Formulating Voting Rights Act Remedies to Address Current Conditions

AuthorBarry C. Edwards
DOI10.1177/1532673X13499624
Date01 May 2014
Published date01 May 2014
Subject MatterArticles
/tmp/tmp-17opW2Tn3r1H7w/input 499624APR42310.1177/1532673X13499624American Politics ResearchEdwards
research-article2013
Article
American Politics Research
2014, Vol. 42(3) 376 –408
Formulating Voting
© The Author(s) 2013
Reprints and permissions:
Rights Act Remedies
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X13499624
apr.sagepub.com
to Address Current
Conditions
Barry C. Edwards1
Abstract
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision to strike down a key component
of the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA) closes one of the most successful
chapters in the history of civil rights enforcement. Our country has changed
since 1965 and it is an opportune time to examine current political conditions
for minority voters. Based on analysis of congressional elections from 1960
to 2010, I assess the central holding of Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder,
and other controversial areas of VRA enforcement. My results support the
Court’s finding that the Act’s historic coverage formula does not accurately
reflect current political conditions. However, my results challenge prevailing
views on two points. I conclude that uniform standards are problematic
because redistricting guidelines that improve opportunities for African
American voters are likely to diminish opportunities for Latino voters (and
vice versa). In addition, requiring majority African American districts appears
to diminish aggregate African American voting opportunities relative to
targeting 45% to 50% African American districts.
Keywords
Voting Rights Act, redistricting, congressional elections
1University of Georgia, Athens, USA
Corresponding Author:
Barry Clayton Edwards, University of Georgia, 104 Baldwin Hall, Athens, GA 30602, USA.
Email: bce@uga.edu

Edwards
377
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision to strike down a key component
of the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA) closes one of the most successful
chapters in the history of civil rights enforcement. “Our country has
changed,” Chief Justice Roberts opined for the majority, “and while any
racial discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the
legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions.”1
The case of Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder may close one chapter, but
if history is any guide, the story is far from over. Congress and the federal
courts will continue to confront the challenge of protecting the right to
vote.2 Our country has changed since 1965 and it is an opportune time to
examine current political conditions for minority voters. How can the VRA
speak to current conditions? That question opens a new chapter in civil
rights enforcement.
In this article, I offer statistical analysis of congressional election out-
comes to answer the most pressing questions about voting rights in multicul-
tural America. I analyze the empirical foundations of the Court’s opinion and
consider how VRA remedies might be reformulated in light of current politi-
cal conditions. Although this topic area has been previously addressed by
political scientists, I aim to contribute to this research area by applying a
model of fairness and equal opportunity that was developed to evaluate par-
tisan redistricting to racial redistricting, updating prior analysis with congres-
sional election results through 2010, and analyzing African American and
Latino voters as distinct groups.
I focus my analysis on answering three questions. First, do political condi-
tions in states singled out by the VRA justify the heightened enforcement
provisions imposed on them?3 Second, was the VRA coverage formula suf-
ficiently tailored to the problem it targeted? Third, when minority voting
rights are properly at issue, what remedy provides minority voters with equal
opportunities to elect their preferred candidates of choice?
My answers to the first two questions support the Court’s decision.
Consistent with the Court’s recent decision, I find that the relationship
between race and representation has changed significantly over the past five
decades. I find the historic coverage formula only loosely fit current condi-
tions for African American and Latino voters in the United States. My results
indicate that political conditions for minority voters remain difficult in Deep
South states covered by Section 5. However, Section 5 also covered states
that are not exceptional (e.g., Arizona) and did not apply to states that have
especially challenged minority voters (e.g., Maryland).
My answer to the third question points to several problems in the prevail-
ing approach to VRA enforcement. My research indicates that African
American and Latino candidates face distinct electoral conditions. At present,

378
American Politics Research 42(3)
majority-Latino districts are necessary and trends suggest supermajority-
Latino districts may be needed to provide Latino voters equal opportunities
to elect their preferred candidates. Conversely, it appears that majority
African American districts actually diminish African American voters’ abil-
ity to elect their preferred candidates relative to targeting districts where
African Americans compose 45% to 50% of a district’s voting age popula-
tion (VAP). Accordingly, a single, uniform redistricting standard is problem-
atic. Likewise, minority coalition districts are unlikely to improve the
opportunities of either African Americans or Latinos to elect their preferred
candidates to Congress.
I use my empirical analysis of minority voter success at the district level
to simulate aggregate consequences of various VRA standards on congres-
sional representation nationwide. Simulating real world results is useful
because minority voters’ opportunities to elect their preferred candidates are
constrained by geography and vary among different states. Based on recent
congressional election results, 2010 population data, and voting simulations,
my research suggests that the objective of the VRA is best accomplished by
districts with 45% to 50% African American VAP and districts with 60% to
65% Latino VAP.
Redistricting Guidelines of the VRA
The VRA of 1965 has played a central, often controversial, role in American
politics. Although African Americans and Latinos are still underrepresented
in Congress relative to their proportions in the general population, the num-
ber of African Americans and Latinos in Congress has grown considerably
over the past five decades. In 1962, Congress had 3 African American
members; in 2012, it had 41 African American members. Congress had
only 1 Latino member in 1962. Now, 29 Latinos serve in Congress.
Political scientists have examined a number of the implications of race
and redistricting. Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran (1996) considered the
impact of racial composition on the substantive representation of minority
interests in Congress. These authors found that drawing districts to maximize
the number of minorities elected diminishes substantive representation of
minority interests, largely as a result of reducing electoral support for White
Democrats (see also Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999; Grose, 2011; Swain, 1993;
but see Minta & Sinclair-Chapman, 2013). Lublin (1997, 1999) has docu-
mented the interaction of African American and Latino voters in majority–
minority districts, regional differences in racial representation effects, and
indirect effects of Republican candidate emergence in districts surrounding
majority–minority districts.4

Edwards
379
Compared with research on African American districts, the literature on
Latino districts is relatively nascent. Research indicates that the proportion of
Latinos significantly affects the probability a district elects a Latino represen-
tative, though this relationship varies by region and professionalization of the
legislature considered (Casellas, 2009). Latino voters’ ability to elect their
preferred candidates to Congress may be constrained by a number of factors.
Research suggests that Latino voter turnout trails that of other groups (Santoro
& Segura, 2011). A significant share of voting age Latinos are not citizens
and therefore not eligible to vote (although they do count for reapportionment
and redistricting purposes). Therefore, applying the same redistricting stan-
dards to Latino and African American voters may not work. Moreover, eligi-
bility and propensity to vote may vary among distinct nationalities considered
Latino or Hispanic by the Census Bureau (Shah, 2010). As a result, one might
expect Latino voters’ ability to elect their preferred candidates to Congress
varies from one state to another.
As the purpose of this study is to inform legal analysis of the VRA, it
makes sense to consider the Act in some detail so that the research design
addresses real areas of controversy. This is a difficult task. The Court’s
directives on race and redistricting appear contradictory, muddled, and arbi-
trary to legal observers and policymakers (e.g., Engstrom, 2012; Fuentes-
Rohwer & Durfee, 2009; Kousser, 1999, 2007). Foreshadowing the Shelby
County
decision, a number of authors questioned whether the VRA has out-
lived its usefulness (Issacharoff, 2004; Swain, 1993; Thernstrom, 1987; but
see Ansolabehere, Persily, & Stewart III, 2009; Lublin, Brunell, Grofman, &
Handley, 2009).
As a starting point, it is useful to consider who bears the initial burden of
proof in VRA cases and distinguish the essential elements of a cause of action
under the VRA from the remedies the Act affords minority voters. Confusion
arises because...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT