Fundraising for Favors? Linking Lobbyist-Hosted Fundraisers to Legislative Benefits

Published date01 December 2018
Date01 December 2018
DOI10.1177/1065912918771745
Subject MatterArticles
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771745PRQXXX10.1177/1065912918771745Political Research QuarterlyMcKay
research-article2018
Article
Political Research Quarterly
2018, Vol. 71(4) 869 –880
Fundraising for Favors? Linking
© 2018 University of Utah
Lobbyist-Hosted Fundraisers to
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Legislative Benefits
https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918771745
DOI: 10.1177/1065912918771745
journals.sagepub.com/home/prq
Amy Melissa McKay1
Abstract
Do legislators and lobbyists trade favors? This study uses uncommon data sources and plagiarism software to detect a
rarely observed relationship between interest group lobbyists and sitting Members of Congress. Comparison of letters
to a Senate committee written by lobby groups to legislative amendments introduced by committee members reveals
similar and even identical language, providing compelling evidence that groups persuaded legislators to introduce
amendments valued by the group. Moreover, the analysis suggests that these language matches are more likely when
the requesting lobby group hosts a fundraising event for the senator. The results hold while controlling for ideological
agreement between the senator and the group, the group’s campaign contributions to the senator, and the group’s
lobbying expenditures, annual revenue, and home-state connections.
Keywords
interest groups, lobbying, campaign contributions, fundraising, Affordable Care Act, U.S. Congress
More than a hundred campaign fundraisers occur in an aver-
group’s legislative requests on a bill of major public impor-
age week in Washington.1 Political fundraising in tance. I show that senators are more likely to perform leg-
Washington is a thriving industry, with many firms dedi-
islative favors for lobbyists who fundraise for them than
cated to hosting fundraisers, inviting people to attend, and
for lobbyists and groups that do not. While no study of
soliciting contributions. Journalistic accounts describe pro-
money in politics can prove a causal link, in a literature
fessional fundraisers and fundraising firms that collect and
replete with null findings (Lowery 2013), the observed
exploit lists of willing donors, leadership political action
relationship between hosting fundraisers and securing
committees (PACs)2 that allow double contributions to
desired policy provisions is provocative and robust.
Members of Congress, and privileges (such as listening in
on a conference call of high-ranking Members) that are
Previous Literature on Political
exchanged for large contributions (in this example, $250,000
to the party) (Birnbaum 2000). The concerned citizen asks,
Fundraising
“Who is providing all of this fundraising assistance, and
Several decades of studies have investigated campaign
what are they getting in return?”
contributions as both explanatory and dependent vari-
Good governance groups and the government itself
ables. Fundraising, meanwhile, is treated in the literature
express concern about fundraising practices and the lobby-
as little more than the amassing of campaign contribu-
ists who provide them. Yet fundraising events, unlike lob-
tions. Existing studies examine fundraising only indirectly
bying activities and contributions, are not publicly reported.
as it relates to candidates and elections (e.g., Heberlig
As a result, previous scholars have not had access to data
2003; Herrnson 1992; Smidt and Christenson 2012). Little
that allow examination of whether fundraising events—
attention has been given to the relationship between the
and the lobbyists who typically host them—have any effect
on the benefitting legislators. This study uses for the first
1University of Exeter, UK
time data containing instances of fundraising by specific
interest group lobbyists on behalf of specific incumbent
Corresponding Author:
Amy Melissa McKay, University of Exeter, Amory Building, Rennes
Members of Congress. It then links these fundraising
Drive, Exeter EX4 4RJ, UK.
events to activities by senators in pursuit of the interest
Email: A.McKay@exeter.ac.uk


870
Political Research Quarterly 71(4)
Leech 1998; Burstein and Linton 2002; de Figueiredo and
Richter 2014; Smith 1995; Stratmann 2005). Others have
argued that campaign contributions matter subject to cer-
tain conditions, such as low issue or vote salience (Morton
and Cameron 1992; Sorauf 1992), whether the issue is
ideological (Witko 2006), or the subject of the vote.
Fellowes and Wolf (2004), for example, find contributions
from business to be a factor in Members’ votes on regula-
tory and tax matters but not on direct government
spending.
Access
Various scholars have studied how campaign contribu-
tions influence the level of access that donors have to
Members of Congress, and some have provided indica-
tive evidence that donors do get greater access to legisla-
tors (Kalla and Broockman 2016; Langbein 1986; but see
Chin, Bond, and Geva 2000).
Effort
A third category of theories makes the case that campaign
contributions buy legislators’ effort on behalf of contribut-
ing interest groups (e.g., Evans 1996; Witko 2006).
Building on the argument of Denzau and Munger (1986)
Figure 1. Example of a fundraiser invitation.
that legislators pursue policy goals when the supply price
This invitation (Figure 1) describes a “private dinner” in January of
2017 at a Washington restaurant with “special guest Majority Whip
of doing so is low, Hall and Wayman (1990) find that cam-
Steve Scalise” benefiting the Scalise Leadership PAC (political action
paign contributions marginally increase Member effort in
committee). The invitation describes “requested contribution levels”
pursuing the goals of the contributing organization. The
of $5,000 or $2,500 for PACs and $1,000 for individuals. The event
authors conclude that an exchange is taking place between
is hosted by several PACs representing the health care insurance
industry—the companies Aflac and Cigna and the professional
Members’ effort on behalf of lobbyists and lobby groups’
associations America’s Health Insurance Plans and the National
campaign contributions to the member. In later work, Hall
Association of Insurers and Financial Advisors. All four of these
and Deardorff (2006) formally argue that lobbyists pro-
groups gave $5,000 to the Representative’s campaign plus $5,000 to
the Scalise leadership PAC in the 2018 cycle. The RSVP information
vide a legislative subsidy to Members of Congress in the
indicates that Drucker Lawhon, a known organizer of Republican
forms of labor, policy information, and political intelli-
fundraiser events (see https://www.opensecrets.org/expends/vendor.
gence, and these subsidies enable Members to focus
php?year=2016&vendor=Drucker+Lawhon), is supporting the event.
resources on the issues of greatest interest to them.
The invitation was found in Eskow (2017).
Fundraising might be provided in exchange for a legisla-
tive benefit, or serve as a legislative subsidy, or both.
politician and the person or group that facilitates this nec-
essary activity. Furthermore, within the literature on the
effects of campaign contributions on legislative policy-
Theory and Hypothesis
making, firm consensus is lacking. Theories focus on
Congressional votes are publicly visible and easily
three kinds of influence—votes, access, and effort.
counted. Interest groups and Members, therefore, have an
incentive to minimize the appearance of vote-buying.
Votes
Access, meanwhile, is less easily observed and counted
than votes. But the effort of Members of Congress is the
Some scholars offer evidence that campaign donations
most difficult form of influence to measure. Doing so has
have a demonstrable influence on legislators’ votes (e.g.,
required delving deeply into what is happening behind
Roscoe and Jenkins 2005; Stratmann 1998; Wawro 2001),
the scenes, as Hall and Wayman (1990) did. Their index
while more have argued that campaign money has little
of legislative effort reflects how much time and energy
influence over votes (e.g., Baumgartner et al. 2009; Wright
Members spent on behalf of the contributing PACs—
1990; for reviews of this literature, see Baumgartner and
attending hearings and votes, speaking at hearings, voting

McKay
871
in favor in their interest, behind-the-scenes negotiating
contributions limited to $2,400 for individuals or $5,000
and persuasion, and, importantly for our purposes, offer-
for PACs did not go very far toward meeting candidates’
ing amendments to the committee bill. The present study
fundraising targets. Moreover, while all federal contribu-
follows in this vein, using as evidence the text of 564
tions over $200 must be reported, the law’s efforts to
amendments offered by members of the U.S. Senators
require “bundled” contributions to be disclosed still
Committee on Finance to the legislation that became the
leaves most fundraising activity opaque.5
Affordable Care Act.
The unrelenting pressure on congressional candidates
Studies of the influence of political money on policy
to fundraise, combined with the significant benefits that
outcomes suggest that influence is more likely to occur (or
successful legislative requests provide to lobbyists, create
to be observed) when the issue or vote is of low salience
incentives for the two sides to trade favors. Since both
(Fellowes and Wolf 2004; Godwin, Lopez, and Seldon
fundraising assistance and interest-group-requested
2008; Gordon 2001;...

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