Williamson v. Gregoire: How Much Is Enough? the Custody Requirement in the Context of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Statutes
| Publication year | 1999 |
| Citation | Vol. 23 No. 01 |
I. Introduction
Elbert Williamson was convicted of first degree child molestation in Spokane County Superior Court in 1990.(fn1) He was sentenced to twenty-seven months of confinement and one year of community placement. In August 1994 Mr. Williamson was discharged after serving the required term of community placement.(fn2) However, this apparent resolution did not end Mr. Williamson's tribulations. Unlike many other convicted criminals, Mr. Williamson's punishment continued even after the completion of his sentence, when he became subject to the registration and notification provisions of Washington's sex offender laws.(fn3)
The sex offender laws in Washington resemble laws recently enacted in many other states. Collectively they are known as "Megan's Laws," and they represent an unparalleled legislative response to an emotionally charged issue: high rates of recidivism among convicted sex offenders.
In Washington, as in other jurisdictions, the legislature has responded to the fears of its electorate over the high recidivism rate of convicted sex offenders by enacting laws that require convicted sex offenders to register with local authorities, thereby making their presence in the community known.(fn4) Under the Washington sex offender statute, local law enforcement officials must forward the registration information to the state's central registry of sex offenders.(fn5) Additionally, if the state's central registry determines that an offender presents a risk to the residents of a community, the law authorizes public agencies to release information to the public about the registered offender.(fn6) While the nature and extent of public disclosure vary based on the offender's risk of reoffense, community notification generally includes, at a minimum, the offender's name, address, and crime for which he or she was convicted.(fn7)
In August 1995, one year after completing his sentence and becoming subject to the registration and notification provisions of Washington's sex offender laws, Mr. Williamson filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, in which he challenged the validity of his conviction.(fn8) According to the federal statute pertaining to habeas corpus, the District Court was required to find that Mr. Williamson was "in custody" before it could assert subject matter jurisdiction.(fn9)
The District Court held that the state registration requirement effectively placed Mr. Williamson "in custody" for purposes of federal habeas corpus relief, but found that he had not properly raised his constitutional claims in the state courts.(fn10) Consequently, the court denied the writ on grounds of procedural default. Mr. Williamson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.(fn11)
In a case of first impression, the Ninth Circuit held that the registration provisions of Washington's sex offender registration law did not place Mr. Williamson "in custody" for purposes of federal habeas corpus, and, therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Mr. Williamson's petition.(fn12) In its opinion, the court reviewed the long line of precedent interpreting the "in custody" provision, and determined that the registration and notification provisions of Washington's law were more accurately described as a collateral consequence of his crime rather than a restraint on his liberty.(fn13) Absent such a restraint on Mr. Williamson's liberty, the court held, he could not be considered "in custody." Accordingly, Mr. Williamson's petition was denied.(fn14)
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit was wrong. The registration and notification provisions operate to constructively restrain the liberty of a convicted sex offender and, therefore, Mr. Williamson is "in custody" for purposes of habeas corpus relief. To support this proposition, this Note will first discuss the federal statute pertaining to habeas corpus and review the case law interpreting the jurisdictional requirement that the petitioner be "in custody"; second, review and discuss Washington State's sex offender registration and notification statutes; and finally, analyze the relevant statute and analogous case law in the context of Washington's sex offender laws in order to demonstrate that Mr. Williamson is "in custody" and is, therefore, entitled to file a petition for habeas corpus relief.
II. The Federal Habeas Corpus Statute - 28 U.S.C. §2241
The writ of habeas corpus(fn15) is a procedural device whereby an individual may seek judicial review of the validity of executive, judicial, or private restraints on personal liberty.(fn16) The writ is not meant to affect the ultimate determination of a person's guilt or innocence. Rather, it is a civil postconviction remedy that allows a federal court to collaterally review the legality of the restraint imposed on a person who has been lawfully convicted.(fn17) If an individual challenges his or her restraint and the court finds the restraint to be illegal, the court may order the immediate release of the challenger.(fn18)
The roots of the modern writ of habeas corpus are found in English statutory and common law.(fn19) It is often referred to as the "Great Writ," and, historically, it has been recognized as'"the greatest of the safeguards of personal liberty . . . ."(fn20) Recognizing the importance of the writ and the extraordinary remedy it provides, the framers of the Constitution provided a federal guarantee for habeas corpus relief: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless, when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it."(fn21)
Additionally, the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus according to the "usages and principles of law."(fn22)
Although the federal writ of habeas corpus was originally based on its common law usage, over the last two hundred years its scope has been expanded and it has developed a uniquely American flavor. This novel American development is primarily due to two important factors: reconstruction and federalism.
Originally, the constitutional guarantee of habeas corpus and the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided habeas corpus relief only to federal prisoners. This limitation, however, changed when, in 1867, Congress expanded the applicability of the writ to state prisoners "in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States."(fn23) The reordering of the relationship between states and the federal government in the wake of the Civil War "established the federal courts' special role in the protection of individual liberty against state power . . ."(fn24) Expansion of the writ's applicability was due, in large part, to the federal government's anticipated difficulty in enforcing new and, in some cases, unpopular substantive individual rights.(fn25) Additionally, lawmakers recognized that the primary focus in state courts is the administration of substantive criminal law, specifically the determination of guilt or innocence. While the state courts are bound to protect a defendant's constitutionally guaranteed rights, "their chief duty is to enforce the law with respect to individuals the police and prosecutors honestly believe to have violated the law."(fn26)
Consistent with this assessment of the role of state courts, Professor Larry W. Yackle, a leading scholar on habeas corpus, contends that the overriding responsibility of state courts to enforce state law "deprives them of the neutrality and dispassion demanded for contemporaneous enforcement of the fourteenth amendment."(fn27) Consequently, the expansion of the writ of habeas corpus provided state prisoners with the opportunity to relitigate their federal claims in the federal court system, so long as certain procedural and jurisdictional requirements were met.
The American system of federalism has also shaped the development of the writ. In the American judicial system, state and federal courts operate in a delicately balanced world of overlapping jurisdiction. With the expansion of the writ in 1867, federal courts were authorized to collaterally review the actions of state courts. In the interests of comity, the federal government, particularly the judiciary, has proceeded carefully, so as to maintain traditional notions of state sovereignty and to preserve the balance between state and federal courts.
Although habeas corpus in the United States was originally fashioned after habeas corpus in England, the expanding protection of individual substantive rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and the unique concerns raised by the American federalist system have combined to transform the writ of habeas corpus over the last century.
The federal statutes governing the writ of habeas corpus are contained in sections 2241-2255 of the United States Code.(fn28) Section 2241 gives the federal courts power to grant a writ of habeas corpus, and section 2254 provides the framework for federal habeas corpus relief in state cases...
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