Geographic Legislative Constituencies: A Defense

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00905917221103298
• Published date: 01 April 2023
• Date: 01 April 2023
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/00905917221103298

Political Theory

2023, Vol. 51(2) 301 –330

© The Author(s) 2022

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DOI: 10.1177/00905917221103298

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Article

Geographic Legislative

Constituencies: A

Defense

Marcus Carlsen Häggrot1

Abstract

Many democracies use geographic constituencies to elect some or all of

their legislators. Furthermore, many people regard this as desirable in a

noncomparative sense, thinking that local constituencies are not necessarily

superior to other schemes but are nevertheless attractive when considered

on their own merits. Yet, this position of noncomparative constituency

localism is now under philosophical pressure as local constituencies have

recently attracted severe criticism. This article examines how damaging

this recent criticism is, and argues that within limits, noncomparative

constituency localism remains philosophically tenable despite the criticisms.

The article shows that noncomparative constituency localism is compelling

in the first place because geographic constituencies foster partisan

voter mobilisation, and practices of constituency service help to sustain

deliberation among constituents and within the legislature and promote

the realisation of equal opportunity for political influence. The article

further argues that it is unwarranted to criticise geographic constituencies

for being biased against geographically dispersed voter groups, for causing

vote-seat disproportionality, and for being vulnerable to gerrymandering.

The article also discusses the criticisms that local constituencies may pose

risks of inefficiency and injustice in resource allocation decisions, may lead

legislators to neglect the common good, and may limit citizens’ control over

1Research Centre ‘Normative Orders,’ Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt am Main,

Germany

Corresponding Author:

Marcus Carlsen Häggrot, Research Centre ‘Normative Orders,’ Goethe University Frankfurt,

Max-Horkheimer-Str.2, Frankfurt am Main, 60629, Germany.

Email: haeggrot@em.uni-frankfurt.de

1103298PTXXXX10.1177/00905917221103298Political TheoryCarlsen Häggrot

research-article2022

302 Political Theory 51(2)

the political agenda. Whilst conceding that these objections may be valid,

the article argues that they do not outweigh the diverse and normatively

weighty considerations speaking in favour of noncomparative constituency

localism. Finally, the article’s analysis is defended against several variants of

the charge that it exaggerates the benefits of geographic constituencies.

Keywords

democratic theory, electoral rules, constituency, voting, political representation,

redistricting

To elect members of their legislative assembly, some democracies have

recourse to electoral constituencies1 that are defined in expressly geographic

terms. That is to say, some democracies divide their enfranchised citizenry

into a number of electoral subunits that are each charged with electing a

defined number of representatives for the legislature and are defined in geo-

graphic terms such that each unit is composed exclusively of voters who

reside within a particular, contiguous area of the national territory. This is,

for example, how the United Kingdom elects its members of Parliament

(MPs), how France elects the members of its Assemblée nationale, and how

Finland elects the members of its unicameral legislature. In each of these

cases, the selection rules are different, of course. The UK elects MPs using

a simple plurality rule, France uses two-round voting rules, and Finland uses

open-list proportional representation rules, its constituencies returning mul-

tiple representatives each. But the way the underlying constituencies are

defined is in each case the same: the definition is geographic.

1. The term “constituency” is polysemic. It can be used in an institutional sense to

designate groups of enfranchised citizens that are formally delimited and respon-

sible for electing a defined number of representatives to a particular representa-

tive body. In that sense, constituency is equivalent to the American term district,

the Canadian riding, the New Zealand electorate, the French circonscription, and

the German Wahlkreis. Constituency can further be used in a noninstitutional

sense to refer to those voters who actually vote for, or more generally support, a

particular candidate or party. And constituency can be used more loosely still to

designate the group whose interests a representative or party seeks to promote

and whose votes the representative or party courts (cf. Rehfeld, 2005, 35–36).

This article uses constituency exclusively in the first, institutional sense.