Foreign policy by posse.

• Author: Haass, Richard N.

There is increasing consideration of (and, in some quarters, consternation about) what might be dubbed "the new unilateralism," the practice of the United States going it alone in the world. It merits attention. The 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama was a unilateral exercise, as for all intents and purposes were the interventions in Grenada and Haiti (at least in its initial phase). Sanctions against Cuba have become a mostly unilateral endeavor, as have those against Iran. The United States broke rank over NATO's enforcement of the Bosnian arms embargo, and Congress has tried to effect a unilateral abrogation of the embargo itself. Meanwhile, despite membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Clinton administration chose to confront Japan unilaterally, and again to threaten sanctions, over the marketing of automobiles and their parts.

The list could go on and no doubt will. Explaining why acting alone is as popular as it is in the United States is not all that hard, given the obvious advantages. It is much easier to act without having to gain the consent of others. No compromise is necessary and there is no one to slow you down. It is easier to keep secrets secret. And unilateralism has always been attractive to a people suspicious of the old world and wanting a free hand in dealing with matters closer to home.

Two features of the post-Cold War international environment -- less automatic resistance from great power adversaries and less dependable assistance from erstwhile allies -- also strengthen the temptation, and at times create the necessity, to act alone. The unilateralist impulse was strengthened further by both Somalia and Bosnia, two multilateral undertakings widely perceived as failures.

It should be recognized that on some occasions unilateral action is surely the best choice. This is especially so when interests are narrowly national, and when the logistical support of others is deemed unnecessary or undesirable, lest surprise be sacrificed or a friend embarrassed. Both Panama and Grenada fit this bill. Retaliating against state sponsorship of terror, as the United States did against Iraq in the wake of the failed attempt on the life of former President Bush, was something best done by the United States alone. In this latter circumstance, new technologies, such as ship-launched cruise missiles, provide opportunities for the United States to strike a limited set of targets with little or no third country role.

But in many instances, including the most significant ones, unilateralism is neither wise nor sustainable. Most military interventions, for example, require either the indirect or direct support and participation of others. Access to bases, the right to overfly, intelligence support -- all are usually necessary if an action is at all complicated or distant. Those operations that promise to be large in scale, or long-term, or both, need the active participation of others -- their forces and equipment -- for several reasons: to share the military burden, to distribute economic costs, and to assuage domestic political demands that the United States not assume a disproportionate share of the costs of acting in the world when the interests of others coincide with our own.

Burden sharing is increasingly relevant as a consideration in an era of flagging domestic support for defense and assistance budgets -- and those budgets are all but certain to decline further in real terms over the next decade. Seen in the context of such increasing resource constraints, a penchant toward U.S. unilateralism would inevitably result in our progressively doing less overseas.

Economic burden-sharing apart the support of others can also help politically. The endorsement of a course of action by the United Nations or a relevant regional body can add an aura of legitimacy and, in the eyes of some, legality to an undertaking. This can have several advantages: in generating domestic political support, in bringing about the military and economic participation of others, and in reducing resistance on the part of the target regime or its backers.

A pattern of seeking such international endorsement can also help inhibit intervention by those who would abuse their power. Russia, for one, might think twice before dispatching forces to its "near abroad" if it knew that the absence of a Security Council resolution endorsing its intervention made it more likely that criticism and even sanctions would follow.

Unilateralism on our part also carries the risk that it will encourage unilateralism by others. The best argument against unilateral abrogation of the Bosnian arms embargo is that it would encourage others to do the same with respect to, say, sanctions against Iraq. If we pay a price for multilateralism we also receive dividends; if we see an advantage for unilateralism we also must be sensitive to its costs.

Unilateral action in other realms -- export controls and economic sanctions more generally come to mind -- risks being feckless except in those circumstances where the U.S. component is so central that doing without or finding a substitute supplier is not a viable option for the target state. Increasingly, though, such U.S. dominance in the economic realm is rare, as others can provide comparable technologies, large markets, and substantial amounts of capital.

Thus, and despite its undeniable domestic...