Fight or flight: Integral emotions and violent intentions

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12222
• Date: 01 November 2019
• Published date: 01 November 2019
• Author: Timothy C. Barnum,Starr J. Solomon

Received: 17 July 2018 Revised: 12 May 2019 Accepted: 17 June 2019

DOI: 10.1111/1745-9125.12222

ARTICLE

Fight or flight: Integral emotions and violent

intentions∗

Timothy C. Barnum1Starr J. Solomon2

1Department of Social Sciences, Texas A&M

University—San Antonio

2Department of Sociology, Kent State

University

Correspondence

TimothyC. Barnum, Depar tment of Social

Sciences,Texas A&M University–San Anto-

nio,One University Way,Central Academic

Building347D, San Antonio, TX 78224.

Email:tbar num@tamusa.edu

∗Additionalsupporting information

canbe found in the listing for this arti-

clein t he WileyOnline Library at

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/

crim.2019.57.issue-4/issuetoc.

Abstract

The effect of proximate emotions on risk perceptions is

of central importance to criminal decision-making theory,

but has been understudied. We investigate the role of two

integral (situational specific) emotional responses, anger

and fear, in a decision-making context regarding the choice

to commit assault. We draw on dual-process models of

information processing and appraisal theory to propose

a theoretical model in which integral emotions influence

decisions and behavior. Using data from an experiment

embedded in a survey to a nationwide sample of adults

(N =804), we test the interrelated roles of anger, fear, and

traditional rational choice considerations on the intention

to commit assault. We find a strong direct association

between emotions and intentions to commit assault. Addi-

tionally, anger and fear moderate the effect of cognitive

deliberations on behavioral intentions and provide a lens

through which to evaluate a criminogenic opportunity.

KEYWORDS

appraisal theory, dual-process models, incidental affect, integral affect,

offender decision-making

Emotions are a transcendent theme in criminological theory. Under criminological frameworks (e.g.,

strain theory, reintegrative shaming, and defiance theory), emotions constitute dispositional traits set-

ting the stage for crime while “in-the-moment” processes are ancillary to primary theoretical assump-

tions (e.g., Agnew, 1992; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Sherman, 1993). Arguing for a greater situational

We wouldlike to thank Greg Pogarsky for helpful comments on earlier versions of the article. We would also like to thank Janet

Lauritsen and three anonymous reviewers for insightful feedbackthat undoubtedly improved the quality of this manuscript.

Criminology. 2019;57:659–686. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/crim © 2019 American Society of Criminology 659

660 BARNUM AND SOLOMON

focus, Nagin (2007) challenged criminologists to broaden the study of emotions to encompass state

affect—the momentary experience of motivations, feelings, and emotions (see also Tibbetts, 2014).

Toward this end, Nagin proposed state emotions be integrated into models of choice, noting the deci-

sion for crime “involves more than cognitive deliberation. It also involves emotion” (2007, p. 264).

At the core of decision-making research is rational choice theory (RCT), in which it is posited

that crime results from calculated assessments of costs and benefits (Beccaria, 1963/1764; Bentham,

1988/1789). In such research, scholars havetreated actors as strict, economic thinkers who seek to max-

imize the utility of crime arguing individuals pursue criminal opportunities when the expected benefits

outweigh the potential costs (Becker,1968; McCar thy, 2002). More recently,researchers across a range

of domains have relaxedt his “strict rational actor assumption”underlying RCT, noting that humans are

flawed, lazy thinkers who rely on mental shortcuts (e.g., heuristics) to make difficult decisions easier

(e.g., Simon, 1978; Thaler, 2015; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). This line of thinking has given way

to research aimed at examining the situational and momentary factors that influence cognitive evalu-

ations of specific criminal opportunities (Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Cornish & Clarke, 1986; McGloin

& Thomas, 2016; Pogarsky, Roche, & Pickett, 2017).

As Nagin (2007) and others have suggested (e.g., Bouffard, Exum, & Paternoster, 2000; Clarke,

2014; van Gelder, Elffers, Reynald, & Nagin, 2014; Warr, 2016), state emotions may play an impor-

tant role in the way criminal opportunities are evaluated. To be sure, researchersoutside of cr iminology

have long suggested the experience of emotions can bound probabilisticestimates and motivate behav-

ior with minimal cognitive effort (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Loewenstein, 1996, 2000). To date,

however, support for the influence of state affect on crime decisions has been mixed. The most popu-

lar approach to study emotions and criminal decision-making has been to induce a range of “affective

states” (e.g., sexual arousal and negative moods; Ariely & Loewenstein,2006; Exum, 2002; Kamerdze,

Louhgran, Paternoster, & Sohoni, 2014; Lowenstein, Nagin, & Paternoster, 1997) using various prim-

ing tasks (see Exum & Zachowicz, 2014).1Participants are then queried about perceptions of crim-

inal risks and rewards. The research hypothesis is that emotional states should influence intentions

to offend directly and indirectly through changes in risk perceptions. Although findings consistently

show a main effect from emotional arousal to offending intentions, expectations that risk perceptions

mediate the effect of emotions on offending intentions havenot been suppor ted (vanGelder, Reynald,

& Elffers, 2014). Carmichael and Piquero (2004) suggested this theoretical inconsistency may be the

unintended consequence of the implicit priming tasks, which are incapable of “directly [querying]

individuals with regard to their perceived emotional arousal that arises from a particular situation”

(p. 378). This is because emotions measured in this manner are incidental and unrelated to the intrinsic

nature of the crime itself (e.g., Athens, 2005; Katz, 1988; Tedeschi & Felson, 1994).

In the current study, we offer a distinct conceptualization of immediate affect directly linking the

experience of emotions to individual characteristics as well as to the context in which decisions are

made. We propose that integral emotions—momentary affective responses occurring within, and as a

result of, a criminal opportunity—influence the decision to offend in specific criminogenic situations.

To this end, we present an integrated theoretical model in which we account for twointeg ral emotions

(anger and fear), as well as for their influences on the cognitive processes foundational to RCT. The

empirical context of our decision-making study is a “bar fight” scenario because violent situations are

characterized by an “emotional field of tension and fear” (Collins, 2008, p. 19; see also Carmichael &

1Criminologists havelong included anticipated emotions, such as expected guilt or shame, into RCT and deterrence models (e.g.,

Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Nagin & Paternoster, 1993;Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001). Anticipated emotions result from feelings like

regret or remorse after a decision has been made (Piquero, 2017; Warr, 2016). Thus, anticipated emotions are not experienced

at the time of the decision and are more akin to economic choice variables than to emotional states (Loewnstein, 2000).