Freedom of Thought as a Basic Liberty

DOI10.1177/0090591716676293
AuthorLucas Swaine
Published date01 June 2018
Date01 June 2018
Subject MatterArticles
Political Theory
2018, Vol. 46(3) 405 –425
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DOI: 10.1177/0090591716676293
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Article
Freedom of Thought as a
Basic Liberty
Lucas Swaine1
Abstract
Freedom of thought has been lauded in political theory and celebrated
in human rights discourse. But what kind of freedom is it? I propose that
freedom of thought deserves status as a basic liberty, given the significance
of thought to human life, the fundamental importance of freedom of thought
in establishing and sustaining crucial rights and freedoms, and the value of
being able to develop and experience one’s thoughts without undue influence
from others.
Keywords
liberty, thinking, thought, liberalism, human rights
Is freedom of thought a basic liberty? Notable statements in the liberal canon
suggest that it is, and a number of prominent international declarations and
resolutions voice the idea that something special graces freedom of thought.
But the nature of freedom of thought remains unclear; and it is far from obvious
that freedom of thought merits status as a basic liberty, alongside cardinal and
established freedoms of expression, religion, conscience, and association.
I examine whether freedom of thought should be considered a basic lib-
erty, in this article. I begin by noting the centrality of thinking to human life,
following which I elaborate a set of important views that emphasize the sig-
nificance of freedom of thought. I consider subsequently the place of
1Department of Government, Dartmouth College, NH, USA
Corresponding Author:
Lucas Swaine, Department of Government, Silsby Hall, Dartmouth College, Hanover,
NH 03755, USA.
Email: lucas.swaine@dartmouth.edu
676293PTXXXX10.1177/0090591716676293Political TheorySwaine
research-article2016
406 Political Theory 46(3)
freedom of thought in liberal political theory and in human rights discourse,
examining prominent statements within those traditions. I move then to
assess whether freedom of thought is distinguishable with respect to other
key liberties, following which I employ my findings to consider whether
freedom of thought merits status as a liberty of the basic kind. In the course
of analysis, I give reason to hold that freedom of thought is indeed special
and distinctive. I propose that freedom of thought deserves status as a basic
liberty, given the significance of thought to human life, the fundamental
importance of freedom of thought in establishing and sustaining crucial rights
and liberties, and the value of being able to develop and experience one’s
thoughts without undue interference from others.
The Importance of Thought
Thinking is a deeply important part of human life. Reflection and cogitation
sparkle in the realm of thought, and it is in thinking that ideas take shape.
Thinking connects to action, conditioning behavior and contributing to the
generation of outward activity. People’s social and political exchanges
involve and imply thoughts. When people air their opinions, they employ
their mental faculties, their expressions often reflecting the ideas and views
they possess. Thinking matters also when one disengages from conversation.
People spend a considerable amount of time alone with their thoughts; some
of this may be taken up in rumination or imagination, some spent evaluating
desires and assessing goals.
Thinking reveals additional significance when one considers what it might
be like not to think at all. It is common enough for authors to decry the lack
of careful thought in democratic majorities, or to bemoan citizens’ disuse of
their mental capacities. But critics chide the public for not thinking well, or
enough, or about the right things; or they voice concern about citizens draw-
ing unjustified or false conclusions and circulating them as though the points
were warranted and true. The critics’ concerns are not that citizens do not
think at all. To be devoid of thought would be not to exist as a social being, in
a normal, human sense of the word. Literally not to think would be to sleep-
walk dreamlessly through life; it would be to suffer exile from the fellowship
of mankind, as Philoctetes might say, marooned without even the quiet com-
pany of one’s mind.
The Idea of Freedom of Thought
Like thinking itself, the idea of freedom of thought proves to be a weighty
concern garnering support from many points on the political spectrum. Rosa

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