Fundamental reform in public safety communications policy.

• Author: Peha, Jon M.

1. INTRODUCTION II. QUESTIONING TODAY'S ORTHODOXY FOR PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS A. Today's Basic Assumptions B. A Time for Change C. Properties of a Good System D. Let Each Local Agency Decide: Flexibility Above All E. Commercial Service Providers Need Not Apply F. Public Safety Does Not Share G. Emphasis on Voice Communications III. ALTERNATIVE VISIONS A. Primary Systems Run by Government Agencies B. Primary Systems Run by Commercial Wireless Carriers C. Secondary Systems IV. ENSURING THAT LOCAL AGENCIES ARE WELL SERVED V. NEXT STEPS TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE POLICY VI. SUMMARY I. INTRODUCTION

   All across the country, there have been failures in the communications systems used by first responders, such as firefighters, police, paramedics, and the National Guard. These failures can cost lives in emergencies both large and small. This problem has gained particular attention in the tragic aftermaths of the 9/11 attacks (1) and Hurricane Katrina, (2) when inadequacies in the current system were particularly obvious, but attention has not yet translated to significant progress. As observed by the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate Hurricane Katrina, "[w]ithout functioning communications systems, first responders and government officials cannot establish meaningful command and control, nor can they develop the situational awareness necessary to know how and where to direct their response and recovery efforts." (3)

   Policymakers have considered a variety of remedies to these problems. Most have been small incremental adjustments to long-standing policy. Incremental change is sometimes useful, but when problems are pervasive, the impact of incremental reform will be limited. This Article argues that the problems with public safety communications are rooted in policies that have been in place for many decades and have long outlived their usefulness. Fundamental reform is needed. In the long run, fundamental reform will yield superior systems and will save resources. In the initial transitional period, the federal government should provide resources in the form of spectrum and funding. These resources are indeed coming. With them comes a great opportunity to improve public safety communications. Unfortunately, these resources are likely to be used in ways determined well before 9/11, under the auspices of these same policies that led to today's problems. If so, the resources will be wasted, and the opportunity lost.

   Thanks to the transition to digital television, 84 MHz of spectrum will become available in 2009, 24 MHz of which have tentatively been allocated for public safety. (4) This roughly doubles the spectrum under 2 GHz that is allocated to public safety. (5) Moreover, this spectrum is around 700 MHz, which means it has physical properties that are particularly useful when designing a communications system that must cover a large geographic region. A nationwide block of this size, unencumbered with old equipment, is a great opportunity, at least if it is governed by effective policies.

   In a strangely unrelated effort, the federal government also has plans to invest $3 to $30 billion and a significant amount of spectrum in the Integrated Wireless Network ("IWN") program, (6) which is intended to provide communications services for a small fraction of first responders, i.e., those that work for federal agencies. This Article will discuss how these resources could be used to address the larger problems faced by all first responders.

   Part II describes the policies that have produced today's public safety communications systems, and why it is time for fundamental change to those policies. Part III presents alternative directions for the future. Part IV discusses how to ensure that local public safety agencies are well served and given incentive to endorse and participate in the reform process. Part V presents the next logical steps in the reform process. The Article is summarized in Part VI.

2. QUESTIONING TODAY'S ORTHODOXY FOR PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS

   Part II.A presents basic assumptions that have long dominated how public safety communications are provided. Part II.B explains why it is time to question such assumptions. Criteria for judging a good system are presented in Part II.C, and Parts II.D through II.G describe how today's basic assumptions can be harmful based on these criteria.

   1. Today's Basic Assumptions

      Today's public safety communications infrastructure is built on a number of traditional assumptions. It is assumed that primary responsibility for and authority over public safety communications lies with local governments. In most states, final decisions about infrastructure are made by individual municipal public safety agencies--such as fire departments or police departments--beyond the control of even the central units of local government, such as the Chief Technology Officer for a city or county. Federal agencies provide some assistance in the form of grants or technical advice, but the majority of the funding also comes from local governments.

      It is assumed that public safety agencies must operate their own communications systems and cannot make significant use of commercial companies or municipal networks that provide wireless services (although commercial companies usually provide wireline services without controversy).

      It is assumed that public safety communications must take place in spectrum that is dedicated entirely to public safety using equipment that is dedicated entirely to public safety. Thus, public safety cannot share spectrum allocations or network infrastructure with either commercial subscribers or other government users.

      It is assumed that narrowband real-time voice communications is the principal application for public safety. Other forms of communications are secondary in importance, or they are not available at all. Moreover, in most cases, voice communications are provided separately from other services. Thus, in the spectrum to be reallocated from TV, proposals to provide voice communications as one of many services over a broadband network have received less serious attention.

   2. A Time for Change

      The above assumptions have prevailed in the U.S. for many decades, so why question them now? Because the world has changed.

      First, 9/11 marks a fundamental change in requirements. It is now far more important that we be prepared to respond to large-scale disasters that require a cooperative response from many public safety agencies. A failure rate for interagency communications that was acceptable before 9/11 may not be acceptable today, even if that means giving up some local autonomy.

      Second, the technology has changed dramatically. The results of this progress are obvious in commercial and military wireless systems but are not so apparent in public safety systems. In many cases, current policy and its emphasis on flexibility is an impediment to adopting new technology. For example, effective use of wireless technology can require coordinated planning over a wide frequency band, a large geographic region, or both. Moreover, useful maps or photos may be stored in a jurisdiction far from the emergency, and such information cannot be shared dynamically unless public safety agencies in both jurisdictions have independently decided to invest in a shared infrastructure to connect them.

      Third, costs have changed. In particular, the rapid growth of commercial wireless services has led to mass production and low costs. Thus, equipment used by public safety could be much cheaper than was once possible, if it is similar enough to equipment used in commercial markets. On the other hand, demand for spectrum has increased, making it more valuable. Thus, the many public safety systems designed to reduce equipment costs by consuming more spectrum are far less appropriate today, particularly considering the opportunity costs of spectrum inefficiency to the larger economy.

      Finally, some people have expressed frustration over the progress achieved, despite all of the money allocated to incremental improvements. As stated by the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate Hurricane Katrina, "[d]espite hundreds of millions in federal funding for technology and communications, the absence of true communication interoperability within and between affected jurisdictions severely hindered rescue and response efforts at all levels of government" after Hurricane Katrina. (7) After all, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff said in May 2006 that his Department alone had "allocated over $2.1 billion to states for interoperable communications" since 2003. (8) Perhaps the problem is not a lack of resources for incremental change, but a lack of vision to promote more effective change.

      Not only is this a time to question old assumptions; it is a time to recognize an extraordinary opportunity coming to adopt a new approach in the band reallocated from TV spectrum, which has few legacy communications systems that must be altered or replaced and few entrenched bureaucratic procedures.

   3. Properties of a Good System

      By considering a new approach to public safety communications, we could try to make progress in the following critical areas.

      Interoperability: Interoperability is the ability of individuals from different organizations to communicate and share information. It has often been cited as a major problem for public safety in the U.S. For example, when first responders from multiple public safety agencies arrived at Columbine High School after the shooting in 1999, interoperability problems were so great that they had to rely on runners to carry written messages from one agency's command center to another. (9)

      Spectral Efficiency: It is technically possible to support today's first responders using far less spectrum. (10) When spectrum is used inefficiently, there is a greater risk that public safety will experience a shortage. With a shortage, systems would become...