Focused deterrence, strategic management, and effective gun violence prevention

• Published date: 01 November 2024
• Author: Anthony A. Braga,John M. MacDonald,Stephen Douglas,Brian Wade,Benjamin Struhl
• Date: 01 November 2024
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12682

DOI: ./- .

SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE

GUN VIOLENCE

Focused deterrence, strategic management, and

effective gun violence prevention

Anthony A. Braga1,2John M. MacDonald1Stephen Douglas1

Brian Wade1Benjamin Struhl1

Department of Criminology, University

of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania, USA

Harris School of Public Policy, University

of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, USA

Correspondence

Anthony A. Braga, Department of

Criminology, University of Pennsylvania,

 McNeil Building,  Locust Walk,

Philadelphia, PA-, USA.

Email: abraga@upenn.edu

Funding information

The research presented in this report was

funded by Grant -GP-BX- from

the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of

Justice Programs, U.S. Department of

Justice. Points of view in this document

are those of the authors and do not

necessarily represent the official position

of the U.S. Department of Justice, San

Joaquin County,City of Stockton,

Stockton Police Department, or the

Stockton Office of Violence Prevention.

Abstract

Research Summary: The evaluation literature sug-

gests that focused deterrence strategies are effective in

reducing gun violence. However, focused deterrence

is notoriously difficult to implement and sustain. The

history of focused deterrence implementation failure

raises questions about its viability as a gun violence

prevention strategy. Stockton, California, implemented

focused deterrence three times during the past  years.

In its most recent version, Stockton officials explicitly

designed the strategy to be a permanent feature of the

city’s violence prevention portfolio. Although program

caseloads diminished over the course of the COVID-

pandemic and the strategy faced leadership and resource

challenges, Stockton’s efforts prevented the program

from being discontinued and, for those gang mem-

bers who did receive treatment, delivered a robust gun

violence prevention strategy.A quasi-experimental eval-

uation shows that treated gang members were less likely

to be shot and reduced their violent offending relative

to similar untreated gang members. The focused deter-

rence impacts also appear to spill over to gang members

who were socially connected to treated gang members.

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and

reproduction in any medium, providedthe original work is properly cited.

©  The Author(s). Criminology & Public Policypublished by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of American Society of Criminology.

Criminology & Public Policy. ;:–. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/capp 919

920 BRAGA  .

Although Stockton experienced an increase in homi-

cides over the course of the COVID- pandemic, the

increase was not as steep as other comparable California

cities.

Policy Implications: Focuseddeterrence strategies can

be effective responses to gun violence problems when

implemented properly. A priori planning is essential

when jurisdictions prepare to adopt focused deterrence.

Strategic management actions, such as maintaining

a robust network of partnering agencies, developing

accountability structures and sustainability plans, and

conducting upfront and ongoing problem analysis, are

critical elements that must be in place for focused

deterrence to be effective and sustainable.

Focused deterrence strategies are designed to change violent gun offender behavior by under-

standing underlying violence-producing dynamics and conditions that sustain recurring shooting

problems, and implementing a blended set of law enforcement, community mobilization, and

social service actions (Braga & Kennedy, ). The evaluation literature suggests that focused

deterrence is effective at reducing gun violence by gangs and other criminally active groups

(Braga et al., ; National Academies, ). However, these strategies are also notoriously

difficult to implement and sustain (Engel et al., ; Fox et al., ). An extensive history

exists of failed implementations of focused deterrence, and successful programs discontinued

after leadership changes (Kennedy, , ). The persistent implementation and sustainabil-

ity challenges of focused deterrence highlight the need for evidence of effective programs that

survive difficult challenges over extended periods. Policymakers, law enforcement officials, non-

governmental organizations, and community members need to know whether focused deterrence

programs are inherently limited to producing short-term gun violence reduction gains or can be

implemented as strategic gun violence management systems that generate sustained preventive

impacts.

The City of Stockton, California, has implemented focused deterrence to control homicide

problems three times during the past  years (e.g., California Partnership for Safe Communities,

;Wakeling,). Two previous applications of focused deterrence were discontinued

following leadership changes (–) and after the city faced a fiscal crisis during the Great

Recession (–). Descriptive research suggests citywide homicide rates were lower during

the two prior implementations of focused deterrence relative to other times when the program

was not in place (Bitrain et al., ). As Stockton experienced increased violence during the

early to mid-s, city leaders deliberately developed the capacity to implement a focused

deterrence strategy that was “built to last.” By , the city implemented a revitalized Stockton

Ceasefire focused deterrence strategy that included communications with high-risk individuals

that emphasized procedural justice concepts and a focus on behavioral change, enhanced

street outreach and service provision efforts, a focused enforcement model rooted in ongoing

problem analysis and shooting reviews, the adoption of citywide accountability structures and