Finishing the job: what should be done with nuclear arsenals?

• Author: Renner, Michael

Disarmament will require shutting down test sites, converting weapons design labs to civilian use, dismantling existing warheads, and devising solutions for disposal of fissionable materials.

IN LATE 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig declared in Congressional hearings that the U.S. government was considering, if need be, the firing of nuclear "demonstration" shots to deter Soviet aggression against Western Europe. Amid unmistakable signs that East-West antagonism was rising to a new fever pitch, the statement helped trigger massive peace demonstrations in cities across North America and Western Europe.

Since then, the nuclear issue has receded remarkably, and demonstrators' energies have turned to other concerns. A nuclear holocaust is as unlikely today as it seemed imminent a decade ago. The Cold War rivalry has been buried. Instead of adding missiles and warheads, the U.S. and the remnants of the former Soviet Union are withdrawing large numbers of them. The conventional wisdom is that, with this historic reversal, people can begin to relax a little; the world has become a far safer place.

Yet, the laying down of arms is a tricky process, and too much relaxing of scrutiny at this unprecedented juncture could be a mistake. As the demand for disarmament finds its way from banners and leaflets to government documents, the manner in which it is to be accomplished is crucial. Missiles are being scrapped, submarines decommissioned, and bombers mothballed, but the fate of the dangerous materials contained in nuclear warheads--plutonium and highly enriched uranium--remains to be decided. That fate is critical to the success of nuclear disarmament because such materials can not simply be destroyed. They can be recycled into new warheads, used as fuel for nuclear power plants, diverted into the hands of rogue nations, or stored and guarded, but whatever is done with them entails costs and risks. Yet, none of the treaties between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union even address these details. The other nuclear powers, both declared and undeclared, are not even in on the discussion.

To minimize any risk of current disarmament measures being reversed or abused, the nuclear powers will need to devise ways to implement a number of difficult, risky, and politically charged steps beyond merely deciding to scale down their arsenals. As these steps are taken, much of their effectiveness may be affected by public attitudes toward a longer-range question: Once arsenals are much smaller, can the nuclear powers plan to go to zero? A commitment by the nuclear "haves" to work toward the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons would provide them with a legitimacy they now lack in confronting ominous proliferation trends.

The magnitude of the change now under way--and of the perils and opportunities that it entails--is impossible to appreciate without recognizing the incredible virulence with which the Cold War rivalries drove policies and built arsenals for 40 years. From the start of the nuclear age, the number of warheads grew rapidly, virtually unconstrained by arms control treaties. At its peak in 1988, the global stockpile included almost 25,000 strategic warheads and 35,000 tactical warheads, with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. controlling more than 95%. The explosive power amassed was roughly 1,000 times the firepower used in all wars since the introduction of gunpowder six centuries ago, according to Ruth Sivard, author of the annual World Military and Social Expenditures.

The seemingly endless growth of the nuclear stockpile sputtered to a sudden halt when the Cold War ended--coinciding with rising budgetary constraints and the revelation of pervasive health and safety problems in the superpowers' weapons--production complexes. The 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty, eliminating U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles, resulted in the first small, but real, reductions in the deployed arsenals. The 1991 Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) Treaty then aimed to reduce the number of strategic warheads (those with intercontinental range) by several thousand.

Fears that the disintegration of the Soviet Union might set off a wave of nuclear proliferation led to much deeper cutbacks undertaken outside the framework of formal arms negotiations. In late 1991 and early 1992, Presidents George Bush, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Boris Yeltsin each announced unilateral cuts in existing weapons and proposed additional measures to be implemented if reciprocated by the other side.

As a result, the combined stockpiles of the U.S. and Russia (principal heir to the Soviet arsenal) will decline from 57,000 nuclear warheads in 1988 to an estimated 12,000 over the next decade or so, indicates Robert Norris, a senior scientist with the Natural Resources Defense Council. The U.S. and the Commonwealth of Independent States already have reduced the total number of nuclear weapons they deploy by about half. Great Britain, France, and China still are building theirs, but have offered some token measures of restraint; their combined total is projected to grow from about 1,500 warheads to 2,000 within the next few years.

The global stockpile thus is set for a dramatic drop, but there's a rub--the remaining weapons still contain more than enough firepower to annihilate all life on Earth. Although none of the nuclear powers is contemplating the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons, there are strong reasons to consider just such a goal. As...