Fishing for answers: illegal fishing, depleted stocks, and the need for wto fishing disciplines

AuthorStephen Floyd
PositionGeorgetown University Law Center, J.D./LL.M. in National Security Law, 2022
Pages797-834
NOTES
FISHING FOR ANSWERS: ILLEGAL FISHING,
DEPLETED STOCKS, AND THE NEED FOR WTO
FISHING DISCIPLINES
STEPHEN FLOYD*
ABSTRACT
There are no longer plenty of fish in the sea. One-third of global fish stocks
are overfished beyond biologically sustainable levels, and fishing subsidies are
the primary culprit. Such subsidies incentivize overfishing, foster illegal, unre-
ported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and dangerously reduce global stocks.
Moreover, diminished fishing stocks heighten food insecurity for vulnerable pop-
ulations, engender economic instability, and increase the potential for interstate
conflict. Indeed, fishing subsidies spawn challenges far larger than trade alone.
They present an international problem, and only a multilateral solution will
suffice.
Several international agreements have sought to address IUU fishing, and
these efforts have helped to crystallize norms. But many are voluntary, non-
binding agreements, and they lack the comprehensive scope and enforcement
mechanisms an effective solution requires. The World Trade Organization
(WTO) provides the ideal forum to address the root cause of IUU fishing head
on, and member states reinvigorated negotiations to establish disciplines on
fishing subsidies in 2015. Although negotiators failed to reach an agreement
before a 2020 deadline and face significant hurdles, they reconvened in
Geneva this February. The Chair of the WTO Negotiating Group released a
new draft consolidated text in May, and observers remain cautiously optimistic
about meetings the WTO Director convened in July. An agreement represents
the best opportunity for the international community to reduce IUU fishing and
restore global fish stocks. To prove effective, it must meet three criteria: 1) nar-
rowly limit the application of special and differential treatment (SDT) for
* Georgetown University Law Center, J.D./LL.M. in National Security Law, 2022. V
C2021,
Stephen Floyd. Many thanks to the Georgetown Journal of International Law staff for their editorial
support. I am especially indebted to Professor Timothy Brightbill for guidance on early drafts of
this Note, the faculty advisors and fellows of the 2021 Salzburg Cutler Fellows Program for their
insightful feedback, and Georgetown’s Institute of International Economic Law for selecting this
Note for publication. Above all, I am grateful for the encouragement of my wife, Erin, and her
unsinkable appreciation for fishy puns. The views expressed in this Note are the author’s own and
do not reflect the views of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, or any other private or
public entity.
797
developing states; 2) establish objective mechanisms for stock assessments and
IUU fishing designations; and 3) set a narrow scope for dispute panels to
review decisions. Ultimately, if WTO member states fail to reach consensus, sub-
sidies will continue to deplete global fish stocks, diminish confidence in the mul-
tilateral system, and increase the potential for maritime conflict.
I. INTRODUCTION .................................... 799
II. THE WIDE WAKE OF FISHING SUBSIDIES ................... 800
III. SLIPPERY FISH:INTERNATIONAL FORA &THE GLOBAL DISCOURSE
ON FISHING SUBSIDIES ............................... 808
IV. CHASING THE WHITE WHALE:DOMESTIC REGULATIONS UNDER THE
WTO FRAMEWORK ................................. 813
A. WTO Constraints on Domestic Efforts to Regulate IUU
Fishing ...................................... 814
1. Tuna-Dolphin I: Process, Production Method, and
the Narrow Meaning of Necessity ............. 815
2. The U.S.-Shrimp Dispute: Trapped Turtles and
Article XX Shell Games ..................... 817
3. The Ten-Year Tuna-Labelling Dispute and Its Final
Resolution: Fluke or Flip? ................... 820
B. Impact and Efficacy: Can Member States Deter IUU Fishing
and Unsustainable Practices through WTO-Compliant
Regulations? .................................. 823
V. CASTING INTO THE WIND:CURRENT WTO NEGOTIATIONS &
RECOMMENDATIONS ................................. 825
A. Areas of Consensus ............................. 826
B. The Authority and Scope of IUU Fishing Designations ..... 828
C. Stock Assessments and Overfished Designations .......... 830
D. Standards of Evidence, Dispute Settlement, and the Basis for
Review ...................................... 831
E. Special and Differential Treatment................... 832
VI. CONCLUSION...................................... 834
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
798 [Vol. 52
I. INTRODUCTION
No longer are there plenty of fish in the sea. The Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations has found that
one third of global fish stocks are overfished and not within biologically
sustainable levels.
1
Global tuna and mackerel populations declined by
sixty percent between 1954 and 2006.
2
In the South China Sea, coastal
fisheries have lost seventy to ninety-five percent of their stocks since the
mid-twentieth century.
3
On the high seas, indiscriminate bottom trawl-
ing destroys 95% of sea mount coral with each pass.
4
Fishing subsidies
are the primary culprit behind these trends. To secure food supplies
and protect a culturally significant industry, governments lavish large
subsidies upon domestic fishing fleets. Such subsidies not only distort
international trade but incentivize overfishing, foster illegal, unre-
ported, and unregulated fishing(IUU) in distant seas, and dangerously
reduce stocks. These policies compel local fishermen to fish further
from shore at great personal risk, engender food insecurity, and create
economic instability and the potential for conflict.
5
Fishing subsidies
pose a challenge far larger than trade alone.
Producing social, economic, and environmental effects across bor-
ders and in disparate regions, fishing subsidies present an international
problem, and only a multilateral solution will suffice. This Note consid-
ers how the international community can craft an effective agreement
to eliminate harmful fishing subsidies, reduce IUU fishing, and hold
violators accountable. In Part II, this Note will provide a general back-
ground on fishing subsidies and identify the myriad ways they distort
1. The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture: Sustainability in Action,FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 47 (2020), http://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/
ca9229en.
2. Maria Jose Juan-Jorda, Iago Mosqueira, Andrew B. Cooper, Juan Freire & Nicholas K. Dulvy ,
Global Population Trajectories of Tunas and Their Relatives, 108 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 20650, 20650 (2011), https://www.pnas.
org/content/108/51/20650.short.
3. Trawling for Trouble: Why Do Chinese Fishermen Keep Getting Arrested?,THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 14,
2016), https://www.economist.com/asia/2016/04/14/trawling-for-trouble (noting that coastal
fisheries in the South China Sea have lost 70-95% of their stocks since the 1950s).
4. Charles R. Taylor, Fishing with A Bulldozer: Options for Unilateral Action by the United States Under
Domestic and International Law to Halt Destructive Bottom Trawling Practices on the High Seas,34
ENVIRONS ENVT.L.&POLYJ.121, 167 (2010).
5. See, e.g.,TRISTAN IRSCHLINGER,INTLINST.FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., DEEP DIVE INTO FISHERIES
SUBSIDIES,PART 1: SENEGAL AND THE SUFFERING SARDINELLA (2019), https://www.iisd.org/
articles/deep-dive-fisheries-subsidies-part-1-senegal (A Senegalese fisher once said to me: ‘I risk
my life for fewer and fewer fish every day.’); Felonius Fishing: The Outlaw Sea,THE ECONOMIST, Oct.
24, 2020, at 58–60.
FISHING FOR ANSWERS
2021] 799

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