Federalism and political competition in emerging democracies. (South Africa)

• Published date: 22 March 2011
• Author: Marshfield, Jonathan L.
• Date: 22 March 2011

ABSTRACT

Political competition is essential to the development and maintenance of a healthy and stable democracy. Current scholarship has largely ignored the role that federalism can play in fostering meaningful political competition in emerging democracies. This Article aims to fill this void by developing a theory of political competition within federal systems based on a formal game theory model created by economist and Nobel Laureate Roger B. Myerson. The Article argues that constructive political competition is especially difficult in emerging democracies because social and economic exigencies create strong incentives for new leadership to quash opposition and because first-time voters do not have a point of comparison by which to judge their first set of democratic leaders. Unitary regimes exacerbate these problems because they create an all-or-nothing political scenario and provide voters with only one point of political comparison. Federal systems, on the other hand, create multiple political arenas. This means that political opposition can be contained without being quashed, and that voters will have multiple points of political comparison. After exploring the necessary parameters of this model, the Article then applies the model to post-apartheid South Africa, which has been controlled by a single political party since the country's first democratic election in 1994. The Article concludes that South Africa's federal structure is gradually fostering constructive political competition as the model suggests and that opposition parties in South Africa are well situated to take further advantage of these opportunities in the future.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
                INTRODUCTION
                I. POLITICAL COMPETITION AND DEMOCRATIC STABILITY
                 A. Political Competition as Indicative of Democratic
                 Consolidation
                 B. Political Competition and the Public Good
                 C. Political Competition and Agency Costs
                II. THE DIFFICULTY OF FOSTERING POLITICAL COMPETITION IN
                 EMERGING DEMOCRACIES
                 A. Political Opposition and the Exigencies of Political
                 Transition
                 B. The Problem of Political Track Records and Voter
                 Behavior in Emerging Democracies
                III. A THEORY OF POLITICAL COMPETITION WITHIN FEDERAL
                 SYSTEMS
                 A. Myerson's Theory of Character-Based Track Records in
                 Federal Regimes
                 1. Myerson's Basic Logic
                 2. Myerson's Parameters and Assumptions
                 B. Toward a Broader Theory of Political Competition in
                 Federal Regimes
                 1. Institutional Independence
                 2. Voter Priorities
                 3. Qualitatively Comparable Responsibilities
                 C. Federalism as a Means of Moderating the Exigencies of
                 Political Transition
                IV. SOUTH AFRICA'S FEDERAL STRUCTURE AND CHARACTER-BASED
                 TRACK RECORDS
                 A. South Africa's Electoral System
                 B. Strategic Alternatives Affecting Myerson's Model
                 C. Open Empirical Questions Affecting Myerson's Model
                V. THE PROVINCES' LAW-MAKING AUTHORITY AND POLICY-BASED
                 TRACK RECORDS
                 A. The Provinces' Formal Law-Making Authority
                 B. The Provinces' De Facto Policy-Making Independence as
                 Illustrated by the HIV/AIDS Controversy
                VI. THE PROVINCES' ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY AND POLICY-BASED
                 TRACK RECORDS
                VII. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND INDEPENDENT TRACK RECORDS
                VIII. REAL POLITICAL COMPETITION AND SUBNATIONAL TRACK
                 RECORDS IN SOUTH AFRICA
                 A. The ANC's Dominance from 1994 to 2004
                 B. Evidence of Opposition Success in 2009
                 C. Analysis and Opposition Strategies for 2014
                CONCLUSION
                

INTRODUCTION

By all accounts, South Africa's negotiated transition from apartheid to democracy was one of the great accomplishments of the twentieth century. (1) There are, however, reasons to be concerned about the stability and maturity of South Africa's democracy. A primary concern is the African National Congress's (ANC) stronghold on political life. (2) The ANC is the only political party to have held national power since South Africa's first democratic election in 1994. (3) In the three elections that have been held since then, the ANC has never won less than sixty-six percent of the national vote. (4)

