The Doctrine of Lesser Included Offenses
Publication year | 1992 |
I. Introduction
Courts occasionally fail to appreciate the genius of their own law. The early Washington cases on lesser included offenses, for example, formed a complex and subtle doctrine- the clash and exacting balance of competing interests lying just below the surface of apparently simple standards. Recent cases, however, present a flat and awkward version of the doctrine. They uniformly ignore, misunderstand, and misapply the early law under the influence of a relatively recent formulation of the governing standard(fn1) that is inadequate in almost every respect.
This Article attempts to bring the early cases back to life, to uncover the origins and deeper logic of the doctrine, and to re-introduce the older, elegant solutions to the doctrine's central problems back into current practice. This Article is not, however, a simple restoration project. Rather, with regard to the first part of
These are ambitious goals, but neither the importance nor the complexity of the doctrine of lesser included offenses can be overstated. The doctrine permits either the defense or the prosecution in a criminal case to obtain a jury instruction on an offense not charged in the indictment or information.(fn3) At first glance, the doctrine seems odd. Ordinarily, a defendant is not permitted to choose the offense for which he will be tried.(fn4) Nor is the prosecution ordinarily permitted to obtain a conviction without giving the defendant notice from the outset of the offense he is accused of committing.(fn5)
The mystery largely dissipates, however, when the governing rule is stated. Under the leading case of
It is not surprising, then, that either the defense or the prosecution should be permitted to use the doctrine to obtain an instruction on an offense not charged. The jury may be instructed on a lesser included offense because that accusation is implicit in the offense that has been charged. The defendant necessarily has had notice of, and has defended against, the elements of the lesser offense in the course of the trial of the greater offense. This is true by definition: under
Even from this elementary account of the doctrine, however, one senses its complexity. The doctrine of lesser included offenses, unlike other principles of criminal law, does not simply protect the rights of one or another of the parties. Rather, the doctrine serves both sides, providing each a strategic flexibility-a fall-back position-in the trial of a case, while preserving both prosecutorial discretion and the defendant's right to notice and the opportunity to defend. Properly formulated, the doctrine not only serves the rights and interests of the respective parties, but maintains them in an equitable balance.(fn10)
Furthermore, and largely beyond the concerns of the litigants, the doctrine preserves the rationality of jury verdicts and the integrity of the criminal law. The evidence prong, of course, forecloses jury speculation by barring verdicts that the evidence will not support. But on a deeper level, the doctrine as a whole ensures a close fit between the evidence actually developed at trial and the offense of which the defendant is ultimately convicted, regardless of the offense with which he was originally charged. In a very real sense, the doctrine of lesser included offenses maintains contact between the criminal code and the world in which crimes are committed.(fn11)
The remarkable thing is that none of the doctrine's depth or complexity is apparent in the governing standard. The first prong, especially, is easy to apply. For example, a person is guilty of first degree perjury if, in an official proceeding, while under oath, he makes a materially false statement that he knows to be false.(fn12) A person is guilty of false swearing if, while under oath, he makes a false statement that he knows to be false.(fn13) Because all of the elements of false swearing are three of the five elements of perjury in the first degree, the first prong of
The simplicity of the elements test, however, is oddly deceiving. Once one considers the underlying aims of the doctrine, it seems that something more subtle might be needed. For a time, the Ninth Circuit and other Federal Courts of Appeals certainly thought so. Their opinions derided the elements test as mechanistic, artificial, and altogether inadequate to the task. Those courts, consequently, experimented for a time with an alternative approach, the "inherent relationship" test.(fn14) Section II of this Article will consider that alternative, its flaws, its ultimate rejection by the United States Supreme Court, and the Washington courts' flirtations with it, as a demonstration of the hidden virtues of the modest elements test.(fn15)
Section III of this Article will show how, in spite of its virtues, the elements test can be improved. This proposal involves expanding a little-known variation that was originally formulated as a solution to perhaps the most difficult issue arising under the elements test. The issue is whether, how, and why there can be a lesser included offense to an attempt.(fn16)
Ultimately, however, it is important to probe beneath the surface of
Section IV of this Article considers
It is here that the supreme court's incomprehension of its own rich case law has been most egregious. In at least one passing reference to preclusion, the
The evidence prong, properly understood, has nothing to do with quantities of evidence.(fn25) Each new case elaborating the test for sufficiency simply buries the true meaning of the evidence prong even deeper. Ironically, however, each new corollary to the specious sufficiency standard, once examined, also turns out to be an attempt to capture the special sort of preclusion to which the evidence prong itself originally attended. Because those corollaries are corollaries to a false rule, they are necessarily flawed.(fn26) It makes more sense, obviously, to restore the original meaning of the...
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