"Our federalism" the Younger abstention doctrine and its companions.

• Author: Anderson, Beth Shankle

In the United States, our legal system incorporates two parallel judicial processes, consisting of a federal and a state court system--each state having its own separate structure. Since 1941, there has been significant recognition of circumstances under which a federal court may decline to proceed though it has jurisdiction under the Constitution and federal statutes. (1) These circumstances give rise to what is commonly referred to as the "abstention doctrine," which "prohibits a federal court from deciding a case within its jurisdiction so that a state court can resolute some or all of the dispute." (2) The purpose of this doctrine is to "preserve the balance between state and federal sovereignty." (3) This balance between state and federal courts is often referred to as federalism or comity, and the cases involving federal court abstention embody complex considerations designed to avoid friction between federal and state courts. (4)

Although a plethora of criticism exists, the abstention doctrines are essential to our parallel court systems in those cases where the interests of the states outweigh federal adjudication of those interests. (5) This article seeks to explore the various abstention doctrines and their application, expansion, and curtailment.

The Younger Abstention Doctrine

The Younger abstention doctrine has its roots in the concept of "Our Federalism" which grew out of the case of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). This doctrine instructs federal courts to refrain from hearing constitutional challenges to state action when federal action would be regarded as an improper intrusion on the state's authority to enforce its laws in its own courts. (6) The abstention doctrine derives from the longstanding concepts of comity and federalism. The coexistence of state and federal powers embodies a system in which there must be respect by both sovereigns to protect the other's legitimate interests. (7) Justice Black emphasized that while the federal government may be anxious to protect federal rights and interests, it must "always endeavor to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the [s]tates." (8) This gave rise to the concept of "Our Federalism" which, the Supreme Court explained, "does not mean blind deference to '[s]tates' [r]ights,' anymore than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our [n]ational [g]overnment and its courts." (9)

In Younger, Harris, an advocate for communism, was indicted in a California state court and charged with violation of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act. He filed a complaint in the district court seeking an order to enjoin Younger, the district attorney, from prosecuting him any further under the California statute. Harris alleged that the statute violated his right to free speech and press as guaranteed under the First and 14th amendments. (10) The district court agreed, and held that the California Criminal Syndicalism Act was "void for vagueness and overbredth in violation of the First and [14]th [a]mendments." (11) The court issued an injunction restraining Younger from further prosecuting Harris under the act. (12) Younger then appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Black, reversed the decision of the district court and held that the federal relief sought by Harris was barred because of the "fundamental policy against federal intervention with state criminal proceedings." The Court noted that Congress, since its early beginnings, had emphasized the importance of deference to state court proceedings, leaving them free from federal court interference, specifically citing the "Anti-Injunction Act." (13) Justice Black maintained that the primary sources for prohibiting federal intervention in state prosecutions were readily apparent in the "basic doctrine of equity jurisdiction" and comity, both of which comprise the notions found in "Our Federalism."

The Younger abstention doctrine derived from these longstanding concepts of comity and federalism, which are unique to this country. This foundation creates a federal judiciary without blind deference to the states or centralized control over each and every national issue. Younger abstention is distinguished from other abstention doctrines because it is based on considerations of comity and equity jurisprudence. A court sitting in equity should not interfere with the ongoing proceedings of state criminal prosecutions. (14) The Younger court expressly noted that its decision was based on notions of comity and "Our Federalism," not the Anti-Injunction Act. (15)

Exceptions to the Younger Abstention Doctrine

Younger implied that a federal court may act to enjoin a state court proceeding when certain extraordinary circumstances exist that involve traditional considerations of equity jurisprudence. (16) Although these exceptions are implicit in Younger, many scholars argue that these exceptions are virtually nonexistent in their application. (17) These three principal exceptions include bad faith and harassment, patently unconstitutional statutes, and the lack of an adequate state forum. (18)

The bad faith and harassment exception was specifically mentioned in the opinion as the kind of extraordinary circumstances that would justify federal intervention in the state proceeding. If the state prosecution was brought in bad faith and used to harass the criminal defendant, the Court stated that injunctive relief would be available. Generally, the Court has defined bad faith as prosecuting an individual without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction. The Court further defined the "bad faith and harassment" exception to include "a combination of impermissible motive, multiple prosecutions, and improbability of success." (19) However, since the Younger decision, the Court has never invoked this exception to find that state action constituted a bad faith prosecution. (20)

The second exception to Younger abstention is the patently unconstitutional exception. This exception is derived from Justice Black's declaration that "there may, of course, be extraordinary circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the absence of the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment." (21) To illustrate this point, Justice Black stated that "[i]t is of course conceivable that a statute might be flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it." However, this exception has proven to be almost useless because it is difficult to contemplate a statute so wholly unconstitutional as to meet these requirements. Indeed, there is not a single instance in which the Court has invoked the patently unconstitutional exception to justify federal intervention. (22)

Specifically, in Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 447 (1977), the Court found the statute at issue to be patently unconstitutional. The Court, however, declined to apply this exception to the case before it because the statute in question was not unconstitutional "in every clause, sentence and paragraph." (23) Justice Stevens noted in his dissent that the patently unconstitutional exception would be "unavailable whenever a statute has a legitimate title, or a legitimate severability clause, or some other equally innocuous provision." (24) Accordingly, the Court's interpretation of this exception has completely voided it of any meaning and rendered it practically useless.

The third exception to federal court abstention that derived from Younger is one premised on the "lack of an adequate state forum." (25) Unlike the other two exceptions, the Court has actually used this exception in practice. In Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), for example, the Court found that federal intervention is appropriate under this exception if the state courts are biased and unable to be trusted on a particular issue. In Gibson, the Court found that a board of optometrists was incapable of fairly adjudicating a particular suit because every member had a financial stake in its outcome.

The Court has been far more restrictive...