Foreign Policy Attitudes toward Islamic Actors
| Published date | 01 September 2016 |
| Date | 01 September 2016 |
| Author | Daniel Silverman,Mujtaba Isani |
| DOI | 10.1177/1065912916654988 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2016
Article
Political Research Quarterly
2016, Vol. 69(3) 571 –582
Foreign Policy Attitudes toward Islamic
© 2016 University of Utah
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Actors: An Experimental Approach
DOI: 10.1177/1065912916654988
prq.sagepub.com
Mujtaba Isani1 and Daniel Silverman2
Abstract
This article examines how Western foreign policy opinion reacts to the perceived Islamic character of foreign actors.
Studies show that the target actor’s dominant religion is a key ingredient in foreign policy opinion: Western audiences
react more hostilely to “Muslim” than “Christian” targets. Yet, actors differ not only in which world religion they
belong to but also how that religion is politicized by themselves and by others. We argue that Islam can be politicized
in three major ways—via Islamic rhetoric, policies, and labels—that shape foreign policy attitudes. To examine our
claims, we field a survey experiment in which we attach common Islamic rhetoric (“Allahu Akbar”), policies (“Shari’a
law”), and/or labels (“Islamist”) to a foreign actor in the context of the Syrian civil conflict. We find that these cues
strongly harm attitudes toward the actor, and the results vary widely by type. Indeed, the Shari’a policy cue does the
most damage to attitudes, emotions, and preferences toward the actor. Moreover, the Islamic cues reinforce each
other in fueling these fearful reactions and are particularly potent on conservative citizens. These results paint a richer
picture of how out-group religious cues influence foreign policy attitudes.
Keywords
foreign policy, Islam, public opinion, attitudes, Shari’a
From the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Muslim
often face conflicts with several actors of the same “dom-
Brotherhood to the Islamic State (ISIS), Islamic political
inant religious tradition”—such as Islam—that differ
actors1 have often been at the epicenter of global conten-
markedly in their perceived (and portrayed) religious
tious politics in recent years. This has confronted character. Consider, for example, the plethora of partici-
“Western” powers such as the United States with a stream
pants in the Syrian civil war, including ISIS, the Al-Nusra
of major foreign policy choices about how to engage
front, the “moderate” Free Syrian Army, the Kurdish reb-
them. Since 2011, for example, the United States has had
els, Hezbollah, and the Assad regime. Although all are
to decide whether to embrace elected Islamist parties in
broadly “Muslim,” their Islamic character is presented by
Egypt and Tunisia, whether to aid Islamic rebels in Libya
themselves—as well as by Western media—very differ-
and Syria, and whether to negotiate with Iran over its
ently. Do these differences affect Western foreign policy
nuclear program, in addition to managing two decade-
attitudes toward them? If so, how?
long wars in the Muslim world. Although foreign policy
To examine these issues, we conducted an original
choices such as these are influenced by many factors,
survey experiment in the U.S. context to identify how
public opinion is at a minimum one key constraint in their
particular Islamic cues influence public opinion toward a
formulation.2 This leads us to ask: how does the perceived
generic foreign actor. In the survey experiment, we ran-
Islamic character of these actors shape foreign policy
domly assigned subjects to different news stories about
views toward them?
the ongoing Syrian civil war in which we manipulated the
Unfortunately, the existing understanding of these
Islamic character of a hypothetical Free Syria Movement
dynamics remains quite limited. A pair of recent experi-
(FSM) actor in three different ways. Specifically, we
ments has shown that the “dominant religious tradition”
of the target state is an important variable in foreign pol-
1
icy opinion formation. Indeed, Western populations sup-
University of Muenster, Muenster, Germany
2The Ohio State University, Columbus, USA
port war more against “Muslim” than “Christian”
adversaries (Johns and Davies 2012; Lacina and Lee
Corresponding Author:
2013). Yet, these studies present a static and simplistic
Daniel Silverman, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State
University, 2140 Derby Hall, 154 North Oval Mall, Columbus, OH
view of the various ways in which religion in general, and
43210, USA.
