Forty-plus Years of Iowa Choice-of-law Precedent: the Aftermath of the Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws

• Jurisdiction: Iowa,United States
• Citation: Vol. 43
• Publication year: 2008

43 Creighton L. Rev. 205. FORTY-PLUS YEARS OF IOWA CHOICE-OF-LAW PRECEDENT: THE AFTERMATH OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

FORTY-PLUS YEARS OF IOWA CHOICE-OF-LAW PRECEDENT: THE AFTERMATH OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

KEVIN TUININGA(fn*)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ................................... 206

II. TORT RULES ...................................... 208

A. Default Tort Rule ............................... 208

B. Tort Exception #1 ............................... 209

C. Tort Exception #2 ............................... 215

III. CONTRACT RULES ................................ 216

A. Contract Rule #1 ................................ 216

B. Contract Rule #2 ................................ 217

C. Contract Sub-Rule #1 ............................ 219

D. Contract Sub-Rule #2 ............................ 221

E. Contract Sub-Rule #3 ............................ 222

IV. OTHER RECURRING RULES ...................... 223

A. Procedural Rule ................................. 223

B. Real Property Rule .............................. 224

C. Perfection of Security Interests Rule ............. 225

D. Succession Rule ................................. 225

E. Will Validity Rule ............................... 225

F. Inter Vivos Trust Rule .......................... 226

G. Marriage Validity Rule .......................... 226

H. Divorce Rule .................................... 227

I. Marital Property Rule ........................... 228

J. Family Support Rule ............................ 228

K. Child Custody Rule .............................. 229

V. CONCLUSION ..................................... 229

Fig. 1: Tort Diagram ....................................... 231

Fig. 2: Contract Diagram ................................... 231

I. INTRODUCTION

Beginning with Fabricius v. Horgen, (fn1) Iowa courts shifted to align themselves with the principles of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws ("Second Restatement") in the 1960s. Iowa's departure from the maligned Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws ("First Restatement") was an ambitious and bold adjustment at a time when few other States had begun the transition or developed a body of case law on which Iowa courts could rely.(fn2) Similar strategies in other States have resulted in a quagmire of inconsistent conflicts cases.(fn3) Characterizing recent choice-of-law developments in the United States, Professor Perry Dane has observed, "... choice of law has sometimes resembled the law's psychiatric ward. It is a place of odd fixations and schizophrenic visions."(fn4) Some contend the multiple theories and ad-hoc methods substituted for the First Restatement's approach to choice-of-law issues are an over-correction that has fostered "... increased litigation costs, waste of judicial resources, and an increased danger of judicial subjectivism."(fn5)

Despite the jumble of modern choice-of-law theories, Iowa's shift from the First Restatement to the Second Restatement has produced relatively uniform and straightforward results.(fn6) These results may be in part because, since Fabricius , Iowa courts have rarely wavered from referring to the Second Restatement when confronted with the most common varieties of choice-of-law issues.(fn7) Additionally, the majority of Iowa's modern choice-of-law precedent developed in a unified manner in the Iowa Supreme Court and through legislation, rather than in lower appellate courts.(fn8)

While Iowa courts consistently rely on the Second Restatement, an attorney wishing to determine the applicable law for a particular set of circumstances can simply refer to the Second Restatement. Iowa statutory and case law purposefully departs from the Second Restatement in multiple instances.(fn9) Further, as has been observed in other States, Iowa's courts often do not refer to the more specific presumptive sections of the Second Restatement such as 185, 193, or 196, intended to apply in precise.(fn10) Instead, Iowa courts tend to make cursory reference to general Second Restatement provisions, such as sections 6, 145, and 188, that provide much less guidance.(fn11) Finally, following the Second Restatement often means courts incorporate other distinct theories, like interest analysis or comparative impairment, either expressly or implicitly.(fn12) In any event, empirical study has suggested a State's chosen "methodology plays a relatively minor role in explaining the results in actual cases."(fn13) Thus, while labeling Iowa's approach the "Second Restatement approach," this Article generally puts theory aside and instead focuses on the results of Iowa choice-of-law cases.

Rather than continuing to reject the rule-based approach or criticize new ad-hoc approaches to choice-of-law issues, this Article attempts to smooth the ills of both by demonstrating how Iowa's Second Restatement conflicts precedent can be characterized by a series of descriptive rules; albeit rules more flexible and responsive than the First Restatement rules Iowa rejected. In all, nineteen rules and sub-rules that encompass Iowa's approach to the most common choice-of-law dilemmas are listed and adapted from rules formulated for other States with similar conflicts law by other writers.(fn14) While important nuances exist between choice-of-law patterns that have developed in Iowa and the patterns that have developed in other states paying lip service to the same methodology,(fn15) at least the primary choice-of-law results in Iowa are consistent and comparable to those emerging in other states that represent they have adopted or follow the Second Restatement.(fn16) This Article's conclusion includes two diagrams, at Figures 1 and 2, intended to assist the reader to navigate the suggested tort and contract rules.(fn17) The diagrams, similar to the rules, are not necessarily comprehensive but are a general descriptive guide for Iowa choice-of-law problems.

II. TORT RULES

A. Default Tort Rule:

"In tort cases in which the parties or events are connected with more than one State,(fn18) the law of the State in which the plaintiff is injured governs."(fn19)

Despite the so-called conflicts revolution beginning with an assault on the First Restatement's tort rule,(fn20) the tort rule of general application under Iowa's Second Restatement approach will yield the same result. The First Restatement set forth the lex loci delicti rule, or law of the place of the tort, defined as the place where the injury occurred.(fn21) Under the Second Restatement, the lex loci delicti will remain the operative law for many-probably the majority-of Iowa tort choice-of-law cases although the theory and method by which the result is obtained is significantly altered. Rather than focusing solely on the place of the injury, Iowa courts' new approach first accounts for other factors such as the parties' domicile or principal place of business and the characterization of the law in dispute.(fn22) After consideration of these factors, which could invoke one of the tort exceptions-or escape hatches-set forth below based on the interests involved, Iowa cases revert to the place of the injury in instances where a true conflict between the laws of the different States is present.(fn23)

B. Tort Exception #1:

If the laws of the connected States conflict as to an issue of loss distribution(fn24) and each party contesting that issue is domiciled (or, in the case of a business entity, has its principal place of business) in the same State [at the time of the underlying events] and that State is not the injury State, the law of the State of the contesting parties' common domicile (or principal place of business) governs as to the contested issue.(fn25)

The Supreme Court of Iowa demonstrated the operation of both the default tort rule and tort exception #1 in Fabricius v . Horgen .(fn26) In Fabricius , four Iowa residents collided head on in an automobile accident with another Iowa resident on a Minnesota highway.(fn27) Both drivers and the three passengers were killed.(fn28) An administrator appointed on behalf of four of the Iowa residents involved in the accident ("the plaintiff") sued the administrator for the fifth Iowa resident ("the defendant") for wrongful death.(fn29) The claims on behalf of each decedent sought the recovery of damages suffered by the decedents' next of kin pursuant to Minnesota law.(fn30) On these facts, the default tort rule and the First Restatement rule would have required application of Minnesota law.(fn31)

The defendant moved for dismissal of the plaintiff's claims under Iowa law because Iowa's survival statute, intended to benefit a decedent's estate, contained no grounds for the defendant's liability to the plaintiff on behalf of the decedents' heirs or minor children.(fn32) Furthermore, the plaintiff had no claim under Minnesota law because he had not been properly appointed trustee under Minnesota law.(fn33) Instead, the plaintiff was attempting to recover on behalf of the decedent's next of kin, who were eligible to recover exclusively under Minnesota law, in the capacity of a representative eligible to bring suit under only Iowa law.(fn34)

The trial court refused to dismiss the plaintiff's claims despite the pleading defect and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the ruling on appeal.(fn35) Turning to choice-of-law, the Iowa Supreme Court determined all...