From accomodation to confrontation: the Muslim Brotherhood in the Mubarak years.

• Author: Campagna, Joel
• Position: Egypt, Hosni Mubarak

Introduction

On 23 November 1995, Egypt's Supreme Military Court sentenced 54 leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood to prison terms ranging from 3 to 5 years with hard labor. The trial marked the culmination of a turbulent four-year period which witnessed a deterioration of the state's tolerance for the outlawed Brotherhood -- Egypt's largest political opposition group.

Significantly, the court's verdict, charging the defendants with membership in an illegal organization(1) and ordering the closure of the Brotherhood's headquarters in downtown Cairo, represents the first prosecution of members of the organization by a military court since 1965, when Nasir -- for the second time during his presidency -- sought to crush the Brotherhood by imprisoning its revived leadership. The recent move by the Mubarak regime against the organization's active younger leadership demonstrates a marked departure from the policy of accommodation and tolerance toward the Brotherhood that prevailed for much of the 1980s. This policy, in the past, had afforded the organization wide berth to function as a technically illegal, but widely recognized, political entity, allowing the group's indirect participation in parliamentary elections and the growth of its operations in the field of social services throughout the country.

The November court decision, preceded by arrests of scores of Brotherhood members throughout 1995, raised considerable debate within Egypt about the significance of the crackdown against the organization. Opposition newspapers and political commentators directed attention to the parliamentary elections the same month and a government strategy to prevent prominent Brotherhood candidates, forecasted by many to score substantial victories at the polls, from participating. The strength of such arguments was buttressed by the scope of the 1995 crackdown, during which 81 Muslim Brothers -- all of them former parliamentarians, leading civic activists, or parliamentary candidates -- were prosecuted in 2 trials before the Supreme Military Court. They comprised the organization's younger dynamic leadership within professional associations, university faculty clubs and non-governmental organizations. As for the People's Assembly (majlis al-sha'b) election, it is noteworthy that not one of the approximately 150 Muslim Brotherhood candidates who competed as independents or under the Labor (al-'Amal) Party name won a seat(2) in a contest which local and international human rights groups saw tainted by extraordinary government interference and strong repression against Brotherhood candidates and campaign workers.(3)

While the above hypotheses present a plausible interpretation of events, the behavior of the state over the past four years strongly suggests that the recent crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood goes beyond the 1995 People's Assembly election. Rather, it represents a longer-term strategy -- one which has been in effect for the past four years -- designed to severely curtail the Brotherhood's gains within civil society and weaken its ability to garner increased grassroots support. The state's gradual intensification of its crackdown against the group coincides with several important events during the 1990s which highlight the Mubarak regime's growing concern about the Brotherhood's increasing influence across a broad range of societal levels.

The earliest evidence of the regime's changed attitude toward the group can be traced to the mid-1980s following the Brotherhood's unanticipated success in parliamentary elections (see next section below). However, events of the 1990s, beginning with a parliamentary election boycott by opposition parties -- including the Brotherhood -- and the rising influence of the organization within professional associations and other civil institutions, grasped the state's attention. The regime viewed the group's increasingly visible participation in civil and political life as a formidable threat to its own declining legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary Egyptians. Initially, the response was cautious, yet the authorities' more confrontational stance toward the group was evident as early as 1991, when it began to target suspected members for arrest, followed by rigorous legislative initiatives in 1993 aimed at curtailing Brotherhood influence in professional syndicates such as the national medical and engineering associations. At about the same time, state officials and the semi-official press launched an increasingly zealous media campaign which sought to discredit the group by labeling it a "terrorist" organization operating in close coordination with radical segments of the Islamic movement, despite the Brotherhood's publicly expressed commitment to nonviolence in pursuit of its political goals. The harsh military court convictions in November 1995 represent the most serious action to date, and provide the latest evidence of an ongoing strategy to dilute the Muslim Brotherhood's power base in civil society.

This paper examines events over the last decade which precipitated the state's move toward a strategy of confrontation in the 1990s with the Brotherhood. The reasons for such a response, it will be shown, are directly related to the group's demonstrated ability to serve as a potent and growing political movement capable of mobilizing broad-based support. The Brotherhood's increased legitimization, enhanced by its independent stand on major political issues and its demonstrated support within key institutions of civil society, generated a defensive reaction by the state, no doubt conscious of its own vulnerability -- the result of narrowly based support throughout the country. In 1995, by carrying out its comprehensive crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood's most effective organizers and activists, the Mubarak government displayed its clear intent to disable the group in the years to come.

Cautious Tolerance and Accommodation: 1981 to 1989

Following the assassination of Anwar Sadat by Muslim militants in October 1981, the Mubarak regime embarked on a policy of appeasement toward the Brotherhood, releasing from prison its Supreme Guide, Omar al-Tilmassani, and other members arrested during Sadat's so-called "Autumn of Fury" in September 1981. The state's relationship with the Brotherhood during the early 1980s reflected a delicate balance. The regime sought to use the moderate, non-violent Brotherhood as a political counterweight to what was viewed as the more threatening radical Islamist groups on the rise since Sadat's presidency by permitting the still-outlawed group to resume its political activities through its headquarters in downtown Cairo and once again resume publication of its periodicals.(4) In exchange for this new-found freedom, the group refrained from voicing harsh criticism of the regime, while continuing its grassroots activism through social welfare organizations and expanding its power base throughout the country. According to Gilles Kepel, the regime tacitly supported the Brotherhood along with other conservatively religious segments of society in order to enhance its stability. Their moderate stance in calling for change through peaceful tactics as opposed to violent confrontation with the state as articulated by radical groups, was the main determinant for adopting such a policy. "As long as they did not directly challenge the state in political matters, but saw in the sharia (Islamic law) the opportunity to improve society morally, restraining deviant behavior," says Kepel, "they were welcome."(5)

In the view of the state, the trade-off of this policy was acceptable, since any advantages gained by the group as a result of its increased political freedom would be offset by forcing the Brotherhood to compete openly with secular opposition parties, thus exposing what was perceived as obvious and inherent weaknesses of the movement. The belief was that greater public exposure of the group's ideas would lessen its ability to appeal to citizens on the basis of its "underground" character. Soon, however, this assumption proved incorrect. Egyptian political analyst Diaa Rashwan observes: "[c]onvinced that the Brotherhood posed no real threat, the regime continued to overlook its growing presence till (sic) 1984 when the group scored impressive gains in parliamentary elections through its alliance with the secular Wafd Party."(6)

The results of the 1984 elections, in which the group won 8 seats in the 360-member People's Assembly, came as a surprise to the government and Brotherhood officials alike.(7) It also prompted a subtle change in the state's outlook on the group. As Rashwan notes, this unexpected display of power "alerted the regime to the potential political force of the Brotherhood and prompted it to closely examine the organization's activities."(8) After the election, possible concern was caused by the group's stated intention of stepping-up its criticism of government policy through members in Parliament. The Brotherhood's Supreme Guide, Omar al-Tilmassani, spoke of such plans in a June 1984 interview:

We were completely serious when we joined in the elections. Our aim was to reach Parliament through a legal channel, the Wafd Party, because People's Assembly members enjoy parliamentary immunity. The brothers who will reach the Assembly will speak on behalf of the Brotherhood, will urge enforcement of the Islamic sharia laws, and will embarrass the government on this issue without fear of detention or torture....Now some of them [Muslim Brothers] are People's Assembly members, watching the government and entitled to make it account for its actions.(9)

Despite such bold statements, the state in the ensuing months generally saw the Brotherhood as constituting little in terms of a threat -- particularly as its demands for implementing sharia in Parliament were thwarted. Also, the influence of Islamic radicals at the time was limited to...