and yet the effects of these varying

institutions on governance are not fully

understood, making executive power, particu-

larly at the state level, an important topic for

research.

Although presidential term limits were not

established formally until 1947, gubernatorial

term limits have existed since the American

Revolution in large part because of the colo-

nists’ aversion to the governors appointed by

the British crown (Beyle 2006; Ferguson

2012). Despite the more recent work on legisla-

tive term limits (Carey, Niemi, and Powell

2009; Cummins 2013; Kousser 2005), there has

1

Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA

Corresponding Author:

Alexandra G. Cockerham, Florida State University, 211

Bellamy Building, Tallahassee, FL 32306, USA.

Email: amg08k@my.fsu.edu

State and Local GovernmentReview

2021, Vol. 53(1) 62-77

ªThe Author(s) 2021

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DOI: 10.1177/0160323X211020733

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been less research on the implications of exec-

utive term limits. In this paper, I challenge the

assumption that term limits constrain executive

power and create normatively desirable demo-

cratic outcomes. I do this by examining the

effects of executive term limits on inter-

branch bargaining, demonstrated by the use of

unilateral action and thereby shed light on some

potentially concerning implications for govern-

ance in states where governors are term limited.

Although more recent explorations of state

executive power have begun to emerge (Cock-

erham and Crew 2017; Ferguson and Bowling

2008; Sellers 2016), most extant research on

unilateral executive action focuses on the pres-

ident (Bailey and Rottinghaus 2013; Bolton and

Thrower 2016; Howell 2003; Krause and

Cohen 1997; Mayer 1999). Yet there is much

more variation in the character of term limit

laws among American governors than among

presidents, making states a better laboratory for

research. Accordingly, I demonstrate how

executive term limits pose an obstacle to the

executive’s willingness to bargain with the leg-

islature through two mechanisms. In what fol-

lows, I justify this claim by providing two

theoretical arguments—(1) I explain how

changing the executive’s level of tenure poten-

tial affects his willingness to work with the leg-

islature; and (2) I argue that the executive

chooses to bargain more as he moves later in

his service in office.

The theory is based on the assumption that

as an executive’s expected success from bar-

gaining with the legislature declines, she has

greater incentive to take unilateral action. One

of the primary mechanisms through which term

limits affect the executive’s propensity to bar-

gain is through their effect on the executive’s

tenure potential: her potential to remain in

office. Presidential scholars have little reason

to theorize about the impact of tenure potential

since all U.S. presidents serving after Harry

Truman have been limited to two four-year

terms in office, ensuring that there is no varia-

tion across presidents in the potential to remain

in office. In contrast, this aspect of an execu-

tive’s formal power has been examined in

numerous studies of American governors

(e.g., Beyle 1968; Clarke 1998; Mueller 1985;

Richardson, Konisky, and Milyo 2012; Shar-

kansky 1968).

The most widely used measure of a gover-

nor’s tenure potential was developed by Schle-

singer (1965) and later refined by Beyle (1990)

[see also Dilger, Krause, and Moffett (1995)

and Dometrius (1979)]. The so-called “Beyle

index” of a governor’s tenure potential is a

five-point scale that takes into account the

length of a governor’s term, and any limi ts on

the number of terms she can serve. The value

of this index varies across states, but by defini-

tion, it is constant throughout a governor’s term

in office. I contend that the choice to measure

tenure potential in a way that makes it tempo-

rally constant is at odds with any reasonable

conception of a governor’s tenure potential in

a context in which most governors are term-

limited. In a “term-limited world,” it seems evi-

dent that a governor’s potential to remain in

office declines as he gets closer to the date he

is forced from office by the term limit. To

refine this extant measurement, I define a polit-

ical executive’s tenure potential at any point in

time as the amount of time she would remain in

office if she were to win reelection each time

she is eligible to run. I then advance the propo-

sition that an executive’s propensity to act uni-

laterally increases as her tenure potential

declines, and she becomes less concerned about

maintaining a cooperative relationship with the

legislature. I test this proposition using data

from the American states for the period 2010–

2014, and find strong empirical support.

An executive’s tenure potential is just one of

two means through which term limits influence

an executive’s incentive to act unilaterally. His

experience in office is a second important fac-

tor, since greater experience should enhance his

expected success from bargaining, and thus

reduce his incentive to take unilateral action.

However, estimating the effects of tenure

potential and experience in office on an execu-

tive’s propensity to take unilateral action is a

challenge. Greater time served should give an

executive more experience in bargaining with

the legislature and thus less of a need to take

unilateral action; but at the same time, greater

Cockerham 63