Fresh Cadres bring Fresh Air? Personnel Turnover, Institutions, and China's Water Pollutions

• Author: Pinghan Liang,Nan Gao
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12225
• Date: 01 February 2016
• Published date: 01 February 2016

Fresh Cadres bring Fresh Air? Personnel Turnover,

Institutions, and China’s Water Pollutions

Nan Gao and Pinghan Liang*

Abstract

Weak law enforcement is usually blamed for the dramatic deterioration of the environment in China.

Using a panel data covering 287 Chinese prefecture-cities during 2004–2011, we investigate the role of

personnel turnover and institutions in water pollution. We show that water pollution deteriorates with

the tenure of incumbent mayors. Mayor turnover and institutional quality are associated with lower

pollution. Furthermore, personnel turnover and institutions complement each other in mitigating

pollution: the influence of mayor turnover on pollution reduction is larger in the cities endowed with

stronger executive constraints. We also suggest some channels through which personnel turnover affects

water pollution. In general, we illustrate that the turnover of cadres has only limited and temporary

effects in mitigating pollution.

1. Introduction

Growing at an extraordinarily 10% average annual rate for more than three

decades, China has become the second largest economy in the world. Meanwhile,

China also faces remarkable pollution challenges. Many cities in China have

extremely high air pollution levels and roughly 70% of the river water was unsafe

for human consumption at the beginning of this century. Despite a series of

environmental regulations introduced since 2000, the weak enforcement at the local

level mitigates the implementation of environmental policies. In China, a one-party

authoritarian state, top-down personnel control is frequently used to ensure the

loyalty of local officials. This paper investigates the effectiveness of personnel

turnover on environmental protection.

Using a panel data covering 287 prefecture-level cities during 2004–2011, this

paper investigates the impacts of mayor turnover on water pollution. We are

concerned with the magnitude and limits of the effects of personnel turnover. We

demonstrate that the extent of water pollution (measured in the number of

disclosed water pollution accidents) significantly increases with the tenure of

mayors: every one more year tenure of the incumbent mayor is associated with 4%

more water pollution accidents. In contrast, better local institutions, e.g. executive

constraints, reduce the number of accidents. By using a fixed effect model, we show

that a new mayor could temporarily mitigate pollution: the water pollution

accidents are nearly 13.1% lower during the first two years of the new mayor’s

tenure. However, this beneficial effect of personnel turnover is substantially

alleviated in a province with relatively weak institutions. To a certain extent our

*Liang: Research Institute of Economics and Management, Southwestern University of Finance and

Economics, 55 Guanghuacun Street, Chengdu, 610074, China. Tel: +86-28-873-52178, E-mail:

liangph@swufe.edu.cn. Gao: Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, 430073, China. The

authors wish to thank to an anonymous referee, Anping Chen, Qinying He, Han Li, Liguo Lin, Jia Yuan,

Junfu Zhang and the attendants of various seminars. The financial support from the China Scholarship

Council and National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No: 71503208) is acknowledged.

Review of Development Economics, 20(1), 48–61, 2016

DOI:10.1111/rode.12225

©2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd