Freedom of Navigation Assertions

• Author: Amitai Etzioni
• Date: 01 July 2016
• Published date: 01 July 2016
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X15599635
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Freedom of Navigation

Assertions: The United

States as the World’s

Policeman

Amitai Etzioni

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Abstract

In line with its ‘‘Freedom of Navigation’’ program, the United States conducts

‘‘operational assertions’’ by sending naval vessels to violate what it considers to be

the excessive maritime claims of other states. Efforts have been made to legitimate

this program to the public and elected officials on both liberal and realist grounds:

Freedom of navigation is an important component of the liberal international

order while also central to the exercise of U.S. naval power. However, it does

not follow that military assertions, which create a security risk and are incon-

sistent with liberal principles, should take precedence over diplomatic and

multilateral steps. Rather, the program has faced little scrutiny to date due to its

relative obscurity.

Keywords

foreign policy, freedom of navigation, international law, U.S. Navy, liberal interna-

tional order, United States, United Nations (UN), China

Freedom of navigation operational assertions (FONAs

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) are a mission carried out

mainly by the U.S. Navy. The mission is to ensure that when other nations impose

what the United States considers excessive restrictions on the freedom of navigation

(FON) in any place in the world, the Pentagon will send naval ships or aircraft to

1

The George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA

Corresponding Author:

Amitai Etzioni, 1922 F Street NW, Room 413, Washington, DC 20052, USA.

Email: etzioni@gwu.edu

Armed Forces & Society

2016, Vol. 42(3) 501-517

ªThe Author(s) 2015

Reprints and permission:

sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

DOI: 10.1177/0095327X15599635

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demonstrate that the United States will not accept such restrictions. The United

States also publicizes these assertions at the end of each fiscal year in order to further

support the international norms and laws that call for FON or at least the U.S. view

of these norms and laws. (As one Naval Judge Advocate General [JAG] puts it, ‘‘itis

an ‘in your face,’ ‘rub your nose in it’ operation, that lets people know who is the

boss. At least when it comes to FON—the U.S. does serve as the world’s cop’’).

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FONA is part of a larger FON program, which also draws on diplomatic protests and

multilateral consultations, run by the State Department (Maritime Security and

Navigation, n.d.; see also Chen, 2003).

The analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I of this article describes FONA. Part II

briefly discusses the normative and legal justifications provided for FONA and their

assumptions about the extent to which the American public favors liberal interna-

tionalism or American unilateralism and ‘‘realism,’’ that is, power-based, foreign

policy. Part III studies what FONA reveals about the liberal, rule-based, interna-

tional order which the United States claims it is seeking to uphold, of which FON

is a key element. Part IV studies what FONA reveals about the role FON plays in

U.S. military strategy, particularly in terms of power projection and access to littoral

regions, that is, in ‘‘realist’’ terms. The article concludes by noting the ‘‘importance

of being unimportant’’ in the sense that the limited budget, personnel, and publicity

devoted to FONA make it largely invisible to the public and hence not subjected to

scrutiny.

Part I: FONA (and FON)

FONAs are low-profile operations. The Defense Department itself does not currently

publish a detailed description or justification of the program. Instead, it publishes

only a brief yearly summary of FONA on the website of the Under Secretary of

Defense for Policy, listing the countries against which an assertion was conducted,

the ‘‘excessive claims’’ that were protested, and whether or not multiple assertions

were carried out against a given country (without going into specific details about

the date or number of operations). According to these reports, the number of coun-

tries against which assertions were conducted has fluctuated over time, ranging from

as few as 5 each in 2005 and 2006 to as many as 15 in 2000 or 12 in 2013 (Depart-

ment of Defense, 2015). The countries affected include not just U.S. rivals such as

China and Iran but also much smaller powers and nations friendly to the United

States such as the Philippines, Taiwan, and Canada.

For example, the United States conducted assertions against India, a neutral

major power with which the United States has generally good relations, for requiring

authorization ‘‘for military exercises or maneuvers’’ in its Exclusive Economic Zone

(EEZ; Department of Defense, 2015; UN, 2013).

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Iran was subject to assertions for

the same restriction as well as for ‘‘excessive straight baselines’’ and ‘‘restrictionson

right of transit passage through Strait of Hormuz to signatories.’’ Oman was subject

to assertions for its claim to allow only innocent passage,

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or the right to transit

502 Armed Forces & Society 42(3)