Federalism and Party Behavior in Australia and Canada

• Author: Lawrence Mayer
• Date: 01 December 1970
• Published date: 01 December 1970
• DOI: 10.1177/106591297002300409
• Subject Matter: Articles

795

FEDERALISM

AND

PARTY

BEHAVIOR

IN

AUSTRALIA

AND

CANADA

LAWRENCE

MAYER

Texas

Tech

University

I

UCH

of

the

work

on

federalism

by

political

scientists

has

focused

on

the

legal

distribution

of

powers

between

the

central

and

constituent

govern-

1

ments.

Wheare’s

definition

of

federalism,’

like

most

other

definitions,2

focuses

on

the

spheres

of

power

of

each

level

of

government.

However,

any

effort

to

think

of

federalism

in

terms

of

spheres

of

power

runs

into

difficulty

when

applied

to

empirical

phenomena;

particular

activities

usually

do

not

confine

themselves

to

a

single

category

of

power

in

any

analytic

classification

scheme.

Therefore,

for

the

purposes

of

this

study

a

federal

system

is

one

that

fulfills

the

following

conditions:

national

and

constituent

units

of

government

rule

over

the

same

territory

and

the

existence

of

both

levels

of

government

is

guaranteed

by

a

fundamental

written

law.8

Political

scientists

are

increasingly

cognizant

of

the

fact

that

the

characteristics

of

each

political

system

are

a

function

of

their

cultural

and

economic

milieu.

Fed-

eral

systems

are

no

exception.4

Thus,

one

may,

for

analytical

purposes,

conceive

of

two

alternative

paradigms

of

federal

systems

based

on

the

relationships

between

the

legal

institutions

of

fed-

eralism

and

their

economic

and

cultural

milieu.

On

the

one

hand,

the

legal

institu-

tions

of

federalism

may

be

congruent

with

a

cultural

or

economic

environment

re-

flecting

real

or

perceived

geographically

defined

diversities.

This

paradigm

may

conveniently

be

referred

to

as

a

congruent

federal

system.

On

the

other

hand,

the

legal

forms

of

federalism

are

sometimes

imposed

on

societies

in

which

the

diversities

are

not

geographically

defined.

Such

a

society

may

be

called

&dquo;relatively

homogene-

ous&dquo;

for

the

purposes

of

this

study

and

such

a

federal

system

may

conveniently

be

referred

to

as

a

formalistic

federal

system.

These

paradigms

provide

a

convenient

framework

for

an

analysis

of

the

function

of

parties

as

integrative

institutions

in

federal

systems.

Federalism

can

be

expected

to

have

a

negative

effect

on

the

ability

of

parties

to

perform

the

aggregation

function.

Federalism,

after

all,

presumes

representation

of

parochial

sub-systems

in

the

national

decision-making

process

Clearly,

this

negative

effect

should

be

more

pronounced

in

an

empirical

mani-

festation

of

the

congruent

paradigm

than

in

one

of

the

formalistic

paradigm.

A

1

K.

C.

Wheare,

Federal

Government

(New

York:

Oxford

U.

Press,

Galaxy

Editions,

1964).

2

Cf.

Wm.

Riker,

Federalism:

Origin,

Operation,

Significance

(Boston:

Little

Brown,

1964),

p. 6.

3

This

would

normally

mean

a

written

constitution.

However

the

British

North

American

Act

and

the

Basic

Law

of

the

Federal

Republic

of

Germany

also

satisfy

this

condition.

’ An

early

recognition

of

the

fact

that

federalism

is

often

the

political

manifestation

of

cultural

phenomena

may

be

found

in

William

S.

Livingston,

"A

Note

on

the

Nature

of

Federal-

ism,"

Political

Science

Quarterly,

67

(March

1952),

pp.

81-95.

5

Cf.

Livingston,

"Canada,

Australia

and

the

United

States:

Variations

on

a

Theme,"

in

Valerie

Earle;

Federalism,

Infinite

Variety

in

Theory &

Practice

(Itasca,

Illinois:

Pea-

cock

Publishing

Co.,

1968).