Federalism in a Time of Coronavirus: The Trump Administration, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Fraying Social Compact

DOI10.1177/0160323X21990881
Date01 December 2020
Published date01 December 2020
Subject MatterSpecial Issue 2020
SLG990881 287..297 Special Issue 2020
State and Local Government Review
2020, Vol. 52(4) 287-297
Federalism in a Time
ª The Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
of Coronavirus: The
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0160323X21990881
Trump Administration,
journals.sagepub.com/home/slg
Intergovernmental Relations,
and the Fraying Social Compact

Anne Daguerre1
and Tim Conlan2
Abstract
This article examines Trump administration social welfare policies in order to better understand
their implications for American federalism and the evolving welfare state. We focus particularly on
the use of waivers and other administrative tools to promote work requirements and benefit
restrictions in the two largest means tested spending programs: Medicaid and SNAP. These policies
are accelerating the fragmentation of America’s welfare state and continued movement toward
variable speed, “fend for yourself” federalism. This hyper-partisan, polarized, variegated model of
federalism is resulting in increasingly diverse patterns of state implementation of national policies.
Keywords
Trump administration, Medicaid, variegated federalism, welfare reform, waivers
Introduction
is akin to the concept of differentiated integra-
tion in Europe, wherein “European states, or
In addition to its economic and public health
sub-state units, opt to move out at different
effects, the COVID-19 pandemic has posed
speeds and/or toward different objectives with
enormous governance challenges for the United
regard to common policies” (Dyson and Sepos
States, including incoherent and ineffective
2010, 4). In the U.S. context, it epitomizes an
federal policies, diverse and conflicting state
increasingly diverse set of federal-state rela-
responses, and fractious intergovernmental
tionships, in which polarized states respond in
relationships. These failures are themselves
different ways to federal policy initiatives, such
symptoms of broader and more far reaching
as rapidly or gradually expanding Medicaid
trends in American federalism and public pol-
icy. Both state and national responses to
COVID-19 underscore the erosion of coopera-
1 University of Brighton, United Kingdom
tive, technocratic federalism, which public
2 George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA
health has traditionally exemplified, and con-
Corresponding Author:
tinued movement toward what we have called
Anne Daguerre, University of Brighton, Mithras House,
a more variable speed form of federalism
Lewes Road, Brighton, BN2 4AT, United Kingdom.
(Conlan et al. 2016). Variable speed federalism
Email: A.Daguerre@brighton.ac.uk

288
State and Local Government Review 52(4)
under the Affordable Care Act, accepting it in
requirements in SNAP, by changes to the
modified form through a waiver process, or
Able-Bodied Without Dependents (ABAWD)
choosing to decline it altogether. A similar pat-
rule. Those investigations show that the Trump
tern of varied responses has been evident in
administration has sought to accomplish
fields ranging from immigration to environ-
through administrative means a punitive and
mental protection. The intergovernmental
state-focused public welfare agenda that it has
policies of the Trump administration are rein-
been unable to accomplish through statutory
forcing this underlying trend in American fed-
means. In sum, we seek to place contemporary
eralism, and thus accelerating the fraying and
public health challenges within the broader
fragmentation of America’s welfare state.
context of sustained efforts to further disaggre-
When implemented within a framework of
gate and diminish America’s traditionally pat-
variable speed federalism, this delegated,
chy welfare state, and what this portends for
multi-sectoral governance model raises signifi-
our evolving federal system.
cant accountability and co-ordination issues
amongst various stakeholders (Morgan and
Campbell 2011). States have been allowed to
Setting the Stage for Trump
deviate from normal statutory requirements and
Administration Initiatives: The
employ a variable speed model that permits the
Use of Executive Discretion to
outsourcing of certain health care services and
greater state reliance on market mechanisms
Advance Variable Speed
(Bulman-Pozen and Metzger 2016). This
Federalism
approach has been accelerated by the Trump
The development and expanded use of waiver
administration, which has actively deployed the
authority in the intergovernmental programs
tools of executive federalism and the adminis-
authorized by the Social Security act, as well
trative state (waivers, funding constraints and
as other tools of administrative discretion, laid
executive orders) to alter intergovernmental
a foundation for the Trump administration’s
relations, expand opportunities for state var-
efforts to reduce social spending and increase
iance from national standards, and disentitle the
state discretion. These efforts are examined in
poor (Thompson, Wong, and Rabe 2020).
detail in the following section of this article.
In this article, we examine recent policies
To place them into context, it is helpful first
toward critical means tested programs in order
to examine the decades long dance between
to better understand their implications for
legislative and administrative attempts to
American intergovernmental relations, variable
expand state discretion in the administration
speed federalism, and the evolving welfare
and implementation of intergovernmental
state. We focus on the two largest federal
means tested programs, in which the legislative
means tested spending programs that are admi-
efforts at devolution under presidents Nixon
nistered by the states—Medicaid and SNAP—
and Reagan gave way to the expanded use of
which together account for over two-thirds of
waivers and other administrative tools under
all mandatory means tested federal outlays
subsequent administrations (Conlan 1988).
(Congressional Budget Office 2019). Specifi-
cally, we examine the Center for Medicare and
Waivers and Means-tested Programs
Medicaid Services’ (CMS) efforts to utilize
guidance letters and Section 1115 waivers to
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act, first
permit and promote state imposition of work-
established in 1962, enables administrators at
fare requirements in Medicaid and to provide
the federal and state levels to experiment with
a backdoor entry for Medicaid block grants.
policy initiatives without modifications to the
We also examine the intergovernmental and
underlying statute. These waivers have been
social welfare implications of the Trump
used extensively in programs authorized under
administration’s strengthening of work
the Social Security Act (particularly in

Daguerre and Conlan
289
Medicaid and welfare programs) to bypass a
superwaiver proposal, “governors would be
potentially recalcitrant Congress. Initially such
allowed to request discretion over the funding
experiments were restricted in scope and dura-
and administration of a host of programs:
tion. However, by the late 1980s and early
TANF, food stamps, the Child Care and Devel-
1990s waivers were used to experiment with
opment Block Grant, the Workforce Invest-
welfare program work requirements in several
ment Act, and temporary and public housing
states with Republican governors (Williams
programs” (Allard 2007, 320). Both the Medi-
1994). Extensive waiver policy experiments
caid block grant and the superwaiver proposal
in states like Wisconsin and Michigan paved
faced congressional opposition and were
the way toward a major statutory reform, the
dropped, but the Bush administration actively
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
utilized section 1115 waivers to promote
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in August 1996
greater state diversity.
(Arsneault 2000).
Considerable accommodations to state pol-
Under this welfare reform act, AFDC was
icy preferences continued under President
transformed from an entitlement into a block
Obama. The Affordable Care Act kept existing
grant program—Temporary Assistance for
intergovernmental relationships largely intact
Needy Families (TANF)—administered by the
and represented a compromise between a
states. In place of open ended federal matching
national insurance program and a cooperative
grants for cash assistance to the poor, states
federalist structure where national standards are
under TANF receive fixed sums of federal
open to interpretation by individual states and
money (block grants) with considerable flexi-
localities (Hacker 2019, 38–49). This accom-
bility. TANF was thus a landmark in conserva-
modation to the underlying variability of the
tives’ efforts to devolve means tested
federal system was a deliberate strategy on the
intergovernmental programs, and Section
part of the Obama administration.
1115 demonstrations played a major role in the
It was greatly...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT