Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases: the Need for a New Standard
| Publication year | 2011 |
Fall 2011 #2. Punitive Damages In Products Liability Cases: The Need For A New Standard
VOLUME 26 , NUMBER 4, Fall 2011
Punitive damages arose from the need to provide a remedy for harms not otherwise compen-sable in the judicial system, such as affronts to honor and dignity. One purpose for providing such a remedy was to prevent extra-judicial remedies like dueling.(fn1) The claim evolved to apply to a broad range of cases. Courts and commentators have articulated at least four other purposes for awards of punitive damages: punishing the defendant; deterring the defendant from repeating the same conduct; deterring others from repeating the same conduct; and encouraging lawsuits as a form of private law enforcement.(fn2)
Punishment as a goal of punitive damages is an end in and of itself. Under moral theories like just desert, punishment is justifed as retribution to the extent the act is suffciently blameworthy and the punishment is in proportion to the act.(fn3) Unlike the goal of punishment, the other purposes for punitive damages are means towards a larger public good. For instance, punitive damages promote public safety through deterring manufacturers from selling SUVs with a tendency to roll over.
Historically, punitive damages have focused on punishment for a particular harm to a particular plaintif.(fn4) When courts consider punitive damages in the products liability context, though, they tend to focus on promoting a larger public good by protecting consumers and forcing manufacturers to internalize the social cost of injuries from their products.(fn5) This shift from a focus on punishment to the goal of deterrence is a key reason why punitive damages in products liability claims should be afforded a different standard than that used in other cases. As discussed below, the policies behind products liability law and the nature of the acts that it seeks to regulate also provide the basis for a different standard of proof.
The Law Court adopted heightened standards for the type of reprehensible conduct warranting punitive damages, and for proof of that conduct, in Tuttle v. Raymond.(fn6) In order to imply the requisite standard of malice, conduct must go beyond a "reckless indifference to the rights of others."(fn7) The injured party must prove either express malice, or deliberate conduct so outrageous that malice can be implied, through clear and convincing evidence.(fn8) Citing to a law review article, the Law Court reasoned that it was fair and a more eff-cient deterrent to use this heightened standard to penalize a "more certain and more culpable class of conduct."(fn9)
The article cited explained that moral theories of punishment require that an act must be clearly known as wrongful in order to deserve punish-ment.(fn10) Thus, the need for a heightened standard in order to avoid what the authors saw as inherent uncertainty in terms like 'reckless indifference to the rights of others.' Although the need for certainty and clarity in the standard was based on moral theories of just punishment, the article offered no empirical evidence that a heightened standard proved to be a more effcient deterrent of blameworthy conduct.(fn11) The authors admitted the possibility that a heightened standard could harm the public good by reducing deterrence, and that punitive damages are effective and effcient deterrence in cases where the harm to society is greater than the expected compensator y damages.(fn12)
In adopting these higher standards, the Law Court expressly reserved for another time "many issues concerning the availability of punitive damages," including...
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