Game Theory and the Social Contract, Vol. 1, Playing Fair.

• Author: Ortmann, Andreas

Ken Binmore is a mathematician-turned-game theorist/experimental economist extraordinaire. He argues that "much insight into ethical matters can be gained by approaching them systematically from a game-theoretic perspective" [p. vii]. Not any old game-theoretic perspective, mind you. Binmore has contributed important essays on the foundations of game theory - How to model a rational player? What is common knowledge? - and the relationship between what he termed the "eductive" and "evolutive" approach to non-cooperative game theory [1]. The former signifies the conventional game-theoretic perspective whose somewhat heroic rationality and knowledge requirements have made it a convenient target for those eager to dismiss it. The latter is a complementary approach that gets rid of some of those requirements and tracks by way of evolutionary systems - essentially systems of difference or differential equations - the evolution of a population's actions over time. During the past decade advances in game theory, in particular for games with multiple equilibria, have often been generated by attempts of game theorists and experimental economists to understand better the relationship between the two approaches.

Equipped with these conceptual lenses, Binmore has revisited foundational issues concerning the nature of social contracts, and such constructs as the original position, and the categorical imperative. This inevitably abstract and academic investigation nevertheless has a political subtext. Binmore - a self-declared whig whose thinking on social contract issues can be traced back to the early 80's [2] and the reigns of Thatcher and Reagan - sees his investigation "as a piece of rhetoric aimed at open-minded conservatives" [p. 4].

His investigation's major theme is the claim that there is no such thing as a priori principles of morality or moral absolutes. The social fabric of a society, and hence standards of moral conduct, consists of commonly understood conventions. These conventions are the result of evolutionary processes in which society's members interact repeatedly in a self-interested, though enlightened manner. Consequently, the social fabric, and its underlying seemingly flimsy foundation of commonly understood conventions, ought to be conceptualized as a dynamic equilibrium. This "bottom-up approach to ethical issues" [p. 139] contrasts with top-down teleological approaches to ethical issues like the categorical imperative; it also...