Fall 2001, pg. 208. Ten Principles For The Middle East.

Maine Bar Journal

2001.

Fall 2001, pg. 208.

Ten Principles For The Middle East

Maine Bar JournalFall 2001Ten Principles For The Middle EastIT HAS BECOME A CLICHE: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, CHANGED EVERYTHING, AND WE CANNOT GO BACK TO THE WAY WE WERE.

THIS IS TRUE, AS FAR AS IT GOES. BUT HOW DO WE GO FORWARD? WHAT FUTURE CAN WE ENVISION THAT WILL GUIDE OUR STRATEGIC CHOICES IN THE FACE OF THE NEW REALTIES CREATED BY THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11?

JONATHAN W. REITMAN

One of those realities seems clear: Dealing effectively with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is an essential part of our moving forward. As the Bush administration seeks to build the international coalition to combat terrorism, it has become clear that Arab states have linked support for the Americans to progress in helping the Palestinians.

The ten principles below are not a peace plan for the Middle East. They lack the level of detail and specificity which such a plan would require. Rather, they are a set of ideas which should be seen as a framework document, a starting point for discussion.

These principles are based on a set of assumptions, which include:

* Israel will continue to exist as a state with a Jewish majority (setting aside the impact of the growth in the birth rate of Israeli-Arab citizens), within internationally recognized and secure borders.* A Palestinian state will be created within internationally recognized and secure borders, within which a Palestinian government will have full sovereignty and authority. These first two assumptions are consistent with the "two-state" policy now favored both by the United States and many in the region.

* As September 11 demonstrated so terribly, a prolonged military conflict or ongoing acts of terrorism threaten the stability of the region and the world. This threat compels the active involvement of the international community in a process toward a peaceful solution.

* Political agreements are necessary, but alone they are insufficient to guarantee long-term stability. They must be supported and strengthened by bilateral and multilateral efforts in a variety of areas-a "multi-track" diplomatic approach.

Ten Principles

1. Change the current stalemate of the political negotiations by changing the negotiating teams.

   The current leadership of both the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority has been demonized by the other and by many governments throughout the region and the world. For whatever reason (they may be unwilling or unable), the leaders have found it difficult to negotiate and implement a workable cease-fire, let alone the confidence-building measures called for in the Mitchell Report, or the final status issues contemplated by Oslo. I cast no blame for this failure on either party, but simply note its reality.

   In any negotiation, when a party's representative consistently proves himself unable or unwilling to deliver on any tentative or interim agreement, his adversary will no longer believe that representative has the ability to do so. The absence of any trust, and mutual hostility, have resulted in the current stalemate, and a notable lack of strategic thinking (on both sides) about how to change the dynamic. The parties are stuck and seem out of ideas.

   The attempts since September 11 to create international coalitions to combat terrorism provide a unique opportunity: Why not use these coalitions to change the tenor and inject fresh energy into the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations? I propose using these coalitions to broaden the negotiating teams beyond the current bilateral Israeli-Palestinian teams which seem so stuck, despite their own best efforts.

   There are Arab states in the region which have reasons of their own to want a more stable Israeli-Palestinian relationship. Egypt and Jordan have diplomatic and economic ties to Israel and, even more important perhaps, have a desire for improved economic relationships with the United States. Saudi Arabia and Turkey have domestic concerns about their own fundamentalist Muslims, who see themselves linked to Palestinians. This gives the United States a unique leverage which it could bring to bear on these more "moderate" Arab states. Given the events of September 11, the United States has a special-and perhaps temporary-influence with these states. We should use that influence to urge them to become full negotiating partners with the Palestinian Authority to help broker political agreements for peace and mutual recognition with Israel.

   It seems clear that the Palestinian Authority will not (or, because of domestic political concerns, may not be able to) respond to either Israel's demands for a "total cease fire" as a pre-condition to negotiations or to calls for moderation by the United States, which it perceives as biased toward Israel and/or disinterested in the entire region. If fellow Arab/Muslim states exert pressure to move away from violence, however, there seems more likelihood of a positive response. Indeed, more radical elements in the Palestinian community seem to recognize that the events of September 11 have changed the international community's...