Rethinking Canine Sniffs: the Impact of Kyllo v. United States
Publication year | 2002 |
Citation | Vol. 26 No. 01 |
I. Introduction
On October 26, 2001, the United States Congress hastily passed (and President Bush signed) legislation(fn1) that significantly expanded the tools available to law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism and gather intelligence domestically.(fn2) Concern about the impact of this new legislation on civil liberties inspired lawmakers to initiate a "sunset provision" that requires the bill to be reauthorized by 2005 in order for it to remain effective.(fn3) Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt), the Senate negotiator for the bill, reluctantly acquiesced to President Bush's demands for anti-terrorism powers that may infringe on the civil liberties of Americans.(fn4) Despite these reservations, both Congress and the American public appear willing to relinquish some personal privacy in times of war for the greater public interest.
Even when the nation is not at war, law enforcement personnel use surveillance and investigative technologies on a daily basis. The Supreme Court recently determined in a series of contradictory cases whether the use of certain law enforcement investigative devices are "searches" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Two of these technologies are addressed in this Note: the use of heat-imaging technology and the use of drug-sniffing dogs.
In its 2000-01 term, the Supreme Court held in
This Note does not attempt to reconcile these seemingly contradictory conclusions. Instead, the following paragraphs argue that the Court's holding in
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court stated, in dicta, that a canine sniff of an object is not a search.(fn11) This conclusion was based largely on the limited nature of the intrusion of a dog sniff, both because of the manner in which the information is obtained and the type of information that is revealed.(fn12) The argument is that the canine sniff is so unintrusive that it could not infringe on an individual's expectation of privacy and therefore does not trigger the protections of the Fourth Amendment.(fn13)
With most other investigative techniques, the Court has considered four general factors unrelated to the characteristics of the search itself to determine if there is an expectation of privacy.(fn14) Although the thermal imager used in
The argument develops as follows. Part II provides a general background on how the court has determined whether an investigative technique or device is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and the implications for finding that something is a search. This section focuses primarily on
II. When Is a Search Really a Search?
The Fourth Amendment establishes the right of individuals to be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."(fn16) Since its adoption, the question of when a Fourth Amendment search(fn17) has occurred has not been easily answered.(fn18) However, the implications for such a finding are significant.
Characterizing an action as a search is essentially a conclusion about whether the Fourth Amendment even applies.(fn19) Police tactics are not subject to judicial regulation unless deemed a search(fn20) (although techniques deemed not a search could still be regulated statutorily(fn21). Without judicial regulation, the police are free to use such methods at random, with little or no constitutional limit on their discretion.(fn22) Moreover, any evidence gathered in the course of such action would always be admissible in a criminal trial, unless excluded under some theory other than a Fourth Amendment violation.(fn23)
However, if an action is a search then it must satisfy the Fourth Amendment requirements: it must be reasonable; the officer must have probable cause; and the search may only be properly conducted when a warrant is obtained from a neutral magistrate, unless there are exigent circumstances.(fn24) Therefore, calling a police action a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has implications for both the rights of the individual and the permissible actions of law enforcement officers.
Prior to
In
The Court rejected this mechanical application.(fn33) Despite the prior cases equating Fourth Amendment protection to trespass, the Fourth Amendment does not protect anything a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office.(fn34) By the same token, what a person seeks to preserve as private, even in a public area, may be constitutionally protected.(fn35)
According to the
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan articulated the...
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