Genes, Personality Traits, and the Sense of Civic Duty

AuthorChristopher T. Dawes,Aaron C. Weinschenk
Date01 January 2018
Published date01 January 2018
DOI10.1177/1532673X17710760
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X17710760
American Politics Research
2018, Vol. 46(1) 47 –76
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X17710760
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Article
Genes, Personality
Traits, and the Sense
of Civic Duty
Aaron C. Weinschenk1
and Christopher T. Dawes2
Abstract
Political scientists have long known that the sense of civic duty is one of
the strongest predictors of individual voter turnout, yet scholars are only
just starting to study and understand the origins of this orientation. Recent
genopolitics research has indicated that the sense of civic duty is heritable,
and recent research in political psychology has illustrated that individual
personality traits, many of which have a heritable component, shape feelings
of civic obligation. In this article, we link these two lines of inquiry to better
understand how individual differences shape the sense of civic duty. More
specifically, we explore the relationship between personality traits, measured
using the Big Five model; genes; and the sense of civic duty. We show
that genetic factors account for between 70% and 87% of the correlation
between civic duty and four of the Big Five personality traits. Overall, the
results presented here expand our understanding of the process through
which prosocial orientations, such as civic duty, are formed.
Keywords
civic duty, voter turnout, personality traits, Big Five, genes, genopolitics,
prosocial
1University of Wisconsin–Green Bay, WI, USA
2New York University, New York City, NY, USA
Corresponding Author:
Aaron C. Weinschenk, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin–Green Bay,
2420 Nicolet Drive, Green Bay, WI 54311, USA.
Email: weinscha@uwgb.edu
710760APRXXX10.1177/1532673X17710760American Politics ResearchWeinschenk and Dawes
research-article2017
48 American Politics Research 46(1)
Introduction
Why do some people vote while others do not? This is one of the classic ques-
tions in political science. For decades now, political scientists have grappled
with this question, which seems fairly straightforward but is actually remark-
ably complicated. Indeed, after decades of study, scholars are still trying to
explain variation in voter turnout. The study of voter turnout is so important
and intriguing that scholars in other disciplines, including economics and
psychology, have also attempted to answer the question of why some vote
and some do not. One of the most prominent ideas about political participa-
tion—and one that has influenced much research in political science, eco-
nomics, and psychology—begins with the assumption that individuals will
vote if the expected utility from voting exceeds the expected utility from not
voting. According to Downs (1957), the decision to vote can be represented
by the equation R = (B × P) − C, where R is the reward that one receives from
voting, B is the utility gain from getting the preferred outcome, P is the prob-
ability that the individual’s vote will yield the preferred outcome (the proba-
bility that the individual is the pivotal voter), and C is the cost of voting.
According to the calculus of voting equation, if R > 0, then it is rational to
vote and if R 0, then it is not rational to vote. Given the infinitesimal chance
of being the pivotal voter and the notion that C > 0, B would have to be a large
number for R to be positive. Thus, R will typically be negative (even when a
person votes), which means that voting is irrational.
Recognizing that many people vote, despite the irrationality of voting
according to the calculus of voting equation, Riker and Ordeshook (1968)
attempted to modify the equation to account for other factors that might
shape the vote decision. Their famous modification suggests that the calcu-
lus of voting is represented by the equation R = (B × P) − C + D. Here, the
D term represents the positive benefits associated with the act of voting.
Many people think of the D term as the sense of civic duty to vote. According
to Blais and Galais (2016), “The civic duty to vote is the belief that one has
a moral obligation to vote in elections” (p. 61). It is important to note that
the sense of civic duty is about an individual’s sense of obligation, but it is
also about making a contribution to others and ultimately to society as a
whole. Indeed, as Loewen and Dawes (2012) note, “A sense of a duty to
vote is a prosocial orientation applied to politics” (p. 364, emphasis added).
Although voting is often costly to the individual who does it, some people
feel obligated to contribute to their local, state, or national government (or
all of the above), despite the costs of participating, by taking part in elec-
tions. The ability of people to behave prosocially is important for the func-
tioning of democracy.

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