Genocide, Politicide, and the Prospects of Democratization since 1900

• DOI: 10.1177/00220027211000445
• Published date: 01 October 2021
• Author: Nam Kyu Kim,Nakissa Jahanbani,Gary Uzonyi,Victor Asal
• Date: 01 October 2021
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Genocide, Politicide,

and the Prospects of

Democratization

since 1900

Gary Uzonyi

1

, Nam Kyu Kim

2

,

Nakissa Jahanbani

3

, and Victor Asal

3

Abstract

Why do some autocracies democratize? A country’s violent past has received little

attention. We argue that genocide and politicide undermine democratization by

binding the elites’ supporters more tightly to the governing power, while cementing

in-group/out-group animosities, and helping preserve the elites’ status quo position

within the state. We test this argument on a new dataset of government atrocity and

democratization since 1900. These novel data allow us to capture many important

instances of atrocity missed by others, and thus take a longer look at democrati-

zation and violence throughout history. We find that episodes of genocide and

politicide are associated with a lower likelihood of democratization in both the short

and long run. These effects are larger and more consistent than other common

explanations for democratization. They also differ from the effects of non-genocidal

civil war violence.

Keywords

democratization, genocide, civil wars, polarization, political leadership

1

University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, USA

2

Korea University, Seoul, Republic of Korea

3

SUNY-Albany, Albany, NY, USA

Corresponding Author:

Nam Kyu Kim, Department of Political Science & International Relations, Korea University, Seoul 02481,

Republic of Korea.

Email: namkkim1@gmail.com

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2021, Vol. 65(9) 1521-1550

ªThe Author(s) 2021

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/00220027211000445

journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr

Introduction

Do government mass atrocities make democratization less likely? Scholars highlight

several reasons that states democratize or not, such as alliances (McKoy and Miller

2012), economic development (e.g., Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix 2011), external

threat (Owsiak 2013), ethnic competition (Harkness 2016), the international system

(Gunitsky 2014), and resources (Tilly 2007). However, scholars pay little attention

to the history of a state’s violent experience. While some note the connection

between violence and democracy, scholars often consider violence to be, at most,

a modifying or mediating factor in a state’s democratization process (e.g., Miller

2012). Furthermore, scholars tend to focus on civil war, how such a conflict under-

mines development, and thus the possibility of democratization (e.g., Collier 2003).

We argue that a critical, but understudied, aspect for democratization is whether

the government engaged in mass atrocities against portions of its population. Spe-

cifically, we see genocide and politicide as key factors in determining the probability

that a state will democratize, regardless of whether such violence occurs during or

outside civil war. Drawing on past scholarship highlighting the differences between

genocide and non-genocidal civil war violence (e.g., Staub 1989; Kalyvas 2006), we

argue that government atrocity has a unique influence on a country’s prospects for

democratization in both the short and long run. Such atrocity increases the salience

of societal divisions in a way that civil war does not. It also better helps the gov-

ernment consolidate control (Van der Maat 2020).

Genocide and politicide are the attempted destruction of communal or political

groups, respectively (Harff 2003). For us, the important feature of these atrocities is

that the government identifies and attempts to annihilate a people within the state as

a whole. This process undermines the democratization process by binding the elites’

supporters more tightly to the governing power, while cementing in-group/out-group

animosities, and helping preserve the elites’ status quo position within the state.

While Mann (2005) contends that atrocity can help democratization by creating a

homogenous state, these killings rarely reach such an outcome (e.g., Valentino

2004). Instead, post-atrocity states are left with highly divided societies and salient

scares.

Both Benin and Equatorial Guinea experienced a series of coups, domestic unrest,

and political violence since independence. However, only Equatorial Guinea’s elites

attempted to eradicate the opposition groups they faced withi n the country (see

Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2017). It was this attempted eradication, rather than the

civil war violence both states experienced, that helps to explain, why Equatorial

Guinea has failed to democratize like Benin.

To test our argument, we collect new data on government perpetrated genocide

and politicide from 1900 to the present. Unlike other datasets on government atro-

city, ours extends back to the beginning of the twentieth century, rather than the end

of World War II. This allows us to capture many important instances of such brutal-

ity missed by others (e.g, Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2017; Ulfelder and Valentino

1522 Journal of Conflict Resolution 65(9)