German Business Mobilization against Right-Wing Populism

• Date: 01 December 2021
• Published date: 01 December 2021
• Author: Daniel Kinderman
• DOI: 10.1177/0032329220957153
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329220957153

Politics & Society

2021, Vol. 49(4) 489 –516

© The Author(s) 2020

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DOI: 10.1177/0032329220957153

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Article

German Business

Mobilization against

Right-Wing Populism

Daniel Kinderman

University of Delaware

Abstract

Why do some business associations mobilize, engage in collective action, and take

public stands against the populist right while others do not? This article examines

business mobilization against the populist right in Germany, which is heavily

export-oriented and reliant on the European and global market order. Drawing on

interviews with three business associations, the article presents three key findings.

First, economic self-interest is a powerful driver of business mobilization: perceived

threats and vulnerability spurred two German associations to act collectively against

right-wing populism. However, mobilization is driven not by declining revenues

or profits but by a mixture of values and material interests. Second, business

associations that mobilize stress the need to reform the system, democratize the

European Union, and address those who feel “left behind.” Third, medium-size,

export-oriented manufacturers are the core business constituency supporting

liberal democracy and the European Union. The article shows that some business

factions can play a role in defending the liberal international order against right-wing

populism.

Keywords

business, Germany, interests, mobilization, liberal democracy, populism

Corresponding Author:

Daniel Kinderman, Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of Delaware,

Newark, DE 19716, USA.

Emails: kindermd@udel.edu; dpk24@cornell.edu

957153PASXXX10.1177/0032329220957153Politics & SocietyKinderman

research-article2020

490 Politics & Society 49(4)

There are days in which decades happen, observed Marx.1 On June 23 and November

9, 2016, decades happened. Brexit—the British vote to leave the European Union—

and Donald Trump’s election as president of the United States dealt profound shocks

to the West’s political-economic order. The Economist wrote, “History is back—with

a vengeance,” and added that these events have “demolished a consensus. The ques-

tion now is what takes its place.”2 By early 2017, “the religion of the global elite—free

trade and open markets”—was “under attack,” and the leaders of the global free mar-

ket order were “looking into the abyss.”3

“The Great Regression” and “The End of The End of History” came as a surprise to

many observers who expected the dominance of a world order based on liberal democ-

racy, free markets, and human rights to persist.4 Brexit and Trump have been charac-

terized as “profoundly and enduringly consequential happenings that transform

structures,”5 and scholars worry that we are now witnessing “how democracies die.”6

With the rise of the antipluralist populist right, “the partisans of liberal democracy

have moved from triumphalism to despair.”7 The rise of “antisystem politics” repre-

sents a dramatic change in the political economies of advanced industrial countries.8

Although they are no enemies of capitalism, right-wing populists threaten business

interests in several ways: supporting protectionism and railing against globalization;

viewing the “people” as threatened by minorities and foreigners; seeking to restrict

immigration, which reduces the supply of unskilled as well as skilled workers in the

labor market; and conducting politics in the name of a genuine “people” in opposition

to corrupt elites, including business elites. Right-wing populists’ ethnonationalism can

make it harder for businesses to recruit mobile employees in tight labor markets, and

the policy agenda of populist right parties is often shrouded in uncertainty—which

makes planning and investments more difficult and risky for businesses in the “real

economy.” All in all, this represents a fundamental break from the business-friendly

politics of center-right parties in recent decades.

As interest in populism has surged, scholarly literature on business responses to the

populist right in the Brexit-Trump era is virtually nonexistent.9 This article aims to fill

the gap by examining German business mobilization against the populist right. In

Germany, the shock of Brexit and Trump was particularly deep. Right-wing populists’

strong nationalism poses a significant threat to German businesses, which are heavily

export-oriented and reliant on the European and global market order. In the words of

Martin Wansleben, the managing director of the German Chambers of Commerce and

Industry (DIHK), “For us, these developments are strong/difficult stuff [harter

Tobak].”10 Oliver Perschau, a high-level official in the Confederation of German

Employers’ Associations, stated that he was “stunned” (fassungslos) by Brexit—his

heart bleeds at the loss of this ally with an affinity for free trade and free markets.11

These developments prompted Henrik Müller to observe that if we are now “at the

beginning of de-globalization,” it is “highly problematic for the open German econ-

omy, because it questions Germany’s business model.”12 Another observer asked,

Where are the top managers and entrepreneurs, the presidents of business associations

. . . who have strong arguments for globalization, openness and European integration?