UNIVERSITY OF PUGET SOUND LAW REVIEWVolume 3, No.1FALL 1979
CASE COMMENTS
Demise Of The Pygmy: Seattle School District No. 1 u. State
Warren C. Thompson III
In Northshore School District No. 417 v. Kinnear,(fn1) the Washington Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Washington system of funding grade school education through state funds and local property tax levies, ruling the state had satisfied its explicit obligation under the Washington Constitution to "make ample provision for the education of all [resident] children."(fn2) Subsequently, a partially reconstituted court, in Seattle School District No. 1 v. State,(fn3) overruled the Northshore decision, holding the system's reliance on special levies to meet expenditures for "basic education"(fn4) is an unconstitutional and insufficient means of meeting the state's duty. Justice Stafford, dissenting in Northshore, termed the majority opinion in that case "a legal pygmy of doubtful origin"(fn5) and predicted a short life for the court's "comfortable 'solution."(fn6) Justice Stafford's recent majority opinion in the Seattle School District case amply fulfilled his prophecy. Although the Seattle School District court ultimately reached the proper result, it unfortunately used a questionable mode of constitutional analysis(fn7) and exceeded unnecessarily the bounds of its judicial function.(fn8)
The Northshore Decision
In Northshore, the Washington Supreme Court faced primarily two alternative issues: whether the Washington Constitution protects a fundamental interest in education that, under equal protection analysis, would invoke strict judicial scrutiny,(fn9) or whether the state constitution provides an independent basis for challenging the state's school financing system.(fn10) Petitioners in Northshore presented four issues for resolution based on state constitutional provisions: (1) whether, under article I, section 12, the state's financing system denied children equal educational opportunity;(fn11) (2) whether, under article I, section 12, the state's financing system denied taxpayers protection from unequal tax burdens; (3) whether, under article IX, section 1, the state had failed to meet its "paramount duty" to "make ample provision for the education of all [resident] children;"(fn12) and (4) whether, under article IX, section 2, the state had failed to provide a "general and uniform" system for distributing educational resources.(fn13)
The court's decision was highly fragmented, encompassing five separate opinions.(fn14) Chief Justice Hale's majority opinion held that the United States Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez(fn15) controlled the equal education and equal tax burden issues, because the t equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and the privileges and immunities clause of article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution must be interpreted identically.(fn16) He dismissed the "ample provision for . . . education" issue for lack of proof,(fn17) and concluded the school system was "general and uniform" to the minimum degree necessary to enable students to transfer between districts without loss of credit.(fn18) Unfortunately, the Chief Justice ignored critical distinctions between Rodriguez and Northshore and misconstrued petitioner's argument concerning ample provision for education.
As in Northshore, the school financing system in Rodriguez produced marked interdistrict funding disparities due to substantial reliance on local property tax levies. Plaintiffs in Rodriguez argued this system unconstitutionally discriminated against poor people residing in school districts having a low property tax base,(fn19) and impermissibly interfered with the exercise of a fundamental right.(fn20) Applying fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis, the district court found in plaintiff's favor, holding wealth a "suspect" classification and education a fundamental right.(fn21) Under either condition the school financing system could be upheld only on a showing of a compelling state interest, a burden the state was unable to meet.(fn22) The Supreme Court reversed, holding first, that wealth itself did not constitute a suspect class requiring strict scrutiny;(fn23) second, that because the Texas school financing system did not create any other class possessing the traditional indicia of suspectness,(fn24) no other suspect class could exist; and third, that the system did not abridge a fundamental interest explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution.(fn25) After finding neither of the conditions requiring strict judicial scrutiny, the Court applied a rational relationship test and concluded such a relationship existed between the state's legitimate interest in preserving local control and the financing system employed.(fn26) In Northshore, however, Chief Justice Hale failed to recognize a crucial distinction between the Rodriguez and Northshore situations. The Washington Constitution, unlike the Federal Constitution, explicitly provides for education.(fn27) Additionally, the Rodriguez Court stated that had education been found to constitute a constitutionally protected interest to which the strict scrutiny standard applied, the Texas levy system would not have passed muster.(fn28) Because the Washington Constitution explicitly provides for education as a protected interest, ample justification existed in Northshore to distinguish Rodriguez and enter a contrary result.(fn29)
In addition, Chief Justice Hale and the entire Northshore court chose to consider the "ample provision" question in a substantive sense-whether the funding provided was "ample" to meet the educational requirements of the state's school children. Petitioners had attempted to avoid substantively defining "ample provision" for reasons of unmanageability and nonjusti-ciability.(fn30) Instead, petitioners asserted that where the state contribution to funding is so meager that special levies are required, the state has effectively delegated the decision as to what constitutes "ample provision" to the local districts.(fn31) As a procedural matter, they argued, this delegation is impermissible where local districts provide vastly disparate educational services.(fn32) Rather than identifying a particular level of constitutionally required funding, petitioners asked the court to find that, whatever the level of education the state chooses to provide, all districts must afford children equal opportunity to reach that level.(fn33) Because petitioners had not introduced conclusive evidence on the substantive issue, the court found they had failed to prove their case.(fn34) Justice Stafford's prophetic dissent set the stage for the litigation that followed on precisely that issue.
Seattle School District No. 1: Northshore Falls
Exactly one year after the Northshore decision, Seattle School District No. 1, certain named King County taxpayers, and children enrolled in the district schools brought petitions for mandamus, prohibition, and declaratory judgment in the Washington Supreme Court. Petitioners claimed the state had failed to discharge its "paramount duty" to make "ample provision for the education" of its resident children pursuant to article IX, section 1 and to "provide for a general and uniform system of public schools" pursuant to article IX, section 2.(fn35) After a hearing, the supreme court referred the matter to the Thurston County Superior Court for an expedited resolution of all issues of fact and law, subject to direct appeal to the supreme court.(fn36)
Following trial, the superior court entered its judgment, declaring: (1) the Seattle School District's children have a constitutional right to an adequately funded educational program; (2) the legislature is required to fund, or provide dependable and regular tax sources for funding, a basic(fn37) program of education; (3) the state's reliance, in whole or in part, on a funding system that incorporates special levies to fund "basic education" is unconstitutional; and (4) special levies may be used to fund only "enrichment programs.(fn38) Appellants(fn39) assigned error to numerous factual and legal conclusions and appealed the judgment.(fn40) The supreme court affirmed.
After resolving several threshold issues,(fn41) Justice Stafford's majority opinion undertook a comprehensive examination of article IX, section 1. From this examination he concluded that article IX, section 1 creates a judicially enforceable duty on the state to fund education at a minimum level. He then outlined the nature and scope of that duty and established the legislative responses necessary for its discharge.
In concluding that article IX, section 1(fn42) creates a judicially enforceable duty, the majority opinion rejected the argument that section 1 is merely a preamble, or policy declaration, without enforceable substantive effect and rejected appellants' argument concerning the placement and publisher's titling of section 1.(fn43) Attributing particular significance to the framers' choice of the words "paramount duty,"(fn44) the court concluded that, rather than "explaining goals, or designating objectives to be accomplished," section 1 "is declarative of a constitutionally imposed duty" having substantive implications beyond the mere establishment of a "general and uniform system of public...
