Geographic Representation in Party‐Dominated Legislatures: A Quantitative Text Analysis of Parliamentary Questions in the German Bundestag

• Author: Thomas Zittel,Dominic Nyhuis,Markus Baumann
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12238
• Published date: 01 November 2019
• Date: 01 November 2019

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LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, 44, 4, November 2019

DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12238

THOMAS ZITTEL

Goethe-University Frankfurt

DOMINIC NYHUIS

Leibniz University Hannover

MARKUS BAUMANN

Heidelberg University

Geographic Representation in

Party-Dominated Legislatures:

A Quantitative Text Analysis of

Parliamentary Questions in the

German Bundestag

Political representation in European democracies is widely considered

partisan and collectivist. This article, however, stresses that there is more to the

representative process in European democracies than just its textbook version. It

emphasizes the role of geographic representation as a complementary strategy in

party-dominated legislatures that is characterized by two distinct features. First,

legislators employ distinct opportunities to participate in legislative contexts

to signal attention to geographic constituents without disrupting party unity.

Second, these activities are motivated by individual- and district-level character-

istics that supplement electoral-system-level sources of geographic representa-

tion. We empirically test and corroborate this argument for the German case on

the basis of a content analysis of parliamentary questions in the 17th German

Bundestag (2009–13). In this analysis, we show that higher levels of localness

among legislators and higher levels of electoral volatility in districts result in in-

creased geographic representation.

Two Models of Representation

How legislators define their constituents shapes both the

input and the output side of politics (Bishin 2000, 2009; Rehfeld

2005). Their representational foci affect opportunities for politi-

cal partic ipation since they prescribe what k inds of demands gain

© 2019 Washington University in St. L ouis

682Thomas Zittel, Dominic Nyhuis, and Markus Baumann

access to p olitics and to whom voters pay attention (e.g., Däubler,

Bräuninger, and Brun ner 2016). Legislators’ representational foci

also influence the nature of the issues that shape the process of

authoritative decisionmaking, specifically the extent to which

these involve local or, rather, national concerns (e.g., Ferejohn

1974).

Theories of politi cal representation distingu ish between two

ideal typical models that differ with regard to legislators’ foci of

representation and that are considered antithetical to each other

(Curtice and Shively 2009; Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Powell

2004; Uslaner and Zittel 2006). The first model of partisan rep-

resentation portrays legislators as members of teams that col-

lectively represent socially cohesive national coalitions of voters.

The second model of dyadic representation depicts legislators as

individual agents accountable to local and thus geographically

defined constituencies. Even though these models are framed in

abstract ways, they result from specific institutional contexts.

Whereas Western European legislators are considered to join

teams (parties) and to collectively represent the policies and ide-

ological convictions of these teams, U.S.-American legislators

are viewed as representing geographic districts in individualized

ways.

This article advances from recent observations in the elec-

toral studies literature that theoretically challenge the assumed

predominanc e of collectivist forms of repres entation in European

contexts. This observation concerns the proliferation of candi-

date-centered electoral rules in European democracies and re-

sulting incentives to cultivate personal votes (Carey and Shugart

1995; Colomer 2011; Karvonen 2010; Renwick and Pilet 2015). It

provides reasons to ask about the behavioral implications of this

in otherwis e party-centered contexts and how par ties and legisla-

tors reconcile the conflicting incentives that flow from it. This is

the question this article is concerned with addressing.

We address the research question raised by arguing that

geographic representation matters in Western European parlia-

ments as a supplement to par tisan representation in twofold ways.

First, we envision legislators to d evelop the motivation to cater to

local constituents contingent upon individual- and district-level

factors, supplementing the role of electoral-system-level sources.

Particularly, we envision legislators’ localness and the partisan

nature of local voter markets to matter most. This suggests to

perceive geographic representation either as a last resort for