Wartime Internment of Japanese-americans: an Examination of Current Reparations Proposals
| Publication year | 1982 |
| Citation | Vol. 6 No. 01 |
During World Weir II the United States government removed 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry(fn1) from the West Coast and interned them in relocation centers hundreds of miles from their homes. The main justification given for this action was the prevention of sabotage and espionage. In retrospect, however, the suspicion of sabotage and espionage by Japanese-Americans was unfounded.(fn2) The suddenness of the evacuation and lack of adequate safeguards resulted in effectively requiring Japanese-Americans to abandon their homes, possessions and jobs. Estimates of their losses in both physical injury and property damage are in the billions of dollars.(fn3)
Because the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the evacuation out of deference to military judgment in times of war, Japanese-American claims based on internment injuries are precluded from judicial remedy.(fn4) The Court has recognized, however, that Congress may remedy judicially noncognizable claims.(fn5) Recognizing its ability to remedy the inequity done to the Japanese-Americans and the need for a remedy, Congress has established a commission to investigate the causes of the internment and extent of the injury suffered, and to recommend an appropriate remedy.(fn6) Various groups have proposed numerous alternative remedies ranging from direct compensation to establishing a corporation to fund projects benefiting the Japanese-American community.
To remedy Japanese-American claims, Congress must acknowledge the extensive injuries that resulted from the government's evacuation and subsequent internment of Japanese-Americans and the inadequacy of its previous remedy. Congress also must exercise its ability to remedy the equitable claims of Japanese-Americans by enacting a remedial plan that provides both direct and indirect compensation for injuries suffered as a result of the evacuation and internment.
This comment will analyze the proposed remedies in light of the injury done by the internment. First, a discussion of the history surrounding the internment will establish the existence of an injury and the extent of the injury suffered by the Japanese-Americans. Second, the previous remedy will be examined. Third, this comment will establish that Congress has the power to satisfy judicially noncognizable claims and that Japanese-American claims justify Congressional action. Fourth, the goals a remedial plan must seek to achieve will be examined. Finally, the individual remedial plans are analyzed in light of those goals, ultimately concluding a plan involving both direct and indirect compensation that most effectively meets those goals.
In 1941, President Roosevelt, realizing war with Japan was imminent, and fearing the potential of internal subversion, ordered a secret investigation to determine the loyalty of Japanese-Americans.(fn7) This investigation culminated in the Munson Report revealing that Japanese-Americans were extraordinarily loyal, that intelligence services had identified what few suspect individuals were present, and concluding there was no "Japanese problem."(fn8) Moreover, with the outbreak of war,(fn9) the FBI immediately rounded up all Japanese-Americans suspected of being enemy aliens.(fn10) Thus, shortly after the outbreak of war the threat to national security identified in the Munson Report had been eliminated.
Immediately after the bombing of Pearl Harbor public opinion was largely sympathetic towards Japanese-Americans.(fn11) In subsequent months public sentiment changed. Statements from both the military and anti-Japanese groups accusing Japanese-Americans of subversion and suggesting their evacuation mobilized public support for an evacuation.(fn12)
Despite the findings of the Munson Report, President Roosevelt responded to public opinion and pressure from the military and set the evacuation machinery in motion. On February 19, 1942, the President signed Executive Order 9066.(fn13) The order authorized the Secretary of War to establish military areas and regulate travel within them.(fn14) To carry out the mandate of Executive Order 9066, the military commander in charge of defending the West Coast, General DeWitt, issued Public Proclamation No. 1 establishing military areas and indicating that "certain persons soon to be designated" would be excluded from those areas.(fn15)
The "certain persons" were designated by Public Proclamation No. 3.(fn16) That proclamation excluded Japanese, Italian, and German aliens, as well as persons of Japanese ancestry, from military areas.(fn17) Moreover, Congress had made it a federal offense to violate any regulation issued pursuant to Executive Order 9066.(fn18) Therefore, the Japanese-Americans effectively were compelled to follow the military regulations or face criminal prosecution.(fn19)
Initially, the military encouraged alien and non-alien Japanese to voluntarily relocate outside Military Area No. 1.(fn20) Persons attempting to resettle, however, met with such hostility they had to return to their homes.(fn21) Responding to the failure of "voluntary" relocation, General DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. 4 terminating that scheme.(fn22) In its place, the military adopted a compulsory relocation plan requiring Japanese-Americans to report to designated relocation centers,(fn23) and prohibiting their leaving established assembly or relocation centers without permission.(fn24)
The military executed the evacuation and relocation within five months.(fn25) Many Japanese-Americans had just one week to evacuate their homes.(fn26) The Army allowed them to bring only minimal belongings, requiring much to be left behind.(fn27)
The Western Defense Command delegated authority to several agencies to protect evacuee property.(fn28) Rather than taking direct responsibility for the property, however, the agencies encouraged evacuees to dispose of their own property.(fn29) Those who attempted to dispose of their property were forced to do so at distress sale prices. Even when the agencies did attempt to take responsibility the result was inadequate,(fn30) causing the Japanese-Americans to lose land because of inability to meet lease and mortgage payments, lose merchandise through post-evacuation looting of their stores, and lose bank accounts to unscrupulous creditors.(fn31)
Under the compulsory relocation plan the Japanese-Americans first reported to assembly centers.(fn32) These were nothing more than hastily converted fairgrounds or racetracks used to temporarily detain them.(fn33) From the assembly centers the military moved the Japanese-Americans to relocation centers (fn34) where they remained until their release in the latter part of 1945.(fn35) The relocation centers were hastily constructed bar-racks,(fn36) guarded at all times, surrounded by barbed wire and watch towers; they resembled prisons. (fn37)
The inadequate facilities and substandard conditions resulted in physical and psychological injuries to many of the internees.(fn38) Moreover, the communal nature of life at the relocation centers destroyed family solidarity and the moral underpinnings of the Japanese culture.(fn39) Internment humiliated the Japanese-Americans; they lost pride in both themselves and their country.(fn40)
Release from the centers did not end the problems of Japanese-Americans. Hometown citizens discouraged them from returning to, or remaining in, their homes.(fn41) These communities instituted economic boycotts to drive the Japanese-Americans out of business.(fn42) Most Japanese-Americans had to start their lives over; the evacuation and internment caused the loss or destruction of their land and assets.(fn43)
Regardless of the losses suffered in the evacuation, Japanese-Americans presently have no judicially recognizable legal claim against the United States.(fn44) The United States Supreme Court has held, however, that Congress may legislate concerning any claim arising from an equitable obligation not recognizable in a court of law.(fn45) Such claims or obligations are not limited to those of a legal character but may be grounded in general principles of right and justice.(fn46) Moreover, in remedying equitable obligations Congress is not bound by traditional legal standards. Nonetheless, Congress has implicitly adopted standards to assure that only meritorious claims are satisfied. Though such standards are traditionally applied to private bills, they are equally applicable to remedial legislation addressed to Japanese-Americans as well. Both private claims and Japanese-American claims involve claimants injured by government action who have no recognizable legal claim.(fn47)
The standards Congress uses to evaluate private claims consist of three elements.(fn48) First, the government must be responsible for the private loss, as shown by the government's control over or connection to the instrumentality that caused the loss. Second, the party asserting the claim must have exhausted all available remedies. Finally, the claimant must be free from fault.(fn49)
Under these standards, Japanese-American claims based on internment injury warrant Congressional action.(fn50) The executive branch of government, through both the President and the military, was responsible for...
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