Islam in particular, is politicized in global politics. States
Email: Silverman.130@osu.edu
572
Political Research Quarterly 69(3)
examined whether giving the actor common Islamic rhet-
attitudes of citizens toward other states (Herrmann,
oric (“Allah willing . . . Allahu Akbar”), policies (“Shari’a
Tetlock, and Visser 1999; Herrmann et al. 1997).
law”), and/or labels (“Islamist”) shaped citizens’ social
In the post-Cold War context, the most salient of these
affect, political attitudes, and foreign policy preferences
cultural attributes may be religion. This idea was most
toward it.
forcefully articulated by Samuel Huntington’s (1993,
Overall, we find that these Islamic cues can be quite
1996) “clash of civilizations” thesis in the 1990s. Surveying
powerful, reducing subjects’ affect, trust, and support for
the international landscape in the wake of the Cold War,
providing aid to the target actor. Yet, we also find that
Huntington concluded that “the principal conflicts of
these effects depend strongly on the type of cue that was
global politics will occur between nations and groups of
employed. Specifically, the “Shari’a” policy is the most
different civilizations” (Huntington 1993, 22). At the heart
potent and consistent predictor of changes in public
of the issue was religion, which was as “a central defining
opinion and perceptions. In contrast, the “Islamist” label
characteristic of civilizations” (Huntington 1996, 47). In
rather surprisingly is the weakest of the three treatments.
particular, Huntington saw Islamic civilization and Western
We also find that the treatments mutually reinforce each
(Christian) civilization as on an inevitable collision course
other, revealing that fear can be maximized when com-
marked by mutual animosity. “The fundamental problem
mon Islamic labels, rhetoric, and policies converge.
for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism,” he declared,
Moreover, the effects are more pronounced on those who
“it is Islam” (Huntington 1996, 217).
identify as Republicans (and to a lesser extent indepen-
Although Huntington’s thesis was strongly criticized
dents) than Democrats. These results suggest that the
in subsequent years, both theoretically (Ajami 1993; Said
role of religious differences in foreign policy opinion is
2001; Sen 1999) as well as empirically (Fox 2001;
not a simple matter of the target actor’s dominant faith,
Henderson and Tucker 2001; Russett, Oneal, and Cox
but a nuanced one that turns on the rhetorical and behav-
2000), the attacks of September 11, 2001 and ensuing
ioral choices of domestic elites as well as the target
occupation of two Muslim-majority countries breathed
actors themselves.3
life into many of its ideas in the West. In fact, this soon
became relatively clear in the elite rhetoric at the time,
Literature Review
such as President Bush’s reference to a foreign policy
“Crusade” (The White House 2001). In addition, survey
Scholars have long identified multiple sets of factors that
research has shown parts of its appeal at the popular level.
shape foreign policy attitudes. On one hand, they have
In particular, Americans hold relatively unfavorable atti-
demonstrated that citizens possess general predisposi-
tudes toward Muslims and Islam (Kalkan, Layman, and
tions—that is, beliefs or principles—that guide their deci-
Uslaner 2009; Nisbet, Ostman, and Shanahan 2007;
sion making in the international arena. In particular, they
Panagopoulos 2006). These attitudes have also become
have identified isolationism versus internationalism quite prominent throughout Europe (Strabac and Listhaug
(Hurwitz and Peffley 1987) and militarism versus accom-
2008; Wike and Grim 2010). Yet, although these studies
modation (Holsti 2004) as quite stable dimensions. On
help measure and explain anti-Muslim sentiment among
the other hand, they have shown that citizens do not just
Western publics, they largely neglect to link it to foreign
cling blindly to their principles, but take situational vari-
policy attitudes. Moreover, their correlational nature
ables into consideration as well. In the case of military
makes it tough to discern the extent to which this senti-
interventions, for example, we know that several features
ment truly shapes foreign policy attitudes, and is not sim-
of the strategic context such as casualty rates (Mueller
ply “a creation or rationalization” of them (Sides and
1973), military objectives (Jentleson 1992), and chances
Gross 2013, 595).
of success (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2006) all play a
The experimental literature on foreign policy opinion
significant role in shaping citizen attitudes.
formation attempts to address some of these limitations.
On the situational side, one of the most prominent the-
Specifically, two recent experiments (Johns and Davies
ories is known as “image theory” (Boulding 1959;
2012; Lacina and Lee 2013) manipulate the regime type
Herrmann 1985; Jervis 1970), which holds...
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