Federalist No. 7: Is Disunion among the States a Hidden Source of Strength?

• Published date: 01 December 2011
• Date: 01 December 2011
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02457.x

Daniel L. Smith is an assistant

professor of public budgeting and f‌i nancial

management in the Robert F. Wagner

Graduate School of Public Service at New

York University. His research focuses on

state government budgeting and f‌i nancial

management, especially the budgetary

implications of state f‌i scal institutions and

fund management.

E-mail: daniel.smith@nyu.edu

Is Disunion among the States a Hidden Source of Strength? S15

Daniel L. Smith

New York University

Federalist Nos. 6 and 7 address the problems of disunion

that led the founders to imagine a stronger national

government, arguing that the states were and would

continue to be a source of unyielding conf‌l ict without

national supremacy.  is essay asks how the states have

adjusted to the Constitution under the Tenth Amendment

and posits that the states are a hidden source of energy

toward good government in their own right.

In Federalist Nos. 6 and 7, Alexander Hamilton’s

concern is that even partial disunion among the

states ultimately would ensure unyielding conf‌l ict

in America. His core argument is founded on the

notion that history had proved that independent sov-

ereignties are wont to engage in war in spite of their

own economic interests for reasons that transcend

material concerns, namely, greed, passion, ambition,

and even jealousy. Hamilton found no comfort in the

notion that so-called commercial republics would f‌i nd

in their mutual economic interests suf‌f‌i cient motiva-

tion not to engage in conf‌l ict, and he was convinced

that anything other than a tightly woven tapestry of

states—unif‌i ed by a federal government endowed with

powers bestowed by a United States Constitution—

would ensure a harmonious and prosperous existence

for Americans.

 is paper examines the unanticipated or hidden

strengths that are attendant with the de facto disunion

that exists among the American states by virtue of

the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. While a

visceral disagreement between two of what Hamilton

called “confederacies” decades after his writing did

indeed result in a tragic and bloody American civil

war—perhaps the ultimate proof that disunion can

be just as dangerous as he had warned—the states and

local governments they have created, and the Union

as a whole, are stronger and more responsive to the

unique demands of their citizens than they otherwise

would be without the freedom to operate as commer-

cial republics. Here, the hidden strengths of disunion

are analyzed from a perspective that was of direct

concern to Hamilton: public debt.

Hamilton and the Commercial Republics

In Federalist No. 6, Alexander Hamilton’s argument

for ratifying the U.S. Constitution and establishing a

strong central government is grounded in his concern

that even partial disunion among the states ultimately

would ensure unyielding conf‌l ict in America. He

thought it a manifest consequence of human nature

that independent sovereignties would engage in

“frequent and violent contests with each other” (Poole

2005, 70). In support of his argument, Hamilton cites

examples of prior conquests inspired by ambition,

passion, and avarice—traits that cannot be removed

from “men.” He is openly skeptical that wholly inde-

pendent states would f‌i nd in their mutual commercial

interests suf‌f‌i cient motivation not to engage in civil

war:

 e genius of republics (say they) is pacif‌i c; the

spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the

manners of men and to extinguish those inf‌l am-

mable humours which have so often kindled

into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will

never be disposed to waste themselves in ruin-

ous contentions with each other.  ey will be

governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate

a spirit of mutual amity and concord. (Poole

2005, 72)

Hamilton’s skepticism is supported by his several

examples of democracies and so-called commercial

republics—with experiences and institutions similar to

America’s—engaging in war even though it is against

their own economic interests. Only bound together

under a U.S. Constitution that unif‌i es and equalizes

the states can they harmoniously coexist, according to

Hamilton.

Hamilton carries his line of argument into Federal-

ist No. 7, this time f‌i rst thinking specif‌i cally about

territorial disputes that he found likely to arise among

the states if they were to remain sovereign, especially

given that much of the territory in the United States

(as formed under the Articles of Confederation)

Federalist No. 7: Is Disunion among the States a Hidden

Source of Strength?