FALSE STATEMENTS AND FALSE CLAIMS

FALSE STATEMENTS AND FALSE CLAIMS

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895

II. FALSE STATEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897

A. Elements of a § 1001 Offense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899

1. Statements or Concealments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899

2. Falsity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901

3. Intent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902

4. Materiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904

5. Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904

B. Section 1001 Defenses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907

1. Ambiguity and Literal Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907

2. Double Jeopardy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908

3. Recantation and Other Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910

4. Guidance Against Charging “Exculpatory No” . . . . . . . . . 911

C. Sentencing Under § 1001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912

III. FALSE CLAIMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914

A. Elements of a § 287 Offense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915

1. Presentation of a Claim Against the United States . . . . . . 916

2. False, Fictitious, or Fraudulent Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918

3. Knowledge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919

B. Section 287 Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920

1. Intent-Based Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920

2. Double Jeopardy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921

C. Sentencing Under § 287 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922

I. INTRODUCTION

Sections 1001 and 287 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code criminalize the same basic

conduct: lying to the government. Section 1001 prohibits knowingly and willfully

making a false statement in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive

branch and in certain matters within congressional and judicial jurisdiction.

1

Section 287 proscribes knowingly making a false claim upon or against the United

States, or any of its departments or agencies.

2

The two criminal statutes contain similar elements,

3

which often allows prosecu-

tors to prosecute fraud cases under either statute.

4

For example, Medicare fraud

1. 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

2. Id. § 287.

3. Compare United States v. Whyte, 918 F.3d 339, 350 n.12 (4th Cir. 2019) (“To prove false claims under 18

U.S.C. § 287, the Government must show: (1) the defendant knowingly made or presented a claim to any federal

agency and (2) the defendant knew that such claim was false, f‌ictitious, or fraudulent.”), with United States v.

Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 305 n.13 (2d Cir. 2018) (“To secure a conviction under [18 U.S.C. § 1001], the

895

can be prosecuted under § 1001 or § 287, among other statutes.

5

Moreover,

because the statutes’ language demonstrates that Congress intended to create two

distinct violations, prosecuting a defendant for a single act under both § 1001 and §

287 does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

6

Although prosecutors may use both statutes to charge the same or similar con-

duct, there are signif‌icant differences between the statutes. For example, while

materiality is an element of § 1001,

7

the circuit courts are split on whether it is an

element of § 287.

8

In addition, § 1001 requires the prosecutor to prove that the de-

fendant both knowingly and willfully lied to the government;

9

but, in certain cir-

cuits, § 287 requires only that the defendant acted knowingly.

10

Furthermore,

§ 287’s jurisdictional hook reaches “department[s] or agenc[ies]” of the United

States,

11

whereas § 1001 applies to statements made “in any matter within the juris-

diction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch[es] of the Government of

the United States.”

12

This article describes the contours of the two statutes. Section II of this article

discusses criminal prosecutions brought for false statements under § 1001. Section

III addresses criminal prosecutions brought under § 287.

government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant ‘(1) knowingly and willfully, (2) made a

materially false, f‌ictitious, or fraudulent statement, (3) in relation to a matter within the jurisdiction of a

department or agency of the United States, (4) with knowledge that it was false or f‌ictitious or fraudulent.’”

(quoting United States v. Litvak, 808 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2015))).

4. See W. Bruce Shirk, Bennett D. Greenberg, & William S. Dawson III, Truth or Consequences: Expanding

Civil and Criminal Liability for the Defective Pricing of Government Contracts, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 935, 985–

86 (1988) (suggesting a set of hypothetical facts that could support a conviction under both 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and

18 U.S.C. § 287); see also Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal ‘Code’ Is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes

as Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 653–55 (2006) (stating that because of redundancy in the

federal criminal code, including redundancies in sections pertaining to false statements, prosecutors “have the

ability to pick and choose among a smorgasbord of statutes that might apply to given criminal conduct”).

5. See, e.g., Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. Assocs., Ltd., 277 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2002).

6. See United States v. Allen, 13 F.3d 105, 109 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that punishing a single act via

convictions under both statutes does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V

(“No person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”).

7. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1)–(3); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-680, at 8 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.

A.N. 3935, 3942 (containing statement in § 1001’s legislative history that the “express requirement that all three

offenses [in § 1001] have materiality as an element resolves a conf‌lict among circuits as to whether materiality is

an element of all three offenses”).

8. See United States v. Newell, 658 F.3d 1, 16–17 (1st Cir. 2011) (declining to decide whether the First Circuit

requires “materiality” under § 287 and noting that though the Fourth and Eighth Circuits have “read materiality

into” § 287, the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Second Circuits have declined to do so and the Third Circuit has ruled

that materiality sometimes is an element under § 287); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIM. RES. MANUAL § 922,

https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-922-elements-18-usc-287 (last visited Feb. 10,

2021) [hereinafter CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL] (discussing circuit split).

9. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a).

10. See infra Section III.A.3 (discussing intent); see also CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 8, § 922

(discussing division of circuits on the issue of whether willfulness is an essential element of § 287).

11. 18 U.S.C. § 287.

12. Id. § 1001(a).

896 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:895