Getting inside their mind.

• Author: Barrass, Gordon
• Position: Report

Editor's Note: A retired senior British diplomat who has just published an important new study of the Cold War (The Great Cold War--A Journey Through the Hall of Mirrors--see our review in the Bookshelf section below) discusses a successful American approach that contributed to victory over the Soviet Union--"getting inside their mind"--and how it could be applied to contemporary foreign policy and national security challenges.--Ed.

President Obama has not lacked advice on how to deal with the many threats and problems America faces abroad. One critical subject has, however, received less attention than it deserves--and that is the ability of the United States to "get inside the mind" of its adversaries, as well as those of the countries whose support Washington will need.

In recent years, this has not been America's strong suit. But back in the 1970s, this was a subject in which America began to excel--and that, in turn, helped bring the Cold War to a peaceful end. As President Obama's team wrestles with the task of converting attitudes and approaches into sustainable policies, this is a good time to look into how that earlier achievement came about.

Some may wonder whether America's Cold War experience really is relevant today. True, the world is no longer dominated by two superpowers and the military threats are different, but important similarities persist: The Cold War was a fraught confrontation that lasted for decades; during that period the United States learned the need to develop long-term policies and invested heavily in learning about the issues it faced.

Just as importantly, some of America's adversaries now have far more complex and unnerving agendas than the Soviets ever did. Today, there is already one unstable state with nuclear weapons (which is Pakistan) and there are likely to be more in the years ahead. Not surprisingly, last December a Congressionally-appointed committee warned that within five years terrorists could be using biological or nuclear weapons. And that raises the question of what can be done to deter Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or other groups, whose members are willing to undertake suicide missions for their cause.

The "getting inside their mind" approach could also throw much light on Iranian policy, currently a complex mix of insecurity, nuclear ambitions, and support for terrorist groups across the Middle East. Washington certainly needs to know much more about the fears of the mullahs in Tehran, including the gravity of the economic problems Iran--already an importer of refined petroleum products--will face in just a few years. And there is so much still to be learnt about a host of other states including Afghanistan, North Korea (which still baffles the Chinese, who have had close contact with it for over 60 years), and China, as well as Pakistan and Russia, that are considered towards the end of this article.

What follows, I hasten to emphasize, is not a lecture from a Brit trying to teach grandmother how to suck eggs. On the contrary, it is the distillation of what a number of influential Americans told me while I was researching my book on The Great Cold War--A Journey Through the Hall of Mirrors. When I asked them about the lessons they had learned from that era, they kept returning to three key ones--the importance of understanding one's adversary, developing a long-term strategy, and how to get the most out of intelligence.

Strategy and Rationality

As the Soviet Union emerged as a much stronger and more assertive power during the late sixties/early seventies, a small number of Americans came to believe that the Cold War would only end when the Soviet Union had been persuaded to change its ways or abandon its competition with the United States. To achieve either of these objectives the United States would, they insisted, have to wear down the Soviet Union through intense competition. And that would require a carefully thought-out, long-term strategy--and the will to implement it.

These people might best be described as "revivalists," the term used by James Schlesinger, the first leading figure to advocate such a course of action. The "revivalists" were kindred spirits rather than a group, though several of them later worked together in the Carter and Reagan administrations. Their broad analysis fitted well with Reagan's determination to end the Cold War on American terms, a policy he pursued vigorously after becoming president in 1981.

One of the first things that Schlesinger did on becoming secretary of defense in 1973 was to establish the rather secretive Office of Net Assessment (ONA) at the Pentagon. He appointed Andy Marshall, one of RAND's wisest and most creative thinkers, as the director. Marshall still holds that post 35 years later.

Marshall was responsible for advising the secretary of defense on what could be done to strengthen Western strategy and undermine Soviet confidence. Marshall and his staff began by exploring in depth the "correlation of forces" between the two sides.

This was not a simple study of the military balance at that time. Marshall wanted to look more broadly at the strengths and weaknesses of each side, as well the long-term trends that would shape the balance of power. The ultimate question was "What are the Soviet vulnerabilities and what strengths does America have that than can be used to exploit them?"

Once the vulnerabilities had been identified, it was necessary to consider how they could be exploited to best effect and, hopefully, in a cost-effective way. Schlesinger and Marshall were agreed that the next step was to "get inside the mind" of their Soviet adversary.

During the 1960s American thinking about the Soviet Union was dominated by people who assumed that the two sides were rational and reasonable. "They were not inclined to ask," Marshall lamented, "whether there were two kinds of rationality--one Soviet and the other American, with each having its own ideology, values and preoccupations. That worried me."

Marshall was in no doubt that "We would really have to start from scratch. It was not just a question of understanding how a country's history and culture make them different from us. We needed to know the ways in which the structure of the Soviet regime affected the way they viewed the outside world and responded to developments." "It's not enough to ask what they have done," Marshall pointed out, "you need to know why they have done it--and done...