Federalist No. 71: Does Duration in Office Provide Vigilant Autonomy in the Regulatory Process?

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02473.x
• Author: Anne M. Khademian
• Date: 01 December 2011
• Published date: 01 December 2011

Anne M. Khademian is director

of Virginia Tech’s School of Public

and International Affairs. She writes

about leadership, culture, and inclusive

management, often in the context of

homeland security and f‌i nancial regulatory

policy. She is a fellow in the National

Academy of Public Administration.

E-mail: akhademi@vt.edu

Does Duration in Off‌i ce Provide Vigilant Autonomy? S135

Anne M. Khademian

Virginia Tech

Federalist No. 71 contains a strong defense of duration

in of‌f‌i ce as a source of “cool and sedate ref‌l ection” by

the executive. According to Alexander Hamilton’s

argument, duration in of‌f‌i ce is essential for the vigilant

autonomy needed to faithfully execute the laws.  e

author examines this argument

within the context of government

regulation, using the recent

f‌i nancial crisis and consumer

safety as examples of the limits

of stability and autonomy for

creating vigilant autonomy.

When occasions present themselves,

in which the interests of the

people are at variance with their

inclinations, it is the duty of the

persons whom they have appointed

to be the guardians of those interests, to withstand the

temporary delusion, in order to give them time and

opportunity for more cool and sedate ref‌l ection.

—Federalist No. 71

F ederalist No. 71 emphasized duration in the

executive of‌f‌i ce as a key factor in maintain-

ing the separation of powers between the

legislative and executive branches and as a check on

the majority passions or whims of the legislature to

ensure the “stability of the system of administration.”

Alexander Hamilton noted, with trepidation, that

“[t]he representatives of the people, in a popular

assembly, seem sometimes to fancy that they are the

people themselves, and betray strong symptoms of

impatience and disgust at the least sign of opposition

from any other quarter.” Imbued with a powerfully

close connection to the public, Hamilton warned

that the legislative branch could readily dominate

and disturb the administration of government

without the counterbalance of executive duration in

of‌f‌i ce that would “inspir[e] the desired f‌i rmness and

independence of the magistrate.” An independent

executive, willing to “risk more,” has at times “saved

the people from very fatal consequences of their

own mistakes and has procured lasting monuments

of their gratitude to the men who had courage and

magnanimity enough to serve them at the peril of

their displeasure.”

 is essay challenges the suf-

f‌i ciency of executive duration

in of‌f‌i ce and the consequent

stability of administration for

fostering an energetic public

service—specif‌i cally, a public

service that can provide safety

through regulation. While

Hamilton emphasized the

dangers of legislative attention

and majority passion on the

administration of government,

the missing text in Federalist No. 71 is threefold:

(1) that which underscores the dangers of hardened

administrative practices that prevent the innovation

at times needed for the robust accomplishment of

safety in the regulatory process; (2) the vital role of

the legislature in providing the occasional stimulus

for energetic public service and the importance of

legislative support for administrative ef‌f orts; and

(3) the administrative duty of public engagement,

even when “the interests of the people are at variance

with their inclinations.”  e missing text fosters the

institutional equivalent of “vigilant autonomy,” or a

public service rigorous in the exercise of its authority

and energetic in engaging the public and its repre-

sentatives to draw on experience and practice in the

process of regulatory oversight.  e missing text,

in short, pushes beyond the normative debate over

executive versus legislative prominence in the admin-

istration of government (Finer 1941; Friedrich 1940)

and refocuses the empirical debate from evidence of

dominance (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Wein-

gast 1984; Wood and Waterman 1994) to the admin-

istrative role in fostering a public service, autono-

mous in the conf‌i dence of its expertise, but vigilant

in the continuous engagement of the legislature and

Federalist No. 71: Does Duration in Of‌f‌i ce Provide Vigilant

Autonomy in the Regulatory Process?

 is essay challenges the

suf‌f‌i ciency of executive duration

in of‌f‌i ce and the consequent

stability of administration for

fostering an energetic public

service—specif‌i cally, a public

service that can provide safety

through regulation.