Federal Criminal Conspiracy

• Author: Brynne Peluso/Ursa Beckford/Lucy Kalar
• Pages: 807-828

FEDERAL CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807

II. ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809

A. Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810

B. Illegal Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812

C. Knowledge, Intent, and Participation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813

D. Overt Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814

III. DEFENSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814

A. Statute of Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815

B. Variance or Constructive Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816

C. Multiplicitous and Duplicitous Indictment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817

1. Multiplicitous Indictment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818

2. Duplicitious Indictment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818

D. Insufficient Indictment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819

E. Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819

F. The Buyer-Seller Exception. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820

G. Failed Affirmative Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820

IV. CO-CONSPIRATOR HEARSAY RULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821

A. Evidentiary Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821

B. Sixth Amendment Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824

V. PARTIES AND LIABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825

A. Vicarious Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825

B. Joinder and Severance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826

VI. SENTENCING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827

I. INTRODUCTION

The general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, prohibits conspiracy to

commit criminal activity under federal law. Under § 371, it is a crime for two or

more persons to conspire to commit any offense against or to defraud the United

States.

1

Other federal statutes identify more specific conspiracy offenses,

2

but this

Article focuses on general federal conspiracy under § 371. The general federal

1. 18 U.S.C. § 371.

2. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 224 (conspiracy to bribe in the context of sporting events); id. § 241 (conspiracy to

deprive persons of civil rights); id. § 1962(d) (conspiracy to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations (“RICO”) Act); id. § 2384 (seditious conspiracy); id. § 1951 (Hobbs Act Conspiracy); id. § 1512

(k) (conspiracy to commit witness tampering); id. § 1349 (conspiracy to commit bank, wire, mail, securities and

commodities, or health care fraud).

807

conspiracy statute differs from more specific conspiracy statutes because it

requires at least one conspirator to commit an overt act in furtherance of the

conspiracy.

3

A conspiracy offense is treated distinctly because it often poses a greater danger

to society than a substantive offense committed by a single individual; conspiracy

“involves deliberate plotting to subvert the laws, educating and preparing the con-

spirators for further and habitual criminal practices.”

4

A conspiracy is distinct from the substantive crime contemplated by the conspir-

acy

5

and may be charged regardless of whether the underlying substantive offense

actually occurred.

6

A defendant’s acquittal on a conspiracy charge does not bar

prosecution on the substantive offense.

7

Similarly, an acquittal on the substantive

offense does not necessarily bar conviction on the conspiracy charge.

8

However,

acquittal on the substantive offense may bar re-prosecution on a conspiracy count

under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

9

Under § 371, the overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy need not be a felony,

nor must it be criminally proscribed.

10

While a conspiracy to violate a civil law

must inflict actual damage on the civil plaintiff, no such requirement exists for con-

spiracies to violate criminal laws.

11

Prosecutors bring conspiracy charges in a variety of situations, often due in part

to the charges’ strategic and evidentiary advantages.

12

A conspiracy charge enables

3. Compare § 371, with Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997) (stating no overt act requirement for a

RICO conspiracy in § 1962(d)).

4. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946) (quoting United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88

(1915)); Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961) (“[C]ollective criminal agreement—partnership in

crime—presents a greater potential threat to the public than individual delicts. Concerted action both increases

the likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully attained and decreases the probability that the

individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality.”).

5. See United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 389–90 (1992).

6. Salinas, 522 U.S. at 65 (1997) (noting the “conspiracy is a distinct evil, dangerous to the public, and so

punishable in itself” (quoting Callanan, 364 U.S. at 594)).

7. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 486 F.3d 1212, 1223 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Conspiracy and mail fraud are not

the same offense, and the fact that [the defendant] was acquitted of conspiracy is not inconsistent with his being a

member of a more limited mail fraud scheme.” (quoting United States v. Funt, 896 F.2d 1288, 1294 n.4 (11th Cir.

1990))); see also United States v. Bearden, 265 F.3d 732, 736 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding acquittal on a conspiracy

charge did not bar retrial on the underlying mail fraud offense).

8. See, e.g., United States v. DeKelaita, 875 F.3d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Hernandez, 141

F.3d 1042, 1052 (11th Cir. 1998).

9. Whether prosecution of the conspiracy charges is collaterally estopped may be determined by the scope of

the conspiracy charges. When the substantive charges and the conspiracy charge completely overlap, retrial on

the conspiracy charge is barred following acquittal on the substantive charges. See, e.g., United States v.

Crabtree, 878 F.3d 1274, 1283–84 (11th Cir. 2018). If the conspiracy charges are broader in scope than the

substantive offenses for which the defendant was acquitted, conviction on the conspiracy charges is unlikely to

be barred. See, e.g., United States v. Wittig, 575 F.3d 1085, 1091 (10th Cir. 2009).

10. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 966 F.3d 310, 320 (5th Cir. 2020); United States v. Meredith, 685 F.3d 814,

825 (9th Cir. 2012).

11. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 650–52 (2008).

12. See, e.g., Shirley A. Selz, Conspiracy Law in Theory and Practice: Federal Conspiracy Prosecutions in

Chicago, AM. J. CRIM. L. 5, no. 35 (1977).

808 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:807