FEDERAL CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY

FEDERAL CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 925

II. ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE ............................... 928

A. Agreement ...................................... 928

B. Illegal Goal ..................................... 931

C. Knowledge, Intent, and Participation................... 933

D. Overt Act ....................................... 934

III. DEFENSES ........................................... 935

A. Statute of Limitations .............................. 935

B. Variance or Constructive Amendment .................. 936

C. Multiplicitous and Duplicitous Indictment ............... 939

1. Multiplicitous Indictment ........................ 939

2. Duplicitious Indictment ......................... 940

D. Insuff‌icient Indictment.............................. 941

E. Withdrawal ..................................... 942

F. The Buyer-Seller Exception .......................... 942

G. Failed Aff‌irmative Defenses.......................... 943

IV. CO-CONSPIRATOR HEARSAY RULE ........................... 944

A. Evidentiary Issues................................. 944

B. Sixth Amendment Issues ............................ 947

V. PARTIES AND LIABILITY .................................. 948

A. Vicarious Liability ................................ 948

B. Joinder and Severance ............................. 950

VI. SENTENCING.......................................... 951

I. INTRODUCTION

The general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, permits prosecution of

conspiracy to commit criminal activity underfederal law. Under § 371, it is a crime

for two or more persons to conspire to commit any offense against the United

States or to defraud the United States.

1

Other federal statutes also identify more

1. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2018). The statute states in full:

If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to

defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or

more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be f‌ined under

this title or imprisoned not more than f‌ive years, or both.

If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misde-

meanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment pro-

vided for such misdemeanor.

Id.;see also H.R. REP.NO. 80–304, at 28–29(1947) (discussing the origin of § 371).

925

specif‌ic conspiracy offenses,

2

but this article focuses on general federal conspiracy

under § 371. The general federal conspiracy statute differs from more specif‌ic stat-

utes in that it requires at least one conspirator to commit an overt act in furtherance

of the conspiracy.

3

A conspiracy offense is treated distinctly because it often poses a greater danger

to society than a substantive offense committed by a single individual. The

Supreme Court explained:

For two or more to ...combine together to commit ... a breach of the criminal

laws is an offense of the gravest character, sometimes quite outweighing, in

injury to the public, the mere commission of the contemplated crime. It

involves deliberate plotting to subvert the laws, educating and preparing the

conspirators for further and habitual criminal practices. And it is characterized

by secrecy, rendering it diff‌icult of detection, requiring more time for its dis-

covery, and adding to the importance of punishing it when discovered.

4

A conspiracy is distinct from the substantive crime contemplated by the conspir-

acy

5

and may be charged regardless of whether the underlying substantive offense

actually occurred.

6

A defendant’s acquittal on a conspiracy charge does not bar

prosecution on the substantive offense,

7

and similarly, an acquittal on the

2. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (conspiracy to restrain trade); 18 U.S.C. § 224 (conspiracy to bribe in the context of

sporting events); 18 U.S.C. § 241 (conspiracy to deprive persons of civil rights); 18 U.S.C. § 286 (conspiracy to

defraud federal government through fraudulent claims); 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (conspiracy to violate any provision

of Racketeer Inf‌luenced and Corrupt Organization Act); 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (conspiracy to take harmful acts

against the government); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act Conspiracy); 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k) (conspiracy to commit

witness tampering); 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (conspiracy to commit bank fraud, wire fraud, mail fraud, securities and

commodities fraud, or health care fraud); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (drug traff‌icking conspiracies).

3. Compare § 371, with Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997) (stating that there is no overt act

requirement for a RICO conspiracy in § 1962(d)) and United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1994)

(stating that there is no overt act requirement for conspiracy to violate the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.

§ 846).

4. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946) (quoting United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88

(1915)); see also United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270, 275 (2003) (“The conspiracy poses a ‘threat to

the public’ over and above the threat of the commission of the relevant substantive crime—both because the

‘[c]ombination in crime makes more likely the commission of [other] crimes’ and because it ‘decreases the

probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality.’” (quoting Callanan v. United

States, 364 U.S. 587, 593–94 (1961) (alteration in original))); Neal Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J.

1307, 1315–24 (2003) (analyzing the effect of group mentality on the commission of crimes).

5. See United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 389–90 (1992) (explaining that conspiracy is a partnership in

crime distinct from any substantive offense); see also United States v. Fornia-Castillo, 408 F.3d 52, 69 (1st Cir.

2005) (noting that conspiracy and the substantive offense are charged separately and distinctly for double

jeopardy purposes).

6. Salinas, 522 U.S. at 65 (1997) (“It is elementary that a conspiracy may exist and be punished

whether . . . the substantive crime ensues, for the conspiracy is a distinct evil, dangerous to the public, and so

punishable in itself.” (quoting Callanan, 364 U.S. at 594)).

7. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 486 F.3d 1212, 1223 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Conspiracy and mail fraud are not

the same offense, and the fact that [the defendant] was acquitted of conspiracy is not inconsistent with his being a

member of a more limited mail fraud scheme.” (quoting United States v. Funt, 896 F.2d 1288, 1294 n.4 (11th Cir.

1990))); see also United States v. Bearden, 265 F.3d 732, 736 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that acquittal on a

conspiracy charge did not bar retrial on the underlying mail fraud offense).

926 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:925