Federal Criminal Conspiracy

• Author: Kassie Miller/Joanna Lorynn Goodman/Dylan Reichman
• Pages: 823-851

FEDERAL CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823

II. ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826

A. Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827

B. Illegal Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830

C. Knowledge, Intent, and Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831

D. Overt Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833

III. DEFENSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833

A. Statute of Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834

B. Variance or Constructive Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835

C. Multiplicitous and Duplicitous Indictment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837

1. Multiplicitous Indictment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838

2. Duplicitious Indictment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839

D. Insufficient Indictment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839

E. Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840

F. The Buyer-Seller Exception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841

G. Failed Affirmative Defenses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841

IV. CO-CONSPIRATOR HEARSAY RULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842

A. Evidentiary Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842

B. Sixth Amendment Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846

V. PARTIES AND LIABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847

A. Vicarious Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847

B. Joinder and Severance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848

VI. SENTENCING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849

I. INTRODUCTION

The general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, permits prosecution of

conspiracy to commit criminal activity under federal law. Under § 371, it is a crime

for two or more persons to conspire to commit any offense against the United

States or to defraud the United States.

1

Other federal statutes identify more specific

1. See 18 U.S.C. § 371. The statute states, in full:

If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to

defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or

more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under

this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misde-

meanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment pro-

vided for such misdemeanor.

Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 80–304, at 28–29 (1947) (discussing the origin of § 371).

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conspiracy offenses,

2

but this Article focuses on general federal conspiracy under

§ 371. The general federal conspiracy statute differs from more specific conspiracy

statutes because it requires at least one conspirator to commit an overt act in fur-

therance of the conspiracy.

3

A conspiracy offense is treated distinctly because it often poses a greater danger

to society than a substantive offense committed by a single individual. As the

Supreme Court has explained:

For two or more to .. . combine together to commit .. . a breach of the criminal

laws is an offense of the gravest character, sometimes quite outweighing, in

injury to the public, the mere commission of the contemplated crime. It

involves deliberate plotting to subvert the laws, educating and preparing the

conspirators for further and habitual criminal practices. And it is characterized

by secrecy, rendering it difficult of detection, requiring more time for its dis-

covery, and adding to the importance of punishing it when discovered.

4

A conspiracy is distinct from the substantive crime contemplated by the conspir-

acy

5

and may be charged regardless of whether the underlying substantive offense

actually occurred.

6

A defendant’s acquittal on a conspiracy charge does not bar

prosecution on the substantive offense,

7

and similarly, an acquittal on the

2. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (conspiracy to restrain trade); 18 U.S.C. § 224 (conspiracy to bribe in the context of

sporting events); 18 U.S.C. § 241 (conspiracy to deprive persons of civil rights); 18 U.S.C. § 286 (conspiracy to

defraud federal government through fraudulent claims); 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (conspiracy to violate any provision

of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act); 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (conspiracy to take harmful acts

against the government); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act Conspiracy); 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k) (conspiracy to commit

witness tampering); 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (conspiracy to commit bank fraud, wire fraud, mail fraud, securities and

commodities fraud, or health care fraud); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (conspiracy to violate the Controlled Substances Act).

3. Compare § 371, with Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997) (stating that there is no overt act

requirement for a RICO conspiracy in § 1962(d)), and United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1994)

(stating that there is no overt act requirement for conspiracy to violate the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.

§ 846).

4. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946) (quoting United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88

(1915)); see also United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270, 275 (2003) (quoting Callanan v. United States,

364 U.S. 587, 593–94 (1961)) (“The conspiracy poses a ‘threat to the public’ over and above the threat of the

commission of the relevant substantive crime—both because the ‘[c]ombination in crime makes more likely the

commission of [other] crimes’ and because it ‘decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart

from their path of criminality.’”) (alteration in original); Neal Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307,

1315–24 (2003) (analyzing the effect of group mentality on the commission of crimes).

5. See United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 389–90 (1992) (explaining that conspiracy is a partnership in

crime distinct from any substantive offense); see also United States v. Fornia-Castillo, 408 F.3d 52, 69 (1st Cir.

2005) (noting that conspiracy and the substantive offense are charged separately and distinctly for double

jeopardy purposes).

6. Salinas, 522 U.S. at 65 (1997) (quoting Callanan, 364 U.S. at 594) (“It is elementary that a conspiracy may

exist and be punished whether . . . the substantive crime ensues, for the conspiracy is a distinct evil, dangerous to

the public, and so punishable in itself.”).

7. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 486 F.3d 1212, 1223 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Funt, 896

F.2d 1288, 1294 n.4 (11th Cir. 1990)) (“Conspiracy and mail fraud are not the same offense, and the fact that [the

defendant] was acquitted of conspiracy is not inconsistent with his being a member of a more limited mail fraud

scheme.”); see also United States v. Bearden, 265 F.3d 732, 736 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that acquittal on a

conspiracy charge did not bar retrial on the underlying mail fraud offense).

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