Gasoline in the Voter’s Pocketbook: Driving Times to Work and the Electoral Implications of Gasoline Price Fluctuations

• Author: Joonseok Yang,Sung Eun Kim
• DOI: 10.1177/1532673X211043445
• Published date: 01 May 2022
• Date: 01 May 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

2022, Vol. 50(3) 312 –319

https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X211043445

American Politics Research

© The Author(s) 2021

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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X211043445

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Article

Introduction

Oil prices getting lower. Great! Like a big Tax Cut for America

and the World. Enjoy! $54, was just $82. Thank you to Saudi

Arabia, but let’s go lower!

—President Donald J. Trump, Twitter (@realDonaldTrump),

November 21, 2018

Gasoline prices frequently surge to the forefront of American

political debates. During the presidential campaigns in 2012,

President Barack Obama and Republican candidate Mitt

Romney argued over how to temper soaring gasoline prices.1

The contention closely resembled the heated debates between

George W. Bush and John Kerry in 20042 and between

Barack Obama and John McCain in 2008.3 Further, the polit-

icization of gasoline prices applies not only to increases but

also to decreases: President Trump recently claimed credit

for low gasoline prices, attributing the drop in price to his

energy policy and diplomatic endeavors.4

Nonetheless, the US presidents have only limited control

over global gas prices. While various government policies,

such as import tariffs, infrastructure investment, renewable

energy policies, and environmental standards, can nudge gas-

oline prices in one direction or another, the market principle

of global supply and demand mainly determines the day-to-

day oil price.5 Gasoline price fluctuation is thus largely deter-

mined by various foreign events beyond presidential control.

This implies that it is not a mere product of the presidential

political business cycle (Harbridge et al., 2016).6 In fact, the

US is a “price taker” in the global oil market, where short-run

price fluctuations are largely shaped by various global factors

such as crude oil production and oil trading in the futures

market.7 The frequent politicization of gasoline prices then

raises two related questions: (1) Do voters reward or punish

the president for the changes in gasoline prices?, and (2) Why

might voters blame a president for outcomes that the presi-

dents have limited control over? Two mechanisms can

account for the electoral effects of gasoline prices. First, vot-

ers may respond to gasoline price changes based on “pocket-

book” considerations. Changes in gas prices can create sizable

gains or losses for individual voters and may affect their per-

sonal economic situations. Second, voters can be motivated

by a “sociotropic” consideration. Voters may give weight to

gasoline prices because commodity prices often serve as an

informational cue about the national economy in general.

Both pocketbook and sociotropic voting are theoretically

well-grounded (e.g., Fiorina, 1981; Gomez & Wilson, 2001;

1043445

APRXXX10.1177/1532673X211043445American Politics ResearchKim and Yang

research-article

2021

1Korea University, Seongbuk-gu, Seoul, Korea, Republic of

2Sungkyunkwan University, Jongno-gu, Seoul, Korea, Republic of

Corresponding Author:

Joonseok Yang, Sungkyunkwan University, 25-2 Sungkyunkwan-ro,

Myeongnyun 3(sam)ga-dong, Jongno-gu 03063, Seoul, Korea, Republic of.

Email: jsyang01@skku.edu

Gasoline in the Voter’s Pocketbook:

Driving Times to Work and the

Electoral Implications of Gasoline

Price Fluctuations

Sung Eun Kim1 and Joonseok Yang2

Abstract

Gasoline prices are often a heated topic during presidential election campaigns in the United States. Yet, presidents have

limited control over gasoline prices. Do voters reward or punish the president for changes in gasoline prices? Why might

voters blame the president for an outcome beyond direct presidential control? This study addresses these questions by

testing the effects of gasoline prices on pocketbook retrospection by voters. To capture the personal economic burden of

gasoline prices, we rely on average driving times to work, given the inelastic nature of gasoline consumption for commuting.

The results provide evidence for pocketbook voting: constituencies with longer average driving times to work are more

likely to hold the president accountable for gasoline price increases. These findings have broader implications regarding

electoral accountability and rationality in voting.

Keywords

gasoline price, economic voting, presidential Election, pocketbook voting, electoral accountability, rationality of voting