Geographic Market Areas and Market Structure in the Bituminous Coal Industry

AuthorRonald E. Shrieves
DOI10.1177/0003603X7802300305
Published date01 September 1978
Date01 September 1978
Subject MatterArticle
GEOGRAPHIC MARKET AREAS
AND
MARKET
STRUCTURE
IN
THE
BITUMINOUS
COAL INDUSTRY
by
RONALD
E.
SHRIEVES*
The recent controversy regarding the question of whether
or not the petroleum industry had a role in "contriving" the
energy crisis in order to enhance its own profits dramatizes
the concern for a detailed understanding of energy-related
industries. As such, the bituminous coal industry is receiving
increasing attention from economists.' Of particular interest is
the measure of industry structure known as the concentration
ratio. Both buyer and seller concentration ratios have achieved
places of significance in questions of antitrust policy, particu-
larly in merger cases. However, the need for defining the rele-
vant geographic markets in which buyer or seller concentra-
tion ratios are computed, though well recognized, has gen-
erally been addressed only in a relatively unsophisticated man-
ner, particularly in matters related to the coal industry."
* Associate Professor of Finance, University of Tennessee, Knox-
ville.
AUTHOR'S
NOTE:
Research conducted under NSF grant SIA72-
03525 A04. The author acknowledges support and suggestions from
colleagues in the University of Tennessee Appalachian Resources
Project, and is particularly indebted to Mr. Charles Perkins for
assistance in organizing and processing the large amount of data
supporting this research.
1For example, see the recent report by the Federal Trade
Com-
mission, Concentration Levels and Trends in the Energy Sector
of
the U.s. Economy, aStaff Report by Joseph P. Mulholland and
Douglas W. Webbink, March 1974.
2The FI'C study cited in note 1 simply accepted a definition of
the mid-west coal market as determined in an earlier study by Reed
Moyer. See Competition in the Midwestern Coal Industry, Harvard
Univ. Press, 1964. The FI'C report further stated
that
"no distinct
geographic submarkets within the Eastern region can
be
delineated,"
with the insightful explanatory comment, "Although Pennsylvania
coal obviously does not compete with Tennessee coal, there is no
clear-cut gap in interarea competition
that
would allow the delinea-
589
590 THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN
Delineation of geographic markets for bituminous coal is
also relevant in assessing potential regional impact of competi-
tive forces among alternative fuels, e.g., what areas of the
country
will
be significantly affected by a change in oil prices,
and in questioning the interregional impact of changes in envi-
ronmental standards, for example, how more stringent air
quality standards in Illinois will affect other regions of the
country in terms of availability and cost of coal.
The first objective of this study is to develop appropriate,
reasonably objective criteria for the delineation of geographic
markets, and to apply these criteria to recent data on the bitu-
minous coal industry.
The second objective is to utilize the geographic markets
delineated in a comprehensive assessment of the concentration
aspect of the structure of the bituminous coal industry.
I. DELINEATION OF GEOGRAPHIC
MARKET
AREAS
IN THE
BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY
A. Criteria for Delineation
of
Geographic Markets
ADJUSTED PRICE
The criterion for a geographic market typically presented
in textbooks of economics is generally attributed to Alfred
Marshall. For example, Stigler has defined a market as: "The
area within which the price of a commodity tends to uniform-
ity, allowance being made for transportation cost." Stigler
tion of, say, a north-south dichotomy of the region." Since the first
draft of this study, a study by Hogarty has been published. While
the methodology of this later study is certainly an exception to the
"unsophisticated" efforts referred to, the conclusions reached
through the approach devised herein differ considerably from
Hogarty's. See Thomas F. Hogarty, "The GeographicScope of Energy
Markets; Oil, Gas and
Coal,"
in
T.D.
Duchesneau, Competition in the
U.S. Energy Industry, Ballinger, 1975.
BITUMINOUS
COAL 591
goes on to say: "Since the market is defined by uniformity of
price, its area will be
at
least as large as the larger of the
areas of sellers' competition and buyers' competition, or the
sum of the areas when they partially overlap." Thus, even if
all coal produced in the U.S. were controlled by a monopolist,
we would expect competition among buyers in any geographic
market to result in uniformity of
F.O.B.
mine prices, so long
as the monopolist cannot discriminate among buyers in that
region. Of course, if the monopolist can discriminate among
geographic areas on the basis of differential demand charac-
teristics, then geographic markets would emerge.' Similarly,
suppose a monopsonist operated all utility plants in the coun-
try," then the price paid by the monopsonist for coal delivered
to steam plants in different locations from a given coal pro-
ducing region would differ by no more than the differential
transportation costs of delivery to those plants, since no seller
could exact a higher price due to competition of other sellers
in his proximity (i.e., with similar transportation costs). The
F.O.B.
mine price paid for coal at different consumption loca-
tions might differ if the different locations were served
entirely by different producing regions, but such a phenome-
non would be prima facie evidence for delineation of separate
geographic markets, since the monopsonist is discriminating
among coal suppliers on the basis of differences in supply con-
ditions which can be identified in terms of geographic location
of producers.
3See George J. Stigler, The Theory
of
Price, Macmillan
Com-
pany, 1966, p. 85.
4
It
should be noted that, in interpreting amarket area on the
basis of the degree of competition, Stigler's notion of the Marshal-
lian concept of a market area is at odds with the interpretation
given by others who would argue
that
Marshall's concept of a mar-
ket area depends upon variation of supply and demand forces in a
spatial context only, not on forces attributable to structural configu-
ration of the industry. For example, see Peter O. Steiner, "Markets
and Industries," International Encyclopedia
of
the Social Sciences,
Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968
(Vol.
9, pp. 575-581), and Ken-
neth G. Elzinga and Thomas F. Hogarty, "The Problems of Geo-
graphic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits," Antitrust Bulletin,

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