Five Years of Missed Opportunities

AuthorBob Sussman
PositionPrincipal of Sussman & Associates
Pages58-58
58 | THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM Reprinted by permission from The Environmental Forum®, May/June 2021.
Copyright © 2021, Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, D.C. www.eli.org.
THE DEBATE
Predictably, the Trump EPA
opted for the appearance rather
than the reality of chemical risk
reduction, and the industry pub-
licly touted the program’s success
— while working behind the scenes
to protect its chemicals from mean-
ingful regulation. For four years,
the Trump EPA went through the
motions of creating a functioning
program while making questionable
legal, scientic, and policy calls that
favored industry at the expense of
at-risk communities.
With new EPA leadership under
President Biden, frustrated advocates
have now called for reprioritizing
EPA’s public health mission over ac-
commodation of industry. e start-
ing point in building a better TSCA
program is understanding where the
Trump EPA went wrong, and how
the tools in the new law can be used
more eectively.
e central innovation of the
Lautenberg Act is a requirement
to conduct comprehensive risk
evaluations of high-concern or
high-exposure substances in order
to identify unreasonable risks of in-
jury, and then eliminate them using
EPA’s regulatory authority. Congress
directed the agency to immediately
begin work on evaluating 10 chemi-
cals; completing these evaluations
has been EPA’s primary task over the
last ve years. All 10 have now been
assessed and determined to present
unreasonable risks of injury, con-
rming the central premise of TSCA
reform that many widely used
chemicals have been poorly assessed
and inadequately controlled.
At the same time, EPA’s indepen-
dent Scientic Advisory Committee
on Chemicals faulted the 10 evalu-
ations for serious gaps and limita-
tions and expressed concern that the
agency was understating risks and
overlooking vulnerable subpopula-
tions which the law required it to
protect. ese aws reected unwise
and often unlawful policy choices
by the agency’s political leadership
that detracted from the hard work
of many career scientists who toiled
around the clock to complete the
evaluations by management’s dead-
lines.
One example is the failure of
the evaluations to account for the
presence of the 10 chemicals in air,
surface water, drinking water, and
waste. Carcinogens like methylene
chloride and trichloroethylene are
pervasive in the environment. Levels
found in air and drinking water ex-
pose millions of people to elevated
cancer risks. Large segments of the
population are also exposed to these
chemicals when using consumer
products or during their jobs.
e overall cancer risk they face
is a function of total exposure from
multiple pathways. But this risk
will be understated if the evaluation
excludes important contributors to
exposure and fails to aggregate ex-
posures across pathways. e losers
from this approach will be the sub-
populations at greatest risk, people
who live and work in communities
with the highest exposures.
e agency has argued that it is
unnecessary for TSCA to address
the presence of unsafe chemicals
in the environment because other
laws perform this function. How-
ever, these laws are narrow in scope,
provide less protection than TSCA,
and in many cases have simply not
addressed air emissions or drinking
water contamination that endangers
public health. TSCA is unique in
its ability to provide a comprehen-
sive picture of chemical risk across
conditions of use and environmen-
tal media, and drive reductions in
exposure that EPA’s stovepipe envi-
ronmental programs cannot achieve
alone. is ability to evaluate and
address chemical risks holistically
should play a central role in the
Biden EPA’s eorts to revitalize the
law.
Rebuilding the TSCA program
will not be easy but must be a top
priority of the EPA administrator.
Bob Sussman is principal of Sussman & As-
sociates.
Five Years
of Missed
Opportunities
By Bob Sussman
Passage of the Lautenberg
Chemical Safety Act in 2016
was a rare moment of bipar-
tisan agreement in the increas-
ingly fractured politics of environ-
mental protection. Congress united
around the simple proposition that
the 1976 Toxic Substances Control
Act was broken and regulation of un-
safe chemicals had reached a dead end.
But this seeming consensus
masked dierent motivations for x-
ing TSCA and conicting visions of
what a new law would accomplish.
NGOs demanded action on a long
list of chemicals that threatened
health and the environment and
wanted them removed from com-
merce or severely restricted without
delay. Facing attacks on its products
and operations, industry wanted to
defuse public concerns about chemi-
cal safety by pointing to a more
robust federal program and at the
same time create a bulwark against
activist states and NGOs.
Whether industry would actually
put its products and prots at risk to
earn public condence was conve-
niently ignored, as Congress closed
ranks to get the new law across the
nish line.
Once TSCA took eect, however,
conicts immediately surfaced. e
new law gave EPA broad authorities,
but much depended on the willing-
ness of the agency to implement
them forcefully. With strong direc-
tion from the top, the new TSCA
could produce tangible public health
protection, but it was all too easy for
weak leaders to create the illusion
of progress by measuring success
through bureaucratic activity (such
as meeting statutory deadlines)
rather than improvements in chemi-
cal safety.

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