From Quiet to Noisy Politics: Transformations of Swiss Business Elites’ Power*

• DOI: 10.1177/0032329220985693
• Author: Stéphanie Ginalski,Thomas David,André Mach,Felix Bühlmann
• Date: 01 March 2021
• Published date: 01 March 2021
• Subject Matter: Special Issue Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329220985693

Politics & Society

2021, Vol. 49(1) 17 –41

© The Author(s) 2020

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DOI: 10.1177/0032329220985693

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Special Issue Article

From Quiet to Noisy Politics:

Transformations of Swiss

Business Elites’ Power*

André Mach, Thomas David, Stéphanie Ginalski,

and Felix Bühlmann

University of Lausanne

Abstract

During most of the twentieth century, it was possible to consider Switzerland a

coordinated market economy, characterized by dense interfirm networks and

the strong role of business associations. Thanks to their cohesion and collective

organization, in a context of quiet politics and informal institutions, business

elites could largely self-regulate major socioeconomic issues in the shadow of

politics. However, since the end of the twentieth century, Swiss business elites

have undergone profound changes not only in their composition, but also in their

coordinating capacity, their growing political divisions, and their connections to

politics. This growing sociological and political fragmentation, combined with changes

in the way of doing politics, through noisier and more formal politics, has weakened

the instrumental power of Swiss business elites. To compensate for this loss of

direct influence, business elites of the largest Swiss companies have developed new

political strategies, relying on their growing structural power in a context of global

and financial capitalism.

Keywords

business power, elites, noisy politics, structural power, Switzerland

Corresponding Author:

André Mach, Institute of Political Studies, University of Lausanne, Switzerland.

Email: andre.mach@unil.ch

*This is one of six articles that constitute a special issue titled “Quiet Politics and the Power of Business:

New Perspectives in an Era of Noisy Politics.” Some of the articles in the issue were first presented

at the SASE annual meeting at the Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 in June 2017, organized by

Glenn Morgan, Christoph Houman Ellersgaard, Stéphanie Ginalski, and Christian Lyhne Ibsen, and at

a workshop at the University of Bristol funded by the School of Management and the Political Studies

Association section on Labour Movements in June 2018, organized by Glenn Morgan, Christian Lyhne

Ibsen, and Magnus Feldmann.

985693PASXXX10.1177/0032329220985693Politics & SocietyMach et al.

research-article2020

18 Politics & Society 49(1)

In the comparative political economy literature, Switzerland was often considered a

coordinated market economy. It combined collective mechanisms of coordination

with a more liberal regulation of the labor market—setting it apart from its big north-

ern neighbor, Germany. In the absence of strong trade unions, Swiss socioeconomic

institutions were largely shaped by business elites and their associations. In the context

of a weak central state and highly organized business interests, Swiss economic elites

and business interest associations (BIAs) have been the central architects of socioeco-

nomic institutions such as labor market regulations, vocational training systems, cor-

porate governance, financial market regulations, and product markets.

The Swiss economy was characterized by its early export orientation and free trade

policy. However, because of the small size of its domestic market, it also entailed some

“selective protectionist” measures largely organized by BIAs and elites. These protec-

tionist measures allowed Switzerland to limit the penetration of foreign products and

owners. International investors often called Switzerland the “Fortress of the Alps,”

because of its protectionist mechanisms (codified in company law)—which made it

difficult to take control of Swiss companies from abroad—or the “paradise of cartels,”

because of the tolerance for collusive practices among Swiss companies in the domes-

tic market. Michel Albert underscored this point about restrictive Swiss practices

when he discussed the distinction between Anglo-Saxon and Rhine capitalism:

It was during a visit to the Swiss subsidiary of my firm, Assurances Générales de France

(AGF), that I was first alerted to the unique features of Alpine capitalism. I had always

thought of Switzerland as the very incarnation of liberal economic philosophy and

laissez-faire capitalism. Thus I was baffled when, to my question about the firm’s

approach to setting vehicle insurance rates, the managing director replied that there was

no company policy in the matter—there could never be—because all Swiss insurers had

to offer the same rates. I could hardly believe my ears: having for many years advised the

French government on economic policy, and having always championed the abolition of

price controls, I was forced to conclude that France was a far more liberal country than

Switzerland.1

Swiss socioeconomic institutions were shaped and developed by economic and

political actors. In order to understand this process, it is necessary to bridge the gap

between research on elites and comparative political economy. In this process, busi-

ness elites and top managers of companies, as well as leaders of BIAs, represent major

actors in designing and stabilizing the rules of the game and the socioeconomic institu-

tions central to the functioning of an economy. The way business elites are organized

and coordinated largely explains the formation of socioeconomic institutions, which,

in turn, contribute to consolidate the organization of business.

Culpepper’s analytical framework on the power of business is particularly relevant

in helping to bridge the gap between business elites research and the formation of

socioeconomic institutions.2 It explains under which conditions actors decide to regu-

late socioeconomic issues such as social policies, labor market regulations, or corpo-

rate governance. Two dimensions are decisive in explaining the power of business:

first, how much the public cares about a political issue (high vs. low salience); second,