GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITION AMONG THE LARGER POWERS IN THE PACIFIC.

• Author: Sora, Mihai
• Position: ARGUMENTS

INTRODUCTION

There is strategic anxiety in both the United States and Australia about China's increasing influence in the Pacific. Senior White House official Kurt Campbell's remarks in January of this year that the United States may soon face a "strategic surprise" (1) in the region, referring to potential agreements and basing arrangements between Pacific Island countries and China, foreshadowed intensifying geopolitical competition in the Pacific.

In March, a draft security agreement (2) between Solomon Islands and China was leaked on social media, sparking furious international debate about China's tactical intent in the region and the possibility that such an agreement could lead to a Chinese military base in the South Pacific. Senior Australian, U.S., and Japanese politicians flew to Solomon Islands to convince Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare not to sign the security deal with China, to no avail. A final version of the agreement was signed in April.

As the leak and subsequent signing of the agreement occurred in the midst of an Australian federal election campaign, opposition politicians and some commentators seized the opportunity to accuse the Australian government of "dropping the ball" (3) in the Pacific by letting China make inroads into a strategic space where Australia, New Zealand, and the United States had previously been the dominant security players.

China then sought to press its advantage; in May, Foreign Minister Wang Yi embarked on an eight country tour (4) of the Pacific, armed with a regional agreement proposing comprehensive policing, cyber security, political, trade, and development activities with the ten Pacific nations that recognize China. This agreement was also leaked (5) and circulated online, accompanied by a letter (6) from the President of the Federated States of Micronesia, David Panuelo, exhorting Pacific leaders not to sign up for what he called the "single-most game-changing agreement" Pacific leaders had ever seen, which would undermine the sovereignty of Pacific countries and tug them closer into China's orbit.

Wang put the regional agreement to the ten Pacific countries that recognize China during a China-Pacific Islands meeting--the second such meeting of this grouping--but failed to achieve consensus. However, Wang did sign several bilateral agreements with individual Pacific countries on security, development, infrastructure, and other forms of cooperation, though many of the details remain secret for now.

At the same time as Wang's Pacific tour, the newly-elected Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong traveled to Fiji to deliver an address (7) to the Pacific. Wong announced a new Australian foreign policy in the Pacific, underpinned by recognition that climate change is the primary national security threat for Pacific countries and emphasizing a renewed focus on enhancing people-to-people links through improved labor mobility and migration pathways for the Pacific into Australia.

Pacific countries typically eschew overt geopolitical jostling in their region, particularly as this undermines their agency and, with a focus on military basing as a case in point, can distract from genuine regional priorities such as climate change and economic development. Nevertheless, geopolitical competition is well and truly part of regional dynamics and will continue to escalate as China pursues its objective of establishing itself as a regional security power.

CHINA'S INTEREST IN THE PACIFIC

The strategic value of the Pacific to larger powers lies in its huge ocean territories and the utility of being able to traffic and base military assets in Pacific countries. Beyond strategic objectives, Pacific nations afford access to fishing, mineral, and logging resources and can be influential in multilateral fora when they act as a voting bloc.

China has made substantial in-roads into the Pacific in recent years. According to the Lowy Institute's Pacific Aid Map, (8) while Australia remains the largest donor to the Pacific with $864.6 million spent in 2019 (most recent data available), China spent $169.6 million in the region, outpacing the United States at $140.1 million for that year.

However, China's presence is more visible through the tangible deliverables of large-scale infrastructure built by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Chinese construction (9) can be seen across the Pacific, most prominently in Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Tonga, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Samoa. Chinese plans to upgrade air and seaport infrastructure in Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu, and its intention to lease an entire island in Solomon Islands' Central Province, drew rapid international scrutiny and assertions that China sought to establish military basing opportunities in the Pacific. China has provided weapons and equipment, and deployed military or police personnel, (10) to Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Tonga, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu.

China has also established itself as the largest trading partner of most Pacific nations, primarily through importing Pacific resources. According to The Guardian's analysis (11) of trade data, China received more than half the total tonnes of seafood, wood, and minerals exported from the Pacific in 2019, which is more than the next ten countries combined.

Eroding diplomatic support for Taiwan among Pacific nations has been another objective for China in the region. China's precondition for establishing diplomatic ties is that countries must cease diplomatic relations with Taiwan. With the switch of diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China by the Solomon Islands and Kiribati in 2019, Taiwan now has only four diplomatic partners left in the Pacific--the Marshall Islands, Palau, Nauru, and Tuvalu--and 14 total worldwide.

China cultivates relationships with Pacific leaders to increase its presence in the Pacific; they, in turn, seek to broaden their development partnerships and access new opportunities for economic development. Relationship building can take the form of high-level visits to the region, such as Xi Jinping's attendance at the 2018 APEC Leaders' Meeting, hosted in Port Moresby; Wang Yi's Pacific tour in May this year; or invitations for Pacific leaders to visit Beijing. Over the COVID-19 period, hosting virtual meetings and leveraging the presence of Chinese diplomats on the ground in the Pacific have substituted for in-person events when high-level contact has been otherwise impossible.

The sum of China's activity in the Pacific across aid, economic, military, and diplomatic realms has led some analysts to conclude that China aims to establish itself as the regional hegemon. During a visit to Australia in February to attend a Quad meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken remarked, "To my mind, there's little doubt that China's ambition over time is to be the leading military, economic, diplomatic and political power not just in the region but in the world." (12)

RENEWED U.S. ATTENTION TO THE PACIFIC

After his attendance at the Quad, Secretary Blinken visited Fiji on February 12--the first visit of a U.S. Secretary of State to the island nation in 37 years--where he met with Pacific Island leaders. This visit coincided with the release of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, (13) the first U.S. document of its kind, which set out objectives for the region and provided an action plan for the following 12-24 months.

With this strategy, the White House said it will devote significant attention (14) to Pacific Islands. The strategy reinforces and builds on key elements of the Boosting Long-Term U.S. Engagement in the Pacific (BLUE Pacific) Act that were included as provisions in the COMPETES Act that passed (15) Congress on February 2.

Under the action plan set out in the Indo-Pacific Strategy,"' the United States is committed to being an "indispensable partner to Pacific Island nations." The United States intends to increase its diplomatic footprint in the Pacific, where there are currently only six U.S. embassies, (17) and intensify its climate, health, security, and development work. The White House has said it will prioritize renegotiation of the Compacts of Free Association with the North Pacific States of Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau, which are due to expire in 2023 and 2024 and have otherwise stalled. (18)

The document also says the United States will expand its Coast Guard presence in the Pacific and build the defense capacity of partners in the Pacific Islands. The White House will work with Congress to fund the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and the Maritime Security Initiative, while the United States will...