South Africa's experience is illustrative of a larger trend of one-party dominance in emerging democracies. (5) Many societies that transition from authoritarianism to democracy (6) struggle to develop political cultures that support loyal opposition and constructive political competition. (7) This trend is troubling because political competition is inextricably linked with democratic stability. Mature, stable democracies almost universally exhibit vibrant two-party of multi-party political systems. (8) Indeed, democratic theorists generally agree that "a functioning political opposition is essential to democracy." (9)

Yet, emerging democracies face significant obstacles to loyal political opposition.(10) Social, economic, and political exigencies associated with dramatic political transition can create strong incentives for the first-elected party to consolidate power and quash opposition. (11) An additional, and perhaps more universal, obstacle to political competition in emerging democracies concerns the peculiar circumstances facing first-time voters. Within mature democracies there are typically many political leaders that have established reputations for using political power within constitutional constraints and for the public good. (12) Voters therefore have the ability to make real comparisons between democratic leaders and their policy platforms. (13) Political track records provide voters with a means of evaluating a candidate's propensity to adopt efficacious policies and a credible basis to believe a candidate's promises. (14) These circumstances create a competitive market for votes in which political track records are the most valuable currency. (15) Voters in emerging democracies are situated in a fundamentally different political game. There are no established leaders with credible reputations for democratic governance. (16) Thus, voters have no real reference point against which to compare the performance or policies of the first-elected government or any challengers. Additionally, even if voters become dissatisfied with the first-elected government, they have no reason to believe that an incumbent will perform any better because incumbents cannot demonstrate their credibility or competence by reference to an established track record. As a result, many emerging democratic societies stifle political competition by repeatedly re-electing bad leadership. (17)

Notwithstanding these serious problems facing emerging democracies, there has been very little theoretical research exploring the ways in which institutional design can foster constructive political competition. (18) Most theoretical discussions simply assert that democracy is incompatible with formal legal restraints on political opposition.(19) While these negative assertions are no doubt true, they do not address the more constructive issue of how to design institutions that can counteract one-party dominance by creating positive incentives for constructive political competition in emerging democracies. (20) This Article takes up that important but neglected question. It argues that well-designed federal arrangements ate one way to effectively counteract some of the obstacles to political competition facing emerging democracies.

Federalism can facilitate political competition in at least two ways. First, in a unitary system there is only one political arena. This means that only one political party has the opportunity to develop a positive track record at any given time, and, consequently, the first-elected party in an emerging democracy has a monopoly on voters' expectations. In a federal regime, however, there are multiple constitutionally protected political arenas. (21) Federalism creates the possibility that several different political parties can develop political track records at the same time. This, in turn, provides voters with points of comparison, and, consequently, creates a competitivo market for votes based on positive political track records. In this way, the decentralization of political power by federal arrangement is better suited to facilitate political competition than a unitary system. (22) In economic terms, it can reduce opportunity costs associated with political choice.

Second, federalism is well suited to dealing with the incentives to quash political opposition that appear in many emerging democracies. First-elected leaders are under extreme pressure to address momentous social problems quickly and effectively. (23) This creates incentives for the ruling party to remove impediments to swift government action, including political opposition. Unitary regimes exacerbate this problem because they create an all-or-nothing political scenario. By creating multiple spheres of political authority, federalism creates new possibilities for compromise and consensus between political groups. (24) For example, certain contested issues can be left undecided at the national level but delegated to subnational government. This can make it easier for first-elected governments to avoid political deadlocks and direct political confrontation at the national level, thus mitigating the incentives to quash all opposition. (25)

This is not to suggest that federalism can solve all exigencies facing new democratic regimes. The more modest but nevertheless important point is that unitary regimes create an all-or-nothing political scenario, which creates incentives for the first-elected party to quash all opposition and provides voters with only one point of political comparison. Federal arrangements, on the other hand, create multiple political arenas. This means that competition can be contained without being destroyed, and that voters will, from time zero, have multiple points of political comparison. In short, federalism can foster constructive political opposition because it creates legally independent spheres of competition that operate simultaneously.

After further...