Fragmentation and hubris: a shaky basis for American leadership.

• Author: Schlesinger, James R.

Nations, like men, love that which flatters their passions - even more than that which serves their interests.

- Alexis de Tocqueville

As the century draws toward its close, America's position as the leading, if not the dominant, world power appears to be unchallengeable. Yet its preeminence, and certainly its ability to lead, are being undermined by internal weaknesses rather different from those that have affected great powers in the past - weaknesses that were well controlled in that long period of the Second World War and the Cold War during which America achieved that preeminence. Some of these weaknesses are structural, some merely habitual. They range from the character of the American Constitution (whose defects are the obverse side of its strengths), to the American constitution in a broader sense, that is, the elements and the habits of mind of the American Democracy. Included in the latter is a growing hubris, reflecting the weakening of restraints and the absence of a serious challenge in the post-Cold War world, and a naive belief that assertiveness is now cost-free and does not entail serious consequences. Unless we are able to acknowledge and confront these weaknesses, our ability both to lead and to achieve the international goals we seriously pursue will increasingly be eroded.

One must start with the Constitution. The Founding Fathers did not envision a nation absorbed by foreign policy, let alone one that was the world's leading power. They were as much concerned with avoiding the abuse of executive authority as they were with providing the executive power lacking under the Articles of Confederation.

By contrast to executive authority elsewhere, the American presidency is a constitutionally weak office that ultimately remains dependent upon the celebrated "bully pulpit" to win support for a foreign policy. For over a quarter of a century, essentially starting with Pearl Harbor, the inherent weakness of the presidential office in this respect was obscured by the willingness of Congress regularly to defer to the president on important issues. That habit of deference began to disappear around the time of the Tet Offensive, and has further weakened with the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of an ever-present threat.

For many years, the inherent power of the Congress in matters of foreign policy was little understood overseas.(1) Foreign governments typically believed that they could rely on the commitments of the executive branch. Only in recent years has awareness of the power of Congress grown, and other nations, as well as national groups, have turned to it increasingly and with zest. And that, as we shall see, detracts from the potential coherence of American policies.

During the Cold War, the United States was ideally suited for its role of international leader. Its purposes were benign. It generally stood ready to protect other states against external assault, and most others were comfortable under the protective wing of the United States. The American public could focus on a central, seemingly permanent military and political threat. Policies could focus on that threat, and thus be shaped by an overarching design. If the government were inattentive or the policies lacked adequate coherence, the public would demand a change.

By contrast, the United States is far less suited to the role of international leader in the more complex and ambiguous environment of the post-Cold War world. It is difficult to build or sustain public support for an overarching structure. The public mood is volatile and given to the pursuit of multiple and changing objectives, frequently in conflict with one another. To the extent that the public pays attention to foreign policy, it can no longer focus as sharply as it could on the clear villainies of an evil empire.

From the standpoint of U.S. foreign policy, the good news is that there is no major challenge out there, and few are in prospect. But the bad news comes from the same source. Without any serious challenge, both our ambitions and our illusions have tended to grow. With no external check, a set of demands, frequently peremptory, is made on others - often without the necessary engagement on our part or understanding of their position. Thus, despite America's preeminence in the post-Cold War period, our relations with other nations, including many friendly ones, have become subject to growing strain. We have increasingly tended to alienate others and seem scarcely cognizant of their growing annoyance.

Legitimizing Ethnic Politics

What underlies these phenomena? A crucial ingredient has been the sharp decline in the public's concern about foreign policy that has followed the end of the Cold War. In recent polls only 2 percent of the American people indicate that foreign policy is the most important issue facing the country, down from some 30-40 percent in 1984. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat and the fading of public attention, the field has been left open to domestic interest groups that have their own special axes to grind, unhindered by any commonly accepted vision of the national interest. The goals of our foreign policy are said to be the expansion of democracy and market economics. These provide precious little in the way of specific guidance across a range of problems and are subject to easy manipulation. In these circumstances domestic constituencies, most notably ethnic groups, have acquired an excessive influence over our foreign policy. The inevitable consequence is that our policy lacks overall coherence. Rather than reflecting a hammered-out vision of the national interest, America's